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Current History

MARCH, 1986

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Recent political changes and economic development are two of the topics discussed in this issue on the countries of South Asia. The war in Afghanistan, however, continues to dominate the region. Our lead article points out that for the United States and the Soviet Union in South Asia, "the key issue in the mid-1980's is the civil war in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the settlement of this conflict through the United Nations is highly unlikely. . . . Some forms of indirect or direct United States-Soviet negotiations on this issue are necessary."

United States and Soviet Policy toward South Asia

BY LEO E. ROSE

Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

ACCORDING to a superficial analysis of regional power-superpower relationships in South Asia, there is a United States-Chinese-Pakistani "axis" that confronts a Soviet-Indian-Afghan "alliance." But even if one accepts this greatly oversimplified version of political reality, it is evident that both the United States and the Soviet Union have had enormous difficulties in their relations with regional powers in their respective strategic camps.

Afghanistan, the crucial factor in American decision making on South Asia since early 1980, has set the framework within which United States relations with India and Pakistan have been defined and has exerted a strong influence on superpower interaction in South and Southwest Asia. Washington's policy toward Afghanistan does not appear to be consistent with broader United States regional policy objectives. While the stream of sanctimonious rhetoric from United States administration sources on Afghanistan is impressive, American policy has been timid and has evaded any sense of responsibility to the Afghan National Liberation Movement. There was some improvement in aligning performance with propaganda in 1985, but serious divergencies remain.

Perhaps what United States policy on Afghanistan is *not* should be noted, since many Western and South Asian commentators reach unsupported conclusions. What might be termed the "Vietnam syndrome" position argues that Washington perceives Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's "Vietnam" and that, therefore, it is in the United States interest to keep the war "hot." There may be American officials who express this opinion, but key people in the decision-making process hold different

views. These analysts tend to believe the opposite: first, that the Soviet Union has paid a comparatively low price internationally and domestically for its Afghanistan venture; and second, that the Soviet Union will eventually establish a reasonably firm control over Afghanistan through "Sovietization" and depopulation policies. This would constitute a serious problem for the security interests of the United States and its friends in the region and would make any minor advantages the United States may derive from current developments in Afghanistan meaningless.

Two corollary assumptions are frequently derived from the supposed American insistence that the Soviets must continue to "bleed" in Afghanistan. First, it is claimed that the United States is blocking a political solution in Afghanistan through United Nations negotiations by pressuring Pakistan to reject the proposed terms. It is also charged that the Afghan resistance (*mujahideen*) is a creation of the United States and would not continue the struggle against the Soviet Union were it not for American encouragement and instigation.

Neither of these assessments of United States policy has much factual basis. The United States believes that its security interests in southern Asia are seriously threatened by the institutionalization of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and Washington has been prepared to accept any political solution in Afghanistan that would include the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As for the Afghan resistance being a tool of the United States, the *mujahideen* movement was founded, survived and even thrived for about five years with very little external assistance from the United States or anyone else. It is now the

recipient of more assistance from various sources. But to suggest that the United States is the determining factor in the continuing resistance is a basic misunderstanding. Although the mujahideen would appreciate more United States assistance, they will continue the struggle against Soviet imperialism regardless of Washington.¹

The critical questions for the United States concern the quantity and quality of assistance to the mujahideen. There has been food and medical assistance to Afghan refugee centers in Pakistan, some of which has been redirected to the resistance, but there has been only very limited and indirect arms assistance. Some American officials argue that if the United States escalated its arms aid to the resistance, the Soviets would escalate their military involvement. A policy of mutual restraint by both Washington and Moscow would keep the conflict in Afghanistan a "limited war."

In 1984, however, the Soviets escalated the conflict and thus raised a question within official American circles—namely, should the United States initiate a program of direct arms assistance to the mujahideen? As usual, the officials responsible for Afghanistan in the State Department hierarchy preferred continuity to change, opposing even the direct provision of food and medical assistance to the mujahideen in Afghanistan (such action was approved in refugee camps in Pakistan), not to mention arms. Reportedly at higher levels in the State Department the decision went against the hierarchy. But there is still little evidence of this change in the fighting in Afghanistan, where the mujahideen are still poorly armed, lacking even the simple missile weapons that can be used effectively against Soviet helicopter gunships.

The United States has considered several other policy options. The economic and cultural blockade against the Soviet Union imposed by President Jimmy Carter has been abandoned by President Ronald Reagan as more costly for the United States than for the Soviet Union. A suggestion has been made to provide the mujahideen with some form of international recognition, perhaps on the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) model, while at the same time taking preliminary steps toward the derecognition of the Babrak Karmal regime. But perhaps the most important step the United States could take, preferably with the cooperation of the Saudis and the Chinese, would be to encourage the various factions within the mujahideen to establish an effective coalition through assistance programs that are specifically defined as "nondiscriminatory"—i.e., available to all factions. Cooperation among the resistance factions improved substantially in 1985, although a coalition government-in-exile will probably not emerge soon.

¹Elie D. Krakowski, "Afghanistan: The Forgotten War," *Strategic Studies* (Islamabad), vol. 7 (Spring, 1985), pp. 33–46.

²For a centrist espousal of accommodation with the Soviet Union, see Sajjad Hyder, "Settling the Afghan War: A Pakistani Perspective" (Paper presented at a conference on Afghanistan at the University of South Carolina, February 1–2, 1985).

THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN

In the 1980's, American policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan have become so closely intermeshed in such complicated ways that it is difficult to analyze them separately. Many Pakistanis would rather see United States policy determined primarily on the basis of Pakistani considerations. They are concerned that the United States has become involved in a minimal support program to the mujahideen and in limited security commitments to Pakistan as part of a transitory phase in global United States–Soviet politics and in order to protect superpower access to Middle East oil rather than from any identification of Pakistan as a critical area in United States security interests. At some point, these Pakistanis fear, the United States and the Soviet Union will reach an accommodation on Afghanistan that is mutually convenient to the superpowers but ignores the vital interests of the Pakistanis, the Afghans, the Iranians and even the Indians.

Thus Pakistanis and other South Asians assess United States policy as follows: 1) Americans see South Asia as peripheral to those areas in Asia where important things are happening; 2) United States policy in South Asia is determined by developments in adjacent areas of Asia; and 3) American commitments to South Asia will not survive the events and developments outside South Asia that motivated them. The obvious conclusion is that the United States is an uncertain factor in South Asian international politics. In this view, the Americans can be exploited under some circumstances for a limited period, however, no South Asian state should become dependent on a security relationship with the United States because of the alleged unreliability of the United States during crisis periods.

For these reasons, some conservative Pakistanis—as well as the usual affluent urban "leftist" menagerie—advocate an accommodation with the Soviet Union rather than a security relationship with the United States even if the Afghan people have to pay the price.² The Pakistani government has rejected this advice, at first somewhat hesitantly, more recently, firmly and explicitly. A reluctance to betray their Muslim brethren in Afghanistan is one factor in Islamabad's decision. But the Pakistani government also realizes that any serious accommodation with the Soviet Union would complicate relations not only with the United States but also with other Islamic states and with China.

As a consequence of its decision to accept some form of security relationship with the United States and to support the mujahideen, Pakistan is a "front-line" state facing contentious neighbors on its eastern and northwestern borders. The United States must be sensitive to Pakistan's vulnerability to both overt and covert Soviet intervention and, under certain circumstances, to Indian intervention. Thus, the United States has sought to define its policy toward Pakistan in terms that advance both the American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan—i.e.

to drive Soviet troops out and let Afghan refugees return. It has tried at the same time to enhance Pakistan's sense of security on its increasingly troubled western border with Afghanistan without stimulating Indo-Pakistani tensions.

One of the more important questions focuses on aid to the Afghans. Pakistan has insisted that it should have a voice in the distribution of any aid that is channeled through Pakistani territory. This seemed a reasonable request to the United States government, but there have been complaints from both Afghans and outside aid organizations that a substantial proportion of the assistance has never been received by the Afghans and that Pakistan has discriminated against certain mujahideen factions in distributing the aid. According to reports, however, Pakistan's performance on both counts has improved during the past year.

A second important issue in United States-Pakistani relations since 1980 focuses on the terms of the security relationship between the two powers.³ The United States reviewed and renewed its security commitments to Pakistan under the 1959 Ankara Agreement, but this has made little impression on the Pakistani government or public, because they believe that in 1965 and in 1971 the United States did not uphold its obligations under the agreement. Nor is Pakistan interested in playing a role in an American-defined Southwest Asian security system. Pakistan has already assumed some security responsibilities in several states in this region through its military training teams and support forces, but these were arranged through bilateral agreements in which the United States played no role.

Thus, anything remotely resembling an old-fashioned military alliance is not acceptable to Pakistan and has not been sought by the United States. There have been no agreements for the use of Pakistani bases or facilities by American military units except on a strictly ad hoc basis, the norm in relations between friendly powers. There is no agreement under which Pakistani forces would be used beyond their own border as part of an American-defined regional security system; indeed, all the United States expects from the Pakistani military is an enhanced Pakistani capacity to protect Pakistan's territory under stressful conditions. There are reports in the Western and Indian press that the United States wants Pakistan to replace Iran as the dominant regional military power in Southwest Asia; but such reports show a vivid imagination—as well as a basic misunderstanding of United States-Iranian relations in the 1970's.

Most public attention in the security relationship, however, has been directed at the controversial United States-Pakistani military sales agreement signed in mid-1981. The Soviet Union (which sold more than twice as many weapons to India as the United States sold to

Pakistan in the 1982-1985 period) speaks hypocritically of the United States contribution to the "arms race" in South Asia. India, which has purchased more than three times as much highly sophisticated equipment abroad (much of it on contracts signed before 1981) and has produced substantially more itself, accuses the United States of providing Pakistan with the capacity to launch an aggressive war against India.

Although Pakistan is extremely unlikely to challenge India again militarily, the United States must consider Indian sensitivity in formulating its military sales program to Pakistan. Thus the United States has tried to stress weapons systems generally classified as defensive rather than offensive, although in some cases the distinction is elusive. The major exceptions have been the 40 F-16 fighters and the Harpoon missiles, which are excellent offensive and defensive weapons. Given the great imbalance in Pakistan's military capabilities compared with the Soviet Union and India, the F-16 and the Harpoon missile are seen as primarily defensive in Pakistan's military strategy in the mid-1980's.

India, of course, is very concerned about any enhancement of Pakistan's defensive capabilities, because these then become a factor in the political bargaining process under way in South Asia. But in public statements New Delhi inevitably talks about the F-16's offensive capacity and the threat it poses to the much larger Indian air force, which has to make do with Mirage-2000's and MiG-27's (with the MiG-29 on the way).

A NEW AGREEMENT

At the end of 1985, probably the most important question in United States-Pakistani relations concerned the ongoing discussion of a new five year economic and military aid program. It has been agreed in principle that there should be a new multiyear program when the 1981 agreement ends in 1987, but the long and complex process of working out the details is just getting under way. Some members of the United States Congress still oppose a Pakistani aid program; but they appear to have limited influence in the context of a substantial, if still partial, liberalization of the Pakistani political system and President Zia ul-Haq's December, 1985, offer to India on nuclear weapons. Americans are also concerned about India's response to a new multiyear United States-Pakistani aid program, a response that is bound to be loudly negative.

But the greater need, given the potentially dangerous developments in Afghanistan, is to reassure Pakistan about the reliability and durability of its American connection. To substitute annual economic and military aid programs for a multiyear program in these circumstances might well send all the wrong signals to the Pakistanis.

The nuclear issue continues to receive considerable attention in the United States, though some of the more simplistic scare scenarios about an "Islamic bomb" appear less frequently these days. The Pakistanis state

³Noor A. Husain, "Pakistan-U.S. Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, Nuclear Issues," *Strategic Studies*, vol. 7 (Spring, 1985), pp. 17-32.

their position on this issue with reasonable clarity.⁴ They intend to continue to develop their nuclear facilities although they do not intend to produce nuclear weapons. But given their extreme vulnerability to external aggression and their lack of any strong external support, they consider it necessary to hold a nuclear card if no other deterrent is available. There are differences of opinion within the United States government on this issue. The prevailing view seems to be that Pakistan will exercise restraint in the production of a nuclear weapon as long as other security options are available, but that if United States aid were cut off or drastically reduced to meet Indian or United States criticism, Islamabad might be pressured into a decision to make the bomb.⁵

The views and policies of the government of India on southern Asia and the Indian Ocean are critical in Pakistan's decision-making process and are very important to the United States and to the Soviet Union. There is a broad consensus within Pakistan that the country cannot afford a confrontational relationship on both its eastern and its northwestern borders over an indefinite period, but must try to achieve some form of accommodation with either or both the Indians and the Soviets—whatever security relationships are established with the United States, China and the Islamic states. A variant on this is the United States position (endorsed by China) that Pakistan's security is best achieved through a friendly and cooperative relationship with India; this view is shared by many of Pakistan's political elite as an alternative to accommodation with the Soviet Union.

American policy in South Asia must consider that an agreement between India and Pakistan on regional security issues is unlikely because of important differences on several key issues, even though India and Pakistan may eventually sign an innocuous treaty of peace and friendship as a first step toward a closer relationship. Pakistan will continue to insist on its sovereign right to obtain

military assistance from any source, including the United States, while India will continue to denounce any South Asian security ties (except its own) with countries beyond the subcontinent. If a friendly relationship with India depends on Pakistan's acceptance of a subordinate status in an Indian-dominated South Asian security system, then Islamabad would prefer to let differences continue.

UNITED STATES-INDIAN RELATIONS

Broad disagreements between the United States and India on security issues continue. While the two powers may share an interest in the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, they disagree on how this could be best accomplished or how to contend with an Afghanistan under effective Soviet control. Thus, the United States does not accept the argument occasionally voiced by Indian officials that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan does not constitute a threat to Pakistan and that the United States military sales program to Pakistan is unnecessary. Here, the choice focuses on the differing Indian and American perceptions of security issues in an area of the world that is important to both.⁶

For the time being, therefore, significant improvement in United States-Indian relations will have to be made on other than security issues. Speculation that Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi might be interested in eliminating the pro-Soviet tilt in Indian foreign policy has been based in large part on wishful thinking. As a pragmatic leader, Gandhi is unlikely to make such a move until he is sure of the consequences. Thus the United States has decided to downplay security issues which might complicate decision making for Washington on a wide range of issues, and to emphasize technological and economic criteria. A Memorandum of Understanding on Technology Transfer was signed in the summer of 1985, and the United States has also been as liberal as the legislation permits in the sale of sophisticated military systems to India.

The objective in these instances—other than to allow United States industries to profit—is to emphasize the development of United States-Indian relations in areas in which the United States has a substantial advantage in areas where the Soviets are, in a real sense, noncompetitive, and in areas that are important to India's economic development. There will probably be a major expansion of United States-Indian relations over the next decade that will enhance the importance of the relationship to both countries and, in the process, will bring India's tie to the superpowers more into balance without any major policy changes by either New Delhi or Washington.⁷

(Continued on page 132)

⁴For a Pakistani analysis of the nuclear issue, see Rasul B. Rais, "Pakistan's Nuclear Programs: Prospects for Proliferation," *Asian Survey*, vol. 24, no. 4 (April, 1985), pp. 458-472.

⁵A variety of Pakistani and American views on major issues are presented in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain, eds., *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985).

⁶Selig S. Harrison has argued that in providing Pakistan with F-16's, the United States has "outraged" India by its interference "in the evolution of a natural balance of power in South Asia, forcing New Delhi to pay an unacceptably high price in order to enforce its military superiority." "The United States and South Asia" (Paper presented at the National Defense University conference on Defense Planning for the 1990's and the Changing International Environment, Washington, D.C., October 7-8, 1983). Apparently, Soviet arms sales to India do not interfere with the "natural balance of power in South Asia" in this line of analysis.

⁷For a balanced collection of Indian views on Indo-United States relations, see the interesting collection of articles in *Man and Development* (Chandigarh), vol. 7, no. 3 (September, 1985), in particular the contributions by B. K. Nehru, L. K. Jha and K. P. Misra.

Leo E. Rose is the editor of *Asian Survey* and a specialist on United States and Soviet policy in South Asia. He is the coauthor of *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies 1985).

"In his first year in office, . . . Rajiv Gandhi has shown that he at least half recognizes that a single individual's domination of a political system is a problem rather than a reliable mode of governing. He has hesitantly begun to rebuild some of the institutions that suffered such erosion under his mother's rule."

India: Awakening and Decay

By JAMES MANOR

Visiting Professor of Government, Harvard University

INDIA'S democracy has never shown greater promise than it does at present, and it has never faced greater risks. These realities are the products of the two great themes that have dominated India's political history since the late 1960's: awakening and decay. Together these themes provide the context for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's still rather tentative efforts to rebuild institutions and a network of political accommodations in order to secure his own and the political system's future.

The awakening has occurred in the electorate, as ordinary voters have developed an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the workings and implications of elections and the system of representation. Members of prosperous and of poorer groups have become more aware of their rights under law, of the secrecy of their ballots, of their collective strength at the polls, and of the notion that politicians and parties should respond in some way to their needs in exchange for their votes. As a result, voters from disadvantaged castes, who once followed instructions on election day from the landowning groups that still dominate village life, now tend to arrive at independent decisions. Both their expectations and their assertiveness have grown. This makes India's political system far more democratic than it was in the 1950's, but it has also made India a more difficult state to govern.

The awakening and maturing of the electorate put pressure on political institutions to operate with greater strength and subtlety, but in reality the opposite has occurred. The period since the 1960's has been marked by the ossification and breakdown of institutions and by political decay—the second great theme in India's recent political history. That term implies a decline in the capacity of the political institutions to respond rationally to pressures from society.¹ In part, this has been the result of a natural process; all human institutions tend to drift and grow rusty over time. But the decay was greatly accelerated by the efforts of Indira Gandhi during her years as Prime Minister (1966–1977 and 1980–1984) to deinstitutionalize, to erode the autonomy and substance of institu-

tions in the interests first of highly centralized government, then of personal and ultimately (by the early 1980's) of dynastic rule.²

This damaged both the formal institutions of state—the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the legislatures, the high offices—and the informal institutions, most especially the Congress party. The damage to the Congress party is crucial, because in the first two decades after independence in 1947, the party—operating as something of a political machine—was India's most important political institution. (This may sound strange to readers in the West, but in the less developed countries, political parties are more often than not the most important political institutions.) In those early decades, the Congress party occupied not only the broad center, but most of the left and the right in India's political system. It therefore enjoyed a dominant position in the Indian Parliament and in the legislatures of nearly all the states in India's federal system. The important conflicts in politics occurred not between the Congress party and the opposition but within the Congress party. The party played a decisive role in knitting together the many heterogeneous regions of India and the various levels of the political system. It was also the main force linking state structures to India's complex society. So the decay of the ruling party is a matter of grave concern.

The simultaneous occurrence of this awakening and this decay has opened up a much wider range of possibilities in Indian politics than existed before the death in 1964 of the first Prime Minister (Indira Gandhi's father), Jawaharlal Nehru. Some of these are creative, but many raise serious doubts about the viability of the existing political order. In particular, so many previously dormant social groups have entered the political process that the task of governing has become far more demanding just when institutions are becoming less and less capable of an adequate response.

India's new Prime Minister appears to be aware of at least some of India's political problems. Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother on October 31, 1984, after she had been assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards. Rajiv was her elder and only surviving son, an airline pilot who was drawn into politics against his will in June, 1980, when his younger, far more ambitious and abrasive brother Sanjay died in an air crash. A man of his inexperi-

¹Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

²See for example Stanley A. Kochanek, "Mrs. Gandhi's Pyramid," in Henry C. Hart, ed., *Indira Gandhi's India* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976); and James Manor, "Party Decay and Political Crisis in India," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer, 1981).

ence might not appear qualified for such a high office, but Indira Gandhi had thoroughly eliminated other strong figures in the party lest they rival her and her son, so there was no realistic alternative. In his first year in office, however, Rajiv Gandhi has shown that he recognizes that a single individual's domination of a political system is a problem rather than a reliable mode of governing. He has hesitantly begun to rebuild some of the political institutions that suffered such erosion under Indira Gandhi's rule.

He is driven to do so by two types of instability that now confront India—one patent, the other potential. First, the nation faces a rising tide of social conflict that is proving extremely difficult to manage and—thus far at least—impossible to reverse. By the Indian government's own reckoning, the country faced one significant riot a day in 1980 and, with some variation, the incidence of such disorders has risen gradually ever since. If this trend were to continue, it could before long cast serious doubt on the survival of India's open, liberal political system. To make matters worse, India's police forces have been so demoralized as a result of corruption and partisan political interference that they are routinely unable to cope with these disorders.

When the police fail, the authorities are forced to turn to the army, the last resort, at an unsettlingly early stage in the proceedings. In 1982, the army was called out to aid the civil authority on 89 occasions. That figure would have staggered lawmen in Nehru's more peaceful era. Only two years later, in 1984, the number had nearly doubled, to 156.³ We do not yet have the figures for 1985, but it was a turbulent year and one particular episode proved deeply disquieting.

In the second quarter of 1985, the western state of Gujarat suffered the most alarmingly sustained bout of rioting (as opposed to the sort of terrorism Punjab suffered in 1983–1984) since Indian independence. A dispute between disadvantaged and middle class groups over the Congress party's extravagant election promises to the disadvantaged led to demonstrations, which soon degenerated into calculated attacks and counterattacks in several urban centers. The police stood by or, as is increasingly their habit these days, supported the middle classes. In the ensuing chaos, there were clashes between Hindus and Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, tribal groups and Hindus, different caste groups and sectarian groups within the Hindu community, Shia and Sunni Muslims, and, ultimately, between rival gangs of bootleggers and criminals. For several weeks, much of Gujarat experienced something akin to the Hobbesian state of nature, a

war of all against all. Eventually, political leaders called in the army, but to their astonishment even soldiers could not put an end to the turmoil. If this sort of episode were to recur, it could seriously undermine Indian confidence in the democratic political order and could inspire would-be autocrats to try to close the system down in the interests of public order.

India is also inordinately overdependent on the actions and survival of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, largely because Indira Gandhi radically overcentralized political power. In pursuit of personal dominance, she seriously weakened both the formal institutions of state and her own party, which she viewed as a threat rather than an instrument of government or a source of support.

Rajiv Gandhi appears to understand that the present situation is unhealthy, and he has begun to reconstruct at least some political institutions. It is a matter of urgency that he succeed, because his life is, regrettably, under grave threat from Sikh assassins. Should he be killed, it would constitute a far more serious blow to the stability of India and the survival of democratic politics than did the murder of his mother, because no successor is available to sustain this highly personalized political system.

REBUILDING INSTITUTIONS

Since his landslide election victory in December, 1984, the Prime Minister has begun to rebuild formal political institutions.⁴ Gandhi's law minister, for example, announced soon after taking office that judges who produced rulings unfavorable to the ruling party would no longer suffer punitive transfers to undesirable bailiwicks. He made this announcement partly to reestablish some autonomy for the Indian judiciary and partly to make it possible once again to attract people of talent and probity to the bench.

Rajiv Gandhi has also given several of his key aides official positions, so that they are formally answerable to Parliament. This represents a dramatic change from Indira's tendency to protect members of her inner circle by wrapping them in an Indian version of executive privilege. The new Prime Minister has also selected competent professional managers as his aides, in contrast to the fiercely loyal but often poorly qualified individuals—including, on occasion, chauffeurs and stenographers—who advised Indira on matters of state.

This reflects Rajiv's determination to reintroduce "accountability"—perhaps his favorite word—into the government process. He is also working to decentralize power. The Prime Minister's Secretariat—India's equivalent of the American White House staff—will limit itself to articulating broad policy objectives. It will no longer intrude into the policymaking of the vast array of central government ministries. Nor will it interfere in matters of minor detail. By the time he became Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi had come to realize that the old system had generated widespread immobilism, and that the blame for this was liable to fall upon the figure at the apex of the

³I am grateful to Kuldip Nayar and Suman Dube for this information and for comments on their sources.

⁴This and many similar comments are based on interviews with politicians and political analysts in India between December, 1984, and February, 1985, supplemented by a reading of the Indian daily press in the months since the December, 1984, election. I am grateful to the British Economic and Social Research Council for funding my research trip to India.

system. He has therefore declared that his education minister will make education policy, his agriculture minister will make agriculture policy and so on, and that they will receive the credit or the blame for the results. He dramatized the change by promoting and dismissing several ministers in a major Cabinet reshuffle in late 1985. The new Prime Minister does not share his predecessor's extravagant fear of strong subordinates.

Rajiv also insists that junior and middle-level civil servants once again become "accountable," and that they make moderately important decisions. Indira Gandhi tended to expect even minor decisions to be brought to her or at least to her aides for approval. This left them with an impossible workload, and junior bureaucrats were afraid to expedite relatively routine matters. The massive logjams that frequently resulted are now less common, and the morale and efficiency of civil servants appear to have improved.

If "accountability" is the first key word of the new administration in New Delhi, "accommodation" might be the second. "Accountability" usually refers to India's formal government structure. "Accommodation" refers to informal understandings with social and political groups. Rajiv Gandhi has made a significant start on that front, but a great deal more accommodation is required if stability is to be restored. The informalities of Indian politics have always been more important than the formalities. The ruling party has always been more important than formal institutions. Party activists have always been more important in the implementation of policy than bureaucrats holding formal office. And informal accommodations, bargains and deals have always provided the cement that holds the whole disparate enterprise together.

Under Nehru, the Congress party forged a vast array of bargains with a vast array of caste groups, religious minorities, linguistic groups and other interests all over India, offering them political patronage and tolerance in exchange for electoral support. The accommodations formed the bedrock on which the stability of Indian democracy rested. Indira ruled less by accommodation than by assertion, a practice that ultimately weakened her and destabilized India's political system.

In his earliest days in politics, Rajiv Gandhi was at least as unyielding as Indira had been, so his recent conciliatory methods come as something of a surprise. In 1983 and 1984, he took a hard line toward the Sikhs in the Punjab and toward non-Congress governments in several Indian states (which Indira Gandhi had sought to topple by means of bribery and/or unconstitutional manipulation of the federal system). His electoral campaign in late 1984 was the most aggressive toward the opposition and the least tolerant toward religious minorities—especially Sikhs—that any Indian Prime Minister had ever mount-

ed.⁵ His assertive approach paid dividends at the polls, because many Hindu voters were in an aggrieved, even vengeful, mood toward the Sikhs after the assassination.

But since the election, the Prime Minister has tended—still somewhat tentatively—to seek accommodations. He must continue to do so, because he must reestablish the understandings that existed between the Congress party and various key groups in India's complex society. Such accommodations will allow the Congress party to respond to mounting antagonisms between social groups by arranging bargains before hostility leads to open clashes. The alarming increase in violent social conflict that has swept India in recent years might then be reversed.

One sign of Rajiv Gandhi's new penchant for accommodation has been his far more conciliatory approach to opposition-controlled governments in various Indian states. In response, the leaders of these state governments have made such generous remarks about the Prime Minister that they have irked their own party colleagues. The Prime Minister has also made substantial concessions to religious and ethnic minorities in the states of Assam and Punjab. In Assam, he discovered that a rapid transition from an assertive to an accommodative approach can be politically costly. In the December, 1985, Assam state assembly elections, Congress lost badly, partly because the constituency that it had cultivated when it aggressively took sides in an ethnic conflict under Indira Gandhi felt betrayed when the party adopted a more evenhanded posture under her son.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Prime Minister's inclination to seek accommodation has also been apparent in his relations with neighboring South Asian nations. It is too early to say how much importance should be attached to the understanding he and Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq forged at their sixth meeting in December, 1985. But opposition leaders in New Delhi accused Gandhi of acquiescing in Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons even though he had frequently voiced concern on the issue in the preceding months. The Prime Minister claimed that the two nations had merely ruled out attacks on each other's nuclear installations and that the way had been opened to a new understanding between the old adversaries. There have been many false dawns in the Indian-Pakistani relationship over the years, but the tone of the December encounter was clearly different; Rajiv Gandhi may not seek Indira's assertive, dominant role in South Asia that prevented real accommodation with India's neighbors.

Gandhi has clearly adopted a more restrained posture in his dealings with Sri Lanka. The Tamil minority there, which predominates in the northern and eastern portions of the island, appears to support armed secessionist insurgents. The ill-disciplined army of Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority has often massacred unarmed Tamil civilians in retribution for guerrilla attacks. At a meeting in New

⁵James Manor, "Rajiv Gandhi and Post-Election India: Opportunities and Risks," *The World Today* (London) March, 1985.

Delhi in the spring of 1985, Rajiv Gandhi made major concessions to Sri Lanka's President J. R. Jayewardene. Gandhi agreed to intercept arms shipments to the private training camps for Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents in south India, which is just across the narrow straits from northern Sri Lanka. He ruled out an Indian invasion of Sri Lanka (an Indian invasion had been much discussed in the international press in mid-1983 when an anti-Tamil pogrom in the Sinhalese-majority areas of the island—which certain elements of the Jayewardene government helped to foment—reached horrific proportions). Gandhi added that India neither desired nor supported a separate state for Sri Lanka's Tamils, and he urged the Tamils to seek Indian-style federalism.

Gandhi's concessions made sense from the perspective of an Indian Prime Minister facing an armed separatist movement in Punjab state that was allegedly receiving support from the neighboring country of Pakistan. But Gandhi's assurances to Jayewardene made very grim reading for the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. Pressure from India had been their one hope of obtaining meaningful concessions from the Colombo government, which contains some hard-line Sinhalese chauvinists and which is under constant pressure from anti-Tamil bigots outside the ruling party. The greatest leverage India has is the threat of an Indian invasion of the island. Although India has never seriously considered an invasion and although an invasion would probably make matters worse, a strong case can be made for maintaining the threat of invasion in order to strengthen the hands of the moderates in the Colombo government. By ruling out an invasion, Rajiv Gandhi may have reduced the chances for the very settlement that he seeks.

A word of caution is in order here. Not everyone in South Asia believes that Prime Minister Gandhi is firmly committed to accommodation either with neighboring nations or with opposition groups in India. Some observers suspect that his conciliatory manner may only persist while he feels politically secure. During the electoral campaign of December, 1984, Gandhi accused opposition parties of antinational collaboration with Pakistan; some critics were concerned that he might jail the opposition after the election. He also hinted darkly that foreign governments may have been involved in the assassination of his mother. Earlier in 1984, he speculated openly on the possibility of war with Pakistan. Some observers fear that these incidents show the real Rajiv and that under serious pressure attempts at accommodation will give way to confrontation.

REBUILDING THE CONGRESS PARTY

Most of the Prime Minister's efforts to rebuild India's political institutions have focused on the formal institutions of central government, especially on the division of

responsibility within the Cabinet and the bureaucracy. A rationality is being imposed that was sorely lacking throughout most of the Indira Gandhi years, but it is a particular type of rationality that may or may not be appropriate. Largely the rationality of the technocrat and the corporate manager, it is bound to produce improvements in bureaucratic efficiency. However, it is not clear whether this rationality will render the machinery of government responsive to India's complex society and its mature and discerning electorate.

Efficient administration can help to maintain the confidence of India's voters, but it alone has never sufficed. A strong party organization able to arrange political bargains with India's vast welter of caste, class, sectarian and other interest groups has always been more important. Most such bargains need to be struck at the state level and below, where the Prime Minister's institutional reforms are having little or no impact. Regimes that do not deliver resources to social groups at the grass roots have usually not gained reelection in recent years. Most national and state-level elections in India since 1971 have been won by the opposition. In such circumstances, Rajiv Gandhi urgently needs to rebuild his fragmented, over-centralized and partially criminalized party.

It is not yet clear whether Gandhi fully realizes this or how seriously he takes the task. He spent most of his career working for Indian Airlines, which is part of the public-sector bureaucracy, and his closest aides come from private-sector firms rather than from the Congress party's old machine. The Prime Minister's preoccupation with rebuilding formal political institutions may blind him to the decisive importance of his party. In late 1985, after his key confidants had restructured the Prime Minister's Secretariat, he switched some of them to leading posts in the party. This may herald the beginning of a major overhaul of the Congress party, but at this writing there are few signs of any forceful effort on Rajiv Gandhi's part. Given the sorry condition of the Congress party, even an aggressive campaign of renovation may not be successful.

The Prime Minister has worked hard to convince his party managers to give him frank reports on political problems.⁶ The message appears to be getting through slowly, but he is asking the managers to depart radically from the standard practice of Indira Gandhi's time. In those days, party officials systematically concealed bad news from her because they had seen several colleagues dismissed for bearing unwelcome tidings. Rajiv Gandhi's efforts have begun to change this practice, but only at the very apex of the party.

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⁶This is based on discussions with high officials of the All-India Congress Committee in New Delhi, January, 1985.

"India today has an educated labor force, a high level of scientific and managerial manpower, a long entrepreneurial tradition, abundant natural resources and a large infrastructure capacity." In 1986, "the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is apparently taking steps to . . . reduce the more detailed and direct planning controls, replacing the latter by more indirect and far more flexible fiscal and financial policies. . . . If these trends continue, India should be able once more to reach the rates of industrial growth that it achieved before 1965."

The Indian Economy Today

BY GEORGE ROSEN

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INDIA'S overall economic record since independence in 1947 shows slow but fairly steady growth in both total output and per capita income. But the per capita income base was low at the start of the process, and it remains low today, with average per capita income below \$300. However, the rates of growth that have been achieved mark a significant increase over rates of growth before independence. In the 60 years from 1860 to 1920, the very approximate data indicate that total output rose by 65 percent, population by 30 percent, and per capita income by 35 percent (the latter figure growing by about 0.5 percent per year). During the following 27 years, from 1920 to 1947—a period characterized by world depression and war—India's population grew by about one-third. Total output may have grown at a rate equal to population, thus maintaining a constant per capita income; at worst, it may have grown at a somewhat lower rate, so that per capita income had declined between 5 and 15 percent from 1920 to independence (India before independence included Pakistan).¹

The rates of growth of these three variables—population, total output and per capita income—were significantly accelerated in India (without Pakistan) after independence. In the 30 years between 1950–1951 and 1980–1981, India's population approximately doubled, its real

national income approximately tripled, and real per capita income rose by about 50 percent. Annual growth rates of population ranged from 2 to 2.5 percent, while total output averaged about 3.6 percent, and per capita income about 1.5 percent.²

These national growth rates of output and per capita income are relatively low compared with those of some other developing countries, but the World Bank data indicate that they generally exceed the growth rates for low-income (below \$400 per capita) countries, excluding China. For India, the world's second largest country in terms of population (733 million people in 1983) and the seventh largest in terms of geographic area, such national averages conceal a wide diversity of growth rates and levels of per capita incomes among the states, many of which are the size of countries. The averages for states like Punjab, Haryana, Maharashtra and Gujerat have at times been well above the national averages and comparable to those of some of the higher growth countries. The averages for the low-income, slow-growing northeastern states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh are low by comparison.³ Even though its average per capita income of \$260 placed it about midway in rank among the World Bank's list of low-income countries in 1983, because of its great size India in 1980–1981 ranked among the world's leading 15 countries in total output and of value added from manufacturing, and among the top 5 in value added from agriculture.⁴

There is some evidence that while India's quality of life is low compared with that of higher income countries (and in some respects compared with China), there has been significant improvement since 1950. The infant mortality rate declined from 150–200 per thousand in the period before 1965 to 93 in 1983; the death rate for children aged 1 to 4 fell from 23 per thousand in 1965 to 11 in 1983; the life expectancy at birth, only 33 years in the decade 1941–1951, had risen to 56 years in 1983. The proportion of the primary-school-age group, 6 to 11 years, attending school, which had been only 43 percent in 1950, reached 79 percent in 1982. (This 1982 percentage was significantly higher for males than females.)

¹For the various pre-independence income estimates see A. Heston, "National Income," in D. Kumar, ed., *Cambridge Economic History of India*, Vol. 2: c. 1757–c. 1970 (Hyderabad, India: Orient Longman, 1984), especially pp. 376–380.

²For the above data see Tata Services, Ltd., *Statistical Outline of India, 1984* (Bombay, 1984), tables 1, 2, 8 and 26; V. K. R. V. Rao, *India's National Income, 1950–1980* (New Delhi: Sage Publications India, 1983), especially tables 4.3 and 5.1; A. Vaidyanathan, "The Indian Economy Since Independence," in Kumar, op. cit.; and the World Bank, *World Development Report, 1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), tables 1, 2 and 19.

³See K. B. L. Mathur, "Statewide Growth Patterns and Interstate Inequality in India," in Government of India, Planning Commission, *Regional Dimensions of India's Economic Development* (Lucknow, Upper Pradesh, 1983), especially pp. 199–212.

⁴See Tata Services, op. cit., table 7; and World Bank, op. cit., table 1.

There is also some evidence that the level of consumption has risen and that the variety of goods consumed has broadened. The index of per capita expenditures on food in real terms rose by about 12 percent between 1950 and 1980, but the daily per capita calorie supply was still somewhat below the "required" amount in 1982. Much of the increase probably occurred before the mid-1960's; it is estimated that the per capita availability of food-grains rose by 30 percent from 1950 to 1961 and has since remained roughly constant. During the same 30-year period from 1950 to 1980, the index of overall private consumption expenditure rose by 34 percent, with increases well above that percentage for such classes of goods and services as clothing, footwear, furniture, medical care, transportation (expenditure for personal transport rose by 600 percent, the largest increase for any item except taxes), education and recreation.

There were large increases in the availability per million people of consumption goods like bicycles, radios and sewing machines, indicating both a desire for those goods and an ability to purchase them. Another indication of the greater freedom of choice between consuming and not consuming is the great rise in household savings as a percentage of personal disposable income. This rose from about 5 to 6 percent in the mid-1950's to 16 percent at the end of the 1970's. Such an increase was well above any advance foreseen in the 1950's.⁵

The picture of general improvement is qualified by a continued and significant inequality of incomes and widespread absolute poverty. In 1975–1976, it was estimated that the highest 20 percent of the income-receiving households received almost 50 percent of the total household income. The sixth five year plan estimated that in 1977–1978, 48 percent of the Indian people were living below a low absolute poverty line measured in terms of an income sufficient to purchase enough food to provide a minimum adequate nutritional intake. Thus while there may have

been some slight movement toward greater equality of incomes and a lower proportion of the population in poverty since the 1950's or 1960's, it has been minor.⁶

The past 30 years have also seen a significant change in the structure of the economy, in terms of the share of the national output produced by the various sectors. There has been less change in the structure of employment, however. In the period from 1950 to 1980, the annual rate of growth of output in the primary sector, largely agriculture, was on the order of 2.1 percent. In the secondary sector, consisting mainly of manufacturing but also including mining, the rate was 5.2 percent. In the tertiary sector, which includes services like transport, communications, banking and insurance, trade, real estate and public administration, the growth rate was about 5 percent. With such different growth patterns, it is not surprising that the share of primary sector output in total net domestic product fell from 56 percent to 35 percent, while the shares of the secondary and tertiary sectors rose from 17 percent and 27 percent, respectively, to 26 percent and 39 percent. Such a shift in the production structure of output is a characteristic of the process of development.

But the related movement in the structure of employment has been far slower. While the data are apparently not strictly comparable over time, the share of the labor force employed in the primary sector fell only slightly from 73 percent in 1951 (it was 71 percent in 1931) to 67 percent in 1981; the share of the nonagricultural sectors in the total labor force rose from 27 percent in 1951 (29 percent in 1931) to 33 percent in 1981. Clearly, the shift in employment from the more slowly to the more rapidly growing sectors has only just begun, in spite of 30 years of conscious development policy. It is obvious, too, that half or more of the growing labor force will continue to be employed in agriculture (or the primary sector) for much of the next generation.⁷

THE FRAMEWORK OF POLICYMAKING

India is a federal government, and there is a division of responsibility with respect to economic policymaking between the central government and the states.⁸ In very broad terms, the central government has the responsibility for macroeconomic policy, i.e., monetary and overall fiscal policy and foreign trade policy. The central government is also responsible for making investments in such major infrastructure areas as the railroads, the communications network and much of the electric power system (the operation and maintenance of the electric power system are under state electricity boards). The rail transport and the communications systems are operated by the central government. In the development area, the Planning Commission, an agency not mentioned in the constitution, plays the major role in preparing the overall national plan, but its role vis-à-vis such regular government ministries as the Finance Ministry has declined since the death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. As a

⁵World Bank, op. cit., tables 23 through 25; Vaidyanathan, op. cit., table 13.3 on p. 965; Rao, op. cit., chapter 6, especially table 6.4 on p. 78 and table 9.7 on p. 139; Tata Services, op. cit., table 47 on p. 54; Ray L. Prosterman, *The Decline in Hunger-Related Deaths*, The Hunger Project Papers, no. 1 (San Francisco, May, 1984), p. 16.

⁶See World Bank, op. cit., table 28; Government of India, Planning Commission, *Sixth Five Year Plan, 1980–85* (New Delhi, 1980), pp. 7, 16; M. S. Adiseshiah, "Mid-Term Review of the Sixth Plan and . . . of the Economy, 1982," Working Paper no. 29 (Madras: Madras Institute of Development Studies, mimeograph), pp. 28–35; Isher Ahluwalia, *Industrial Growth in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 57–63.

⁷The data in the above two paragraphs are based on Rao, op. cit., chapter 4, especially pp. 30–39, and tables 4.3, 4.7 and 4.8; World Bank, op. cit., table 21, estimates that 74 percent of the labor force was in agriculture, 11 percent in industry and 15 percent in services in 1965; in 1981 those percentages were 71 percent, 13 percent and 16 percent, respectively. (The Chinese employment breakdown for 1981 was similar.)

⁸The most detailed study of the economic policy framework in India is Francine Frankel, *India's Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

result of the nationalization of the banking industry, the central government today directly controls the availability of the great bulk of institutional finance for productive purposes, and with its price-setting powers, it can control the prices of "key" products. As a result of these developments and a large government-owned factory sector, the power of the central government in manufacturing is far greater than that of the states.

In the area of agricultural policy, power rests more clearly in the hands of the state governments. This is understandable in light of the widely differing characteristics of farming in India's large area. While the central government sets prices for many farm outputs and inputs, the states are responsible for the taxation of agricultural incomes and for changes in the forms of agricultural ownership. The states also control road transportation within their borders, much of the education system from the primary through the university system, and the administration of the electric power network within their borders through the state electricity boards. They have their own tax systems, and they have set up their own special financial institutions to develop industry (especially smaller-scale industry) and to assist agricultural institutions like farm cooperatives. Over time, the influence of the state governments on economic policies has grown. India's founding fathers have died, the Congress party has split, various statewide parties have matured, and state political leaders have grown in experience and stature. The dominant groups at the level of state parties and legislatures tend to represent the medium-size peasant landowners, and this group has major influence on agricultural policy. At the central government level, non-agricultural interest groups tend to be more important, and policies adopted tend to reflect a compromise among the interests of those various groups.

When there was a united Congress party led by Prime Minister Nehru, his ideas and aims largely determined the central government's macroeconomic industrial policies, although they had relatively little impact on actual state agriculture policies. With respect to industry, India adopted socialist policies, often presented in plans and implemented by central government legislation and by a large central government investment in publicly owned industries. In agriculture, an initial land reform soon after independence broke up the largest farm holdings of absentee landlords. Otherwise, changes in patterns of land ownership have been relatively minor. The private ownership of land is the dominant pattern; cultivation is pursued largely by family farmers; institutions like cooperatives have been established to provide credit and inputs to peasant farmers. The landowning farmers benefit most from the cooperatives. The market system provides the basic organization for the supply of inputs and outputs. The government often provides inputs and infrastructure facilities to farmers at concessional prices and supports prices of output at profitable levels for the farm-

er, at the same time selling some of that output at lower prices in the cities.

For the most part, farm income is not taxed directly, though it is taxed indirectly by taxes on manufactured inputs and consumer goods. In the industrial and service areas, India is socialist in terms of the control of the "commanding heights"; in the agricultural area, India is largely a private ownership market economy within a framework of public institutions and policies. Politically, India is a democracy; except for one relatively brief period there have been regular elections at the national and state levels. Opposition parties can challenge the governing parties; economic policies are a product of this democratic process.

INDIAN AGRICULTURE

The importance of the agricultural sector in India's economy is obvious. It will remain a key sector because it is the employer of a very large proportion of the labor force, a supplier of food for a very large and growing population, a source of industrial raw materials and a market for India's industrial products. Overall, India has been reasonably successful in achieving increasing agricultural output to meet its food needs at relatively low rates of per capita income growth. That has probably been India's main success in agriculture; there has been no famine in India since independence, because of the increasing domestic production of food grains. In some years before 1967, domestic production was supplemented by foreign food aid, but such aid has ended; there is also an efficient distribution system of food to areas deemed to be in emergency.

But while India has achieved independence in food supply, the possibilities of easy and rapid growth appear to have diminished. There has been an apparently steady decline in the rates of growth in agriculture over the 30-year period from 1950 to 1980. The "green revolution" was a great success in the period after 1967, but its success was largely in terms of one crop—wheat—in the two northwest states of Punjab and Haryana. These states had widespread irrigation networks and institutional and social systems well adapted to take advantage of new technological opportunities. V. K. R. V. Rao estimates that the compound rate of growth of output in the primary sector (almost entirely agriculture) declined from 2.7 percent in the decade of the 1950's, to 1.8 percent in the 1960's to 1.7 percent in the 1970's.⁹

P. K. Bardhan more recently estimated that value added in agriculture grew at a rate of 2.4 percent from 1950–1951 to 1964–1965 and at about 2.2 percent from 1967 to 1981–1982. During the first period, much of the increase in output was caused by an expansion of the area of cultivation to include all cultivable land; in the second period, it was caused by higher yields from the cultivable and cultivated land. The index of output for rice production, which has a weight of over one-third in the agricultural production index, rose by about 60 percent from

⁹Rao, op. cit., table 4.3 on p. 32.

1961 to 1982; the output of wheat, with a weight of 12 percent in that index, rose by 250 percent; and the output of coarse cereals and pulses, the major grains consumed by lower income groups, showed only minor increases.

The higher yields reflect a massive increase in fertilizers used per hectare from 1 kilogram (kg) in the mid-1950's to 5 kg in the mid-1960's to 32 kg in the 1980's; the irrigated proportion of the crop area rose from 17 percent to 20 percent to 31 percent over the same period. In the case of wheat, the increase in the price of wheat in the mid-1960's (partly because of the disastrous crops of 1965–1967 and partly because of government policy) had a stimulating effect on output; and it has been argued that the current relatively low price of rice (in comparison to the world price of rice) has had a negative effect on the incentives to expand rice output. There seems to be some evidence that the high price of wheat relative to prices of coarse grains, pulses and various nonfood crops has encouraged a shift away from production of the latter, thus contributing to their slow growth.

Bardhan argues strongly for a greater public investment in agriculture.

The growth prospects of Indian agriculture will remain vitally dependent on the role of public investment in irrigation, drainage and flood control, in land shaping and land consolidation, in prevention of soil erosion and salinity, in development of a widespread research and extension network, and in rural electrification and provision of production credit.

He thus lays greater stress on public investment and the role of the state as major factors for accelerating agricultural growth in contrast to “the usual liberal emphasis on favorable price policy for farm products and the usual radical emphasis on land reforms. . . .” But he is not optimistic as to the prospects for stepping up such public investment for those purposes, in the face of what he considers the negative impact of the dominant coalition of agricultural, industrial and bureaucratic groups within the India polity on such a reallocation of state investment resources.¹⁰

Indian industrial output has grown at a rate of approximately 5 to 6 percent during the period since 1951. That rate compounded over a 30-year period has resulted in a fivefold increase in manufacturing output in terms of gross value added (a 400 percent increase in real output). In addition, there has been a massive shift from the 1950–1951 concentration on production of such goods as

food products and textiles (those classes of industry represented over 50 percent of the value of output in that year to the current production of such manufactured products as chemicals, ferrous and nonferrous mineral products and capital equipment of all types.

By 1978–1979, consumer goods production equaled only 26 percent of the total value of gross output from manufacturing, while basic and capital goods equaled 41 percent.¹¹ In the course of this industrial growth, India became a producer, and in some cases an exporter, of such high technology products as electronic equipment, nuclear power plants and computers. Much of this growth in the basic and capital goods sectors has been in government-owned enterprises, and investment in such public enterprises has far exceeded investment in the private sector since 1956.

Yet while specialists recognize this growth, they frequently describe Indian industry as relatively inefficient and high cost, noting that many firms in many sectors operate at levels well below capacity. Indian economists have been examining the reasons for the marked decline in the rate of growth of industrial output after 1965. Rao estimates a decline in that growth rate of 5.8 percent in the 1950's, 4.9 percent in the 1960's and 5.2 percent in the 1970's. In the most recent thorough examination of India's industrial growth per se, Isher Ahluwalia estimates a decline in the growth rate of net value added in manufacturing from 6.9 percent during the period 1956–1957 to 1965–1966 to 5.3 percent for the following period 1966–1967 to 1981–1982.¹² Both she and other economists have noted a decline in overall efficiency of factor use in Indian industry and, as one element of this, rising capital output ratios.

Indian industry has been described not only by economists but by government officials and industrialists as inefficient in many areas, producing products at high cost and of poor quality. Its competitive position in world trade in terms of many industrial products can only be described as weak. As a result, India's share in exports of manufactured products in the world market has declined over time, although in the early 1950's India was probably the leading producer among the developing countries of such industrial products as textiles.

A major factor behind the declining industrial growth rate, higher costs and growing inefficiency is the restrictive government framework within which industry functions.¹³ The operations of the industrial sector are distorted by policies that not only protect domestic pro-

(Continued on page 127)

¹⁰See Pranab Bardhan, *The Political Economy of Development in India* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), chapter 2, especially p. 11 and table 6 on p. 92 for figures, and pp. 12–13 and 14 for quotations. The book itself, which is short, should be read by anyone interested in the political economy of growth in India today.

¹¹Rao, op. cit., table 5.10 on p. 61.

¹²Ibid., table 4.3 on p. 32; Ahluwalia, op. cit., table 2.3 on p. 13 and chapter 7.

¹³Much of the following is based on my own study now in preparation, entitled “Industrial Change in India: 1970–2000.”

George Rosen has been doing research on the Indian economy since the late 1940's. He spent the year 1983–1984 in India studying Indian industry, exploring developments since his first book on that subject in 1956. His most recent book, partly autobiographical, is *Western Economists and Eastern Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).

"The recent history of Sri Lanka has been rife with contention, conflict and violence. In the 1980's, a series of political moves suggested that constitutional and conventional practices were being manipulated for partisan advantage. . . . Perhaps even more destructive to a free and orderly society is the mounting incidence of communal violence."

Tension and Conflict in Sri Lanka

BY ROBERT N. KEARNEY

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THE past decade has been a period of contention and violence for Sri Lanka. Growing communal violence accompanied demands for a separate state for the Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic minority; in 1983, the violence triggered probably the most brutal and destructive communal riots in the nation's history and produced increasingly frequent clashes between armed bands of separatist guerrillas and the government's military and police forces. The mounting communal tensions in the early 1980's were underlined by controversial political developments that appeared to jolt the democratic political processes of which the nation was understandably proud. Sri Lanka had boasted one of the most vigorous and liveliest democratic systems of government in the third world, capable of repeated orderly transfers of power between partisan rivals as a result of popular elections characterized by very high levels of voter participation.

Political confrontation between the Sinhalese ethnic majority and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority assumed a prominent position in the politics of Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) in the 1950's, only a few years after the nation's independence from British colonial rule. In 1956, Sinhalese (or Sinhala), the language of the majority community, was recognized as the official language of the nation. In the same year, the first Sinhalese-Tamil communal riots broke out, followed two years later by more widespread and more deadly rioting. In addition to the official language question, Tamil grievances have centered on the government's sponsorship of migration by Sinhalese into areas viewed by Tamils as their ancestral homeland, the special status accorded Buddhism and alleged official discrimination in education and public employment.

Sinhalese, who are predominantly Buddhist, constituted 74 percent of the nation's population in the 1981 census. Sri Lanka's Tamils, who speak the Tamil language and are largely Hindu, comprised nearly 13 percent. Sri Lankan Tamils are a majority in the districts in the north of the island and on and near the Jaffna peninsula; they are also numerous on the east coast. Sharing the Tamil language and Hindu religion but socially and

territorially separate from the Sri Lankan Tamils are members of an ethnic group known as Indian Tamils, so designated because their ancestors came to the island from south India in the nineteenth century or later. The Indian Tamils, most of whom live in the tea-growing areas of the central highlands, accounted for slightly less than 6 percent of the 1981 population. A Muslim community known as Sri Lankan Moors formed 7 percent, with smaller ethnic groups making up the balance of the population.¹

Demands began to emerge in the early 1970's for a separate Tamil state that would include the northern and eastern regions in which Sri Lankan Tamils have lived since antiquity. In 1972, the major Tamil political organizations banded together to form a Tamil United Front, later renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The organization contested the 1977 parliamentary election, asking the Tamil people for a mandate to seek a separate independent state, to be called Eelam. Although the TULF captured only 18 out of 168 parliamentary seats, the party's candidates won every constituency on the island with a Sri Lankan Tamil majority except one.

In addition, in the early 1970's an underground separatist group composed mostly of Tamil youths began to engage in assassinations and robberies and other acts of violence. Described variously as "terrorists," "guerrillas" or "freedom fighters," the underground came to be known collectively as the Tiger Movement. Before the end of the decade, the movement had split into several separate and often antagonistic organizations.

The separatist movement has been essentially confined to the Sri Lankan Tamil community. Indian Tamils, most of whom do not live in areas included within or contiguous to the proposed Tamil state, have on the whole remained aloof from the movement.

ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The parliamentary election of 1977 produced the most recent of six consecutive transfers of government power between the major rival political parties, the United National party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP). The UNP won a massive parliamentary majority, capturing 51 percent of the total popular vote; this was the first time a single party had collected an absolute majority of all votes cast. Sri Lanka's plurality electoral

¹Census figures are taken from Sri Lanka, Department of Census and Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing, Sri Lanka, 1981: Preliminary Release no. 1* (Colombo: Department of Census and Statistics, 1981).

system based mostly on single-member districts magnified the UNP victory into an overwhelming 83 percent of the seats in Parliament. The SLFP, which had been in power since 1970, captured 30 percent of the popular vote but won only about 5 percent of the parliamentary seats. Among the contestants was the TULF, which won only slightly more than 6 percent of the vote nationally but scored impressively in the Tamil-majority areas of the north and east.²

Immediately after the election, there was brutal communal rioting, the first major outburst of communal violence in 19 years. The 1977 riots were explained in terms of Sinhalese reaction to Tamil separatist demands, terrorist acts committed in the name of separatism, and anti-Sinhalese statements allegedly made by Tamil politicians in the course of the campaign.³ It was estimated that about 300 individuals lost their lives.⁴

A constitution that drastically altered the nation's political institutions was adopted in 1978. The new constitution replaced a constitution adopted in 1972, when the government was controlled by a united front consisting of the SLFP and two smaller parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja party and the Communist party. The 1978 constitution embodied the long-cherished objectives of UNP leader J. R. Jayewardene and was expected to favor the UNP. Not surprisingly, the SLFP leadership soon announced that, when the SLFP returned to power, the 1978 constitution would be scrapped and the nation would return to the constitution of 1972. Sri Lanka thus seems to face the prospect of constitutional change each time control of the government passes from one party to another.

Among the principal innovations introduced by the 1978 constitution was the replacement of the parliamentary system of government following the British model by a presidential system in which executive power is concentrated in the hands of a President elected for a six-year term. The office of Prime Minister and a Cabinet drawn

from the Parliament were retained but were clearly subordinated to the President. Jayewardene, the first President under the new constitution, was selected by Parliament; thereafter the President was to be chosen by direct popular vote.

Another radical departure came with the introduction in the 1978 constitution of the closed list system of proportional representation. Proportional representation was expected to dampen the wide swings in the electoral fortunes of the major parties that had resulted from the plurality electoral system. The UNP appeared likely to benefit from the change, because in parliamentary elections that party had generally received a slightly larger and more consistent percentage of the popular vote than had its rival, the SLFP.⁵

Smaller parties presumably would be disadvantaged by a provision that a party's list had to receive at least one-eighth of the total vote in an electoral district to be awarded any seats from the district. Also working to the detriment of smaller parties was the novel provision of a bonus seat for the party list winning the largest number of votes in the district before the seats were allotted on a proportional basis. Outside the north, it was expected that the bonus seats would be won by the UNP or the SLFP.

The adoption of proportional representation raised the prospect that the 1978 constitution might be virtually immune to amendment, since no party was likely to obtain the two-thirds majority in Parliament required for amendment. This possibility soon appeared to have major political consequences.

The first popular presidential election was held in October, 1982. Originally scheduled for early 1984, the election was moved forward after a constitutional amendment was adopted allowing a first-term President to seek reelection any time after the first four years of his term. Presumably, the move was designed to take advantage of the disunity and demoralization of the opposition. The SLFP was at the time undergoing a battle for party leadership. President Jayewardene defeated the candidate of the SLFP and four other candidates, winning 51 percent of the votes cast, a plurality of every electoral district except Jaffna in the far north. The candidate of the divided SLFP trailed with 39 percent of the vote.⁶

The TULF declined to contest the presidential election or endorse any candidate, but the leader of the small Tamil Congress entered the race with a call for a separate Tamil state.⁷ The Tamil Congress had recently been reestablished as a separate political party after merging into the TULF in the early 1970's. The Tamil Congress candidate won a plurality of the votes, 40 percent, in Jaffna district, and in the Tamil-majority district of Batticaloa on the east coast his proportion of the votes came within 1 percent of those cast for Jayewardene. It is perhaps indicative of the estrangement of the voters of the north that the incumbent President was not only outpolled by the Tamil Congress candidate but finished

²Sri Lanka, *Report on the General Election to the Second National State Assembly of Sri Lanka (Eighth Parliamentary General Election)*, 21st July, 1977, Sessional Paper IV—1978 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978).

³Sri Lanka, *Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Incidents Which Took Place between 13th August and 15th September, 1977*, Sessional Paper VII—1980 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1980).

⁴Tamil Refugees Rehabilitation Organization, *Communal Disturbances in Sri Lanka* (mimeographed, 1980).

⁵It can be argued, based on past voting patterns, that the new electoral system would make it virtually impossible for the SLFP to return to power without assistance from smaller allied parties. See Robert Oberst, "Proportional Representation and Electoral System Change in Sri Lanka," in James Manor, ed., *Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 118–133.

⁶Figures on presidential election results are taken from Sri Lanka, Department of Elections, *Presidential Election, 1982: Detailed Results* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1982).

⁷*Sun* (Colombo), October 20, 1982, p. 13.

behind the SLFP candidate; the north was the only district in which the SLFP attracted more votes than did the UNP.

The candidates of three small leftist parties collectively received slightly more than 5 percent of the vote. A minor surprise was the dismal performance of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP), long the premier party of the Sri Lankan left. The LSSP candidate received only 1 percent of the vote and did not win more than 2 percent in any electoral district. In 1977, the LSSP failed to win a seat in the legislature for the first time in four decades. The party's performance in the presidential contest, following its 1977 debacle, suggested the decline or perhaps the collapse of the left as a force in electoral politics. An additional leftist party, the Communist party, supported the candidate of the SLFP.

Soon after the election, President Jayewardene suggested that a referendum be held asking the voters to approve the continuation of the Parliament elected in 1977 for an additional six-year term instead of holding new parliamentary elections as expected by the middle of 1983. The controversial proposal was justified on the grounds that an ultra-left plot to assassinate government leaders and foment disorder had been uncovered. The new system of proportional representation, UNP spokesmen claimed, would allow extremists to obtain sizable representation in Parliament and would jeopardize the nation's political stability. More plausible was the strong probability that in a parliamentary election the UNP, although a likely winner, would no longer hold a more than two-thirds majority in Parliament and would thus lose the ability to amend the constitution at will.

THE 1982 REFERENDUM

The referendum held in December, 1982, was reportedly approved by 55 percent of the voters. The proposal was defeated in seven electoral districts, of which

⁸Figures are derived from Sri Lanka, Department of Elections, *Referendum, 22nd December, 1982: Detailed Results* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1982).

⁹For a highly critical discussion, see Priya Samarakone (pseudonym), "The Conduct of the Referendum," in Manor, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–117.

¹⁰Colombo Study Circle, *Reign of Terror in Jaffna, May–June 1981* (Colombo: Colombo Study Circle, 1981); *Ceylon Daily News*, June 11, 1981; *Ceylon Observer*, June 11, 1981.

¹¹Sri Lanka, Department of Elections, *Parliamentary By-Elections and General Election, Municipal and Urban Councils, 18th and 20th May, 1983: Detailed Results* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1983).

¹²See Sri Lanka, *The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1978), article 99; Department of Elections, *Presidential Election, 1982*, and Sri Lanka, *Report of the Delimitation Commission under the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka*, Session-1 Paper I—1981 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 1981).

¹³Sri Lanka, Ministry of State, *The Facts and the International Commission of Jurists Report on Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka* (Colombo: Ministry of State, 1983).

four were in the north and east. In Jaffna district, 91 percent of the votes cast were negative.⁸ The balloting results, however, were clouded by reports of widespread voter intimidation and ballot tampering, as well as by the government's detention of opposition leaders during the campaign.⁹ Despite highly competitive contests, Sri Lankan elections had remained strikingly free of scandal for 50 years after the introduction of universal adult suffrage in 1931.

Claims of local instances of voter intimidation or impersonation were not uncommon, particularly in the elections soon after independence, but the balloting and counting procedures had not been called into question until a 1981 election for newly established district development councils. In Jaffna, the 1981 balloting was preceded by an eruption of communal violence and followed by reports of ballot-box stuffing and the mishandling of ballots.¹⁰ In 1982, the allegations of irregularities in the referendum balloting far exceeded those of 1981, posing a threat to the integrity of the electoral process.

The surprising actions of 1982 were followed by another highly unusual move, apparently in response to criticism that voters opposing the referendum were being deprived of their right to participate in parliamentary elections. Jayewardene had earlier secured undated letters of resignation from all UNP members of Parliament. Eighteen seats won by the UNP in 1977 were vacated when Jayewardene accepted the resignations of members of Parliament after their constituencies voted against the referendum. By-elections were held for the seats in 1983. The UNP retained 14 of the seats, but 10 were won with a reduced share of the votes, compared with the 1977 election. The SLFP won 3 seats and 1 seat was captured by a small party, the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna.¹¹ The seats at stake were all in the southwest. More than nine-tenths of the voters in Jaffna district opposed the referendum. However, the UNP had won no seats in that district in 1977, so the arranged resignations and by-elections had no effect in the north.

If votes for the presidential candidates had been apportioned by district to party lists according to the procedures of the 1978 constitution,¹² the UNP would have won 59 percent and the SLFP 37 percent of the seats in a 196-seat Parliament, with other parties winning about 4 percent. It is highly improbable that votes would have been cast for lists exactly as for presidential candidates. But even in very favorable circumstances the UNP would not have retained a two-thirds majority in Parliament. And the party would have been 16 members short of the 131 members required for a two-thirds majority.

ESCALATING COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

In July, 1983, the most deadly and destructive explosion of communal rioting in the history of Sri Lanka engulfed the nation. Starting in Colombo, a wave of incendiarism, looting and assault spread rapidly across the island. The death toll was reported to be 387,¹³ which

may significantly understate the carnage. Some sources claimed a death toll in the thousands.¹⁴ Property damage was severe. Much of the commercial section of Colombo known as the Pettah was gutted. Tens of thousands of people were driven from their homes to seek shelter in grim refugee camps. In Colombo, there was apparently an element of organization and planning not recorded in earlier communal riots, allegedly perpetrated by employees of a government ministry armed with election lists by which Tamil property could be identified.¹⁵

The riots of 1983 underscored the vicious circle of retaliation and counterretaliation that characterizes the island's ethnic conflict. The riots were seen as retaliation for the ambush killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers on patrol in the north by Tamil Tigers pursuing the objective of a separate state. It has been claimed, in turn, that the ambush was a retaliation for the abduction and rape of several young Tamil women by Sinhalese soldiers in Jaffna district.¹⁶ In the perverse logic of the mob, riot victims included not only Sri Lankan Tamils but Indian Tamils and Indian nationals who had no ties with the north and no association with the separatist movement.

The riots surely heightened alienation among Tamil citizens and undermined their confidence in the ability or willingness of the government to protect their lives and property. Increased separatist militancy, in turn, probably heightens the prospect of violence against Tamils by Sinhalese mobs or security forces.

After some confusion, the government fixed blame for the 1983 riots on an unlikely combination of three small leftist political parties, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, the Nava Sama Samaja party and the Communist party. The three parties, which were subsequently banned, shared little other than a general adherence to Marxism. The leader of the NSSP had contested the presidential election, urging that concessions be made to the Tamils, even allowing them to form a separate state if they so wished. Despite the fact that it was unlikely that three tiny leftist rivals had joined in a conspiracy to attack Tamils, the explanation neatly brought together the government's various opponents. President Jayewardene told the Parliament in early 1985:

¹⁴M. Karunanidhi, *Complaint of Acts of Genocide and Violations of Human Rights Committed against the Tamils of Sri Lanka* (Madras: Committee for the Protection of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, 1983); Brian Senewiratne, "The July 1983 Sri Lankan Massacre," in *The Second World Tamil Eelam Convention, June 20th, July 1st and 2nd, 1984*, Nanuet, New York (n.p., 1984), pp. 29-32.

¹⁵See Gananath Obeyesekere, "Political Violence and the Future of Democracy in Sri Lanka," *Internationales Asienforum*, vol. 15, nos. 1-2 (1984), pp. 30-60.

¹⁶Karunanidhi, *Complaint of Acts of Genocide*, p. 8; Satchi Ponnambalam, *Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil Liberation Struggle* (London: Zed Books, 1983), p. 225.

¹⁷Sri Lanka, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates Official Report*, vol. 34, no. 1 (February 20, 1985), col. 11.

¹⁸For example, Lalith Atulathmudali, *Peace and Dignity for All* (Colombo: Ministry of State, n.d.).

¹⁹Sri Lanka, *Parliamentary Debates*, col. 15.

The events of July [1983] not only smeared the name of Sri Lanka throughout the world, they also showed that all those in the North and the South who seek to overthrow an elected government by violence, by creation of communal and religious discord, by terrorism and other similar methods had joined hands.¹⁷

The following year saw a rapid escalation in the level of violence associated with the separatist movement. Tiger operations shifted from attacks on individuals and government installations to pitched battles with military units and assaults on major police stations by heavily armed guerrillas. By late 1984, government leaders were predicting a major assault on security forces in Jaffna district by Tamil guerrillas trained and outfitted in bases in the southern Indian state of Tamilnadu.¹⁸

Throughout 1984, the foreign press reported military and police excesses, mounting civilian casualties and the destruction of property in the Tamil areas. Sinhalese civilians also became targets of armed attack, presumably by one of the groups of the Tiger movement. The Sinhalese civilian victims were generally migrants to predominantly Tamil regions. A deadly attack was made on the ancient city of Anuradhapura, a center of Buddhist pilgrimage in a region largely populated by Sinhalese. As the devastation mounted, the economic dislocations and financial drain of the struggle became increasingly evident. Reiterating the need to defeat "terrorism," Jayewardene noted somberly that "we may have to equip ourselves to do so at the expense of development and social and economic welfare plans."¹⁹

After the 1983 riots, India, Sri Lanka's giant neighbor, began to assume an increasing role in the communal discord on the island. The government of Sri Lanka charged that Tamil separatist guerrillas were being trained in bases in south India. There were incidents involving Indian fishing vessels because of Sri Lankan efforts to prevent movement between south India and northern Sri Lanka. In late 1984 and early 1985 strains in relations between the two governments were evident. New Delhi's repeated assurance of support for the political unity of Sri Lanka, combined with growing pressure on separatist groups to negotiate a settlement, however, seemed to restore cordiality between the two nations. India's role in pressing the militant separatists to the bargaining table became increasingly clear. Neither the separatists nor the government of Sri Lanka could ignore the proddings from New Delhi.

ATTEMPTS AT SETTLEMENT

The search for a negotiated settlement began in early 1984, when President Jayewardene called an All Party Conference to "discuss the daily growing problems of the

(Continued on page 127)

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"After several years of seemingly permanent political deadlock in Pakistan, several important changes have occurred . . . in the past year or so. Elections have been held; civilian government has been established; martial law has ended; and steps have been taken toward the restoration of political parties."

Pakistan: Out of the Praetorian Labyrinth

By WILLIAM L. RICHTER

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PAKISTAN's past experience with democratic processes and institutions has not been particularly happy or commendable. Generals have ruled for 21 of the country's 38 years of independence, and even the brief periods of civilian rule in 1947–1958 and 1971–1977 were marked by the absence of effective democratic institutions and processes. It is unclear whether this dismal record should be attributed to the underdevelopment of political institutions, the overdevelopment of the military, the relative scarcity of experienced political leaders and mass-based parties, the dominance of landed elites, the personalities of specific individuals or other factors.¹ Whatever the explanation, stability and democracy have been the elusive goals of Pakistan's political system throughout its history as an independent nation.

The martial law regime of General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq came to power in a bloodless military coup on July 5, 1977. From the beginning, the regime claimed to be transitional and temporary. It promised to hold elections "within 90 days" and to restore civilian political order to a divided and protest-weary country. But returning power to civilians, if that was indeed the intention of the generals, proved difficult. Scheduled elections were called off in October, 1977, and again in November, 1979; the latter cancellation was accompanied by a banning of political parties, the imposition of strict censorship and other restrictions. Local elections were held on a nonpartisan basis in 1979 and again in 1983. Constitutional changes were effected by the edict of the President/Chief Martial Law Administrator, and various Islamic reforms were introduced.

Still, it appeared that getting into power was far easier than getting out of it. As if in a labyrinth, General Zia tried one exit, then another, all seemingly in vain. Civilians were coopted into the central Cabinet. The concept

of an Islamic polity was debated, and overtures were made to conservative religious leaders. New institutions were established, like Islamic courts and an appointive national advisory council. Whatever the validity of the military's declared intentions of getting out of the labyrinth, all these actions were understandably interpreted by many critics and outside observers as devious maneuvers to hold and prolong military rule indefinitely.²

Since the beginning of 1985, however, Pakistan has made tangible progress in the direction of a civilian political order, including the holding of national and provincial elections, the establishment of civilian governments, the ending of martial law, and some movement toward the legalization of political parties. Whether this latest attempt to devise a viable democratic political system for Pakistan will succeed still hangs in the balance.

If the experiment should succeed, it will be a historic accomplishment. Indeed, those countries in the third world that have successfully made the transition from military to civilian rule are relatively rare. These observations alone should be sufficient to engender some healthy skepticism, even cynicism, concerning the current changes under way in Pakistan.³ If this experiment should fail, Pakistan could again resume the cycle of authoritarianism and anarchy that has plagued its past.

The recent developments in the civilianization of Pakistan's political system are in accordance with a plan announced by President Zia on August 12, 1983. The plan promised nonpartisan elections both to Parliament and to the provincial legislative assemblies before March, 1985. At the time the public response was not encouraging. Protests instigated by the political opposition against continued military rule ignited smoldering regional sentiments in Sind province and expanded into several weeks of demonstrations, deaths and arrests. By controlling and containing the protest, the regime was able to proceed with civilianization at its own pace. On December 19, 1984, Zia held a surprise referendum on whether the people of Pakistan approved of his Islamization policies. Receiving a 98 percent affirmative vote despite an opposition boycott and charges of foul play, Zia interpreted the result as a mandate to remain in power as President for the next five years.

In retrospect, several earlier developments helped to pave the way for the current civilianization program. The

¹Some of these explanations are explored in William L. Richter, "From Electoral Politics to Martial Law," in Manzooruddin Ahmed, ed., *Contemporary Pakistan: Politics, Economy, Society* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980), pp. 92–113.

²See Marvin G. Weinbaum and Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan in 1982: Holding On," *Asian Survey*, vol. 23, no. 2 (February, 1983), pp. 123–131; and William L. Richter, "Pakistan in 1984: Digging In," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 2 (February, 1985).

³See, for instance, Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

nonpartisan local government elections of 1979 and 1983 helped to create a cadre of politicians who could serve as intermediaries to link the people, particularly those in the rural areas, to the government. The establishment in 1982 of the Federal Consultative Council (Majlis-i-Shura) provided further experience and national exposure for some of these individuals and brought others into the structure of support for the regime.

These developments did not occur in a political vacuum, however. Although political parties have been formally banned since November, 1979, they continue to operate within somewhat vaguely defined limits; they issue public statements and make and break alliances, and their political activities are reported by the press. In 1981, eight of these "defunct" political parties formed an alliance called the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The MRD presently comprises 11 component parties, including both the Pakistan People's party (PPP) of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and several of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) parties that had fought against Bhutto in the March, 1977, elections. Conspicuously absent from the MRD have been two of the more conservative parties: the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The MRD has consistently demanded an immediate end to martial law and full restoration of the 1973 constitution, which was suspended and subsequently modified substantially by General Zia.

Zia's August, 1983, plan was objectionable to the MRD because it threatened to prolong military rule, seemed to preclude the legalization of parties, and appeared to abandon important features of the 1973 constitution. The MRD's failure to topple the military regime through its 1983 protest movement left the opposition parties exhausted and in disarray, with many of their leaders in jail. The MRD did manage, despite heavy government restrictions, to have an impact on turnout for

⁴The government made advocating a boycott a punishable offense and arrested many MRD leaders and workers before the referendum.

⁵Turnout was 52.9 percent in the National Assembly elections on February 25 and 56.9 percent in the provincial polls three days later. Participation was highest in Punjab (61.8 percent) and just under 50 percent in each of the three minority provinces. *Pakistan Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 5 (March 1, 1985), p. 1.

⁶Zia never fully abrogated the 1973 constitution, but instead "suspended" parts of it when he seized power in 1977. His Provisional Constitution Order in 1981 and a Revival of Constitution Order in March, 1985, introduced several modifications, including a strengthened presidency and the creation of a National Security Council to give the military a "formal role" during national emergencies. The Parliament agreed to many of the changes that divided power between the President and the Prime Minister, but eliminated the National Security Council provision.

⁷In its most recent report, Amnesty International cited several human rights violations cases in which political prisoners were tried before military courts, and prisoners were held incommunicado and tortured. *Pakistan: Violations of Human Rights, April 1985* (New York: Amnesty International USA, 1985).

the 1984 referendum through its call for a boycott.⁴

The MRD decision to boycott the February, 1985, elections turned out to be a major tactical error. In contrast to the referendum, the conduct of the elections was relatively fair and turnout was impressive.⁵ Pakistani voters, denied the opportunity to cast ballots in national elections for nearly eight years, chose to participate, even in the absence of party labels and in defiance of the MRD boycott. In the process they defeated several ministers in Zia's preelection Cabinet to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the persistence of martial law, an action that added credibility to the elections.

Besides demonstrating the MRD's misjudgment of public sentiment, the boycott left the field to the independents, the Muslim League, Jamaat-i-Islami, and those politicians willing to abandon their membership in MRD parties. Of these, the members of the Muslim League (though campaigning without party labels) emerged with the largest proportion of seats in the National Assembly. Sindhi Muslim League politician Muhammad Khan Junejo was selected by Zia to fill the post of Prime Minister. Junejo later created an Official Parliamentary Group (OPG), predominantly Muslim League in composition, to perform the role of a party within the assembly. An Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG) then formed around a nucleus of Jamaat-i-Islami members.

Although the Parliament's ideological and class complexion is no doubt considerably more conservative than it would have been if the MRD politicians had participated in the elections, the elected officials have been able to show results, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the process and leaving the MRD politicians to watch from the sidelines. By amending the 1973 constitution to incorporate some—but not all—of the changes advocated by Zia and by acting to absolve Zia and the other generals of any liability for their actions during military rule,⁶ the Parliament was able to bring about a formal lifting of martial law by the end of 1985.

For the most part, the MRD has pursued a "wait and see" strategy, predicting that the military would never surrender real power to civilian politicians. In time, however, the MRD has become more vocal—against the "abandonment" of the 1973 constitution, against relieving Zia and his fellow generals of accountability for their actions during martial law, and in favor of holding fresh elections. On December 25, the birthday of Pakistan's founder—Mohammad Ali Jinnah—MRD-led demonstrations in Lahore led to an estimated 200 arrests.

On December 30, 1985, President Zia declared that martial law was being lifted, with all civil rights restored to Pakistani citizens. The implications of this step are considerable. The many cases routed through military tribunals under martial law will now be brought before civilian judges and the political prisoners arrested under martial law will presumably be able to avail themselves of habeas corpus and other legal protections that were suspended for more than eight years.⁷

Whether the new civilian government can maintain its authority without the cover of martial law remains to be seen. One test of the tolerance of the system for political challenges came during the last half of 1985, when Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan to attend to the funeral arrangements for her brother, Shahnawaz Bhutto. The nominal head of the Pakistan People's party, Benazir had been in exile since January, 1984. She is a charismatic, forceful and articulate speaker and retains much of the popular support she inherited from her father. Despite government assurances of her personal safety and freedom, Bhutto was arrested shortly after her brother's funeral on a variety of charges concerning alleged political activities. After several weeks of house arrest, she was released and allowed to leave Pakistan.

Despite the general success of the February, 1985, elections, the subsequent effective operation of the new civilian government, and the formal termination of martial law, Pakistan's political system still lacks the consensual base it needs for stability and order. The players and the political boundaries have changed, but a sizable, vocal and determined group of politicians remains outside the system. These opponents believe that they speak for a major segment of public opinion not represented by the government. The fact that they are on the outside as a result of their own boycott decision has not lessened their sense of alienation. Until they are persuaded otherwise, or suppressed, or given some stake in the system, they are likely to continue to create problems.⁸

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

The success of the new civilian order in Pakistan will depend in part on its ability to perform in both the economic and the foreign policy arenas. Economic performance has been a major strength of Zia's martial law regime. During the eight and one-half years of military rule, the economy grew by more than six percent annually. Such growth was helped by major inputs of foreign assistance and remittances from Pakistani workers abroad, but it also reflected major structural changes and increases in both agricultural and industrial productivity. As World Bank economist Shahid Javed Burki has noted, in economic terms Pakistan now stands near the dividing line between poor and middle-income nations, and structurally Pakistan has the potential to support a much higher level of development.⁹

It is not altogether certain, however, that Pakistan can

⁸The shrewdest move the Junejo government could make might be to speed up the process of legalizing political parties, then to hold general elections before the end of the present government's five-year term. Such a willingness to let the electorate decide the fate of an existing government, however, would be a new experience for Pakistan and therefore seems unlikely.

⁹Shahid Javed Burki, "Will Pakistan Cross the Poverty Threshold?—I: The Economy's Present Structure and Evolution," *The Muslim*, July 9, 1985, p. 4. See the other two articles in the series in *The Muslim*, July 10–11, 1985.

sustain the growth it has enjoyed during the last decade. Remittances, which have constituted the country's largest single source of foreign exchange since the mid-1970's, peaked in 1984 and have been declining since. Despite measures taken by the government in March, 1985, to induce greater investment of remittances in Pakistan through official channels, the leveling-off of the economic boom in the Middle East is likely to mean a continuing decline in this valuable financial resource.

There are other areas of potential weakness in the economy. During fiscal 1985, exports fell in value by about one percent, because of poor international markets in rice and cotton cloth. Because of bad weather wheat production also fell, and wheat had to be imported for the first time in four years. Energy has become a major concern, as was demonstrated by frequent power shortages and "load-shedding" during mid-1985. In short, despite considerable strength in Pakistan's economy, it remains vulnerable to the uncertainties of the weather and world markets.

Foreign aid will remain strong, at least in the near term. The World Bank, the United States and other major donors appear satisfied with the martial law regime's conservative restructuring of Pakistan's economy. A greater emphasis on foreign investment, the creation of an export-based economy, the privatization of previously nationalized industries, deregulation and the lowering of the highest tax-rate brackets to encourage domestic investment will probably continue under the new civilian government and will stimulate continued foreign assistance. The World Bank-sponsored Aid-Pakistan Consortium pledged \$2.1 billion for the current fiscal year, an increase of more than 15 percent over 1985. The \$3.2-billion American package of economic and military assistance for the five-year period ending in 1987 is expected to double when it comes up for renewal in 1986.

What consequences, if any, will the end of martial law have for Pakistan's economy? In the short run, national policies and the quality of top-level personnel are likely to look much the same. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who has guided economic policy throughout the martial law period, resigned as finance minister in 1985 when he was elected presiding officer of the Senate, the upper house of the central Parliament. The finance portfolio was assumed by Mahbubul Haq, who has been the planning minister.

To the extent that representative government becomes effective under the new civilian order, a number of pressures will affect economic policy in Pakistan. Concerns are likely to be voiced over the inequitable distribution of economic benefits; over the subsidization of exports and the provision of financial incentives to the wealthy while the basic costs for the poorer sectors of society are increasing; and over Pakistan's growing debt burden. Martial law's lid on public discussion, worker migration to the Middle East, and the impact of remittances on local economies have dampened public protest during the past

decade. With the return of political free expression, the PPP, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and other MRD parties are likely to resurrect some of these social issues. The longer term economic picture thus appears somewhat uncertain.

ISLAMIZATION

A prominent feature of General Zia's martial law regime was its stress on translating Islamic values into political, social, economic and legal institutions and policies. Although demands for a *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Islamic system) began before Zia's imposition of martial law in 1977, the military regime quickly seized upon the notion.¹⁰ In the name of Islam, Zia created new legal and economic institutions, more severe criminal punishments, new laws of evidence, extensive restrictions on social behavior and new political rules.¹¹ Although Zia's Islamic system has fallen far short of his publicly stated goals, this resurgence of interest in Islam has greatly altered the nature and bounds of political discourse in Pakistan.

Islamization has also heightened a variety of tensions in Pakistani society. Women have reacted to some of the reforms—like those setting the value of a woman at half that of a man or declaring the testimony of two women equal to that of one man—with indignation and alienation. The Women's Action Forum, created in response to some of the new Islamic restrictions, has provided an activist outlet for feminist protest against Islamization. WAF members have taken to the streets to protest, and have been assaulted and arrested by the police for their struggle against the laws that reinforce their legal inequality.

A second result of the heightened emphasis on Islamic values has been an intensification of sectarian conflict.

¹⁰See William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," *Asian Survey*, vol. 19, no. 6 (June, 1979), pp. 547–557; and William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 3 (Fall, 1978), pp. 406–426.

¹¹For some recent additions to the large and growing literature on Islamization in Pakistan, see Anita Weiss, "Women's Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of Islamization," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 8 (August, 1985), pp. 863–880; Richard Kurin, "Islamization in Pakistan: A View from the Countryside," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 8 (August, 1985), pp. 852–862; and J. Henry Korson and Michelle Maskiell, "Islamization and Social Policy in Pakistan: The Constitutional Crisis and the Status of Women," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 6 (June, 1985), pp. 589–612.

¹²By official figures, 98 percent of those voting in the referendum approved the government's policies on Islam.

¹³When asked about the subject, President Zia first responded that "Islamization has failed," then corrected himself to say that it "has not fully succeeded." Recognizing that other Muslims did not necessarily agree with his views on specific issues, including the inappropriateness of political parties in an Islamic polity, Zia indicated that it would be better to try to persuade than to impose his own views on the country (personal interview, Rawalpindi, July 10, 1985). Given the extent to which Zia has previously imposed his views on the country, this represents a considerable softening of Zia's zeal.

Tensions have increased between the minority Shia community and the majority Sunnis. Shias, who constitute perhaps one-fifth of Pakistan's population, have objected to some of Zia's Islamic reforms on the ground that they represent Sunni interpretations and practice. In several instances, the government has made exceptions for the Shias. Nonetheless, there have been repeated clashes between the two groups.

Similarly, the smaller Ahmadiyya sect has been persecuted for its religious beliefs and practices by the majority community. Following anti-Ahmadi riots in 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto declared the sect to be non-Muslim. In 1984, Zia went a step further and prohibited Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims or their house of worship a mosque, issuing the call to prayer, or using the Islamic statement of faith. Many Ahmadis have been jailed and punished for breaking these injunctions.

The December, 1984, referendum ostensibly gave the government's Islamization policies a strong endorsement,¹² but since then the issue has been somewhat muted. To a large extent, civilianization has supplanted Islamization as the focus of public discussion since early 1985. Even President Zia, when asked about the issue, indicated some discouragement over the prospects for Islamization.¹³

A sharp reversal of policy on Islamization under the new civilian government is unlikely. The Jamaat-i-Islami and other fundamentalists are only a minority in the National Assembly, but they will be watchful of government wavering on its commitment to Islamic values. However superficial the commitment of the nonfundamentalist elected politicians, they too operate in a different political atmosphere from that which existed before martial law. Islam is still very much a part of the public agenda and is likely to remain so for at least the near future. In fact, a peaceful transition to civilian government is probably the best way that Zia can institutionalize the Islamic reforms he has already initiated, thereby separating the issue of Islam from the legitimacy of military rule.

THE AFGHAN CONFLICT

Foreign affairs have been a major concern of Zia's martial law regime, especially since December, 1979, when the Soviet Union occupied neighboring Afghanistan. Six years later, Pakistan continues to host more than three million Afghan refugees and to suffer diplomatic pressures from the Soviet Union and frequent border incursions by the Soviet-supported Afghan air force.

Many Pakistanis feel that the war in Afghanistan has helped to perpetuate military rule and that Zia and mar-

(Continued on page 137)

William L. Richter, head of the department of political science at Kansas State University, has written extensively on Pakistani and Indian politics and on international and security issues in South Asia.

"There has been no respite in the bitter war in Afghanistan, and no political solution is in sight. . . . The Afghan freedom fighters show no signs of losing heart or abandoning the uneven struggle, despite heavy casualties. If anything, resistance to the Russians is intensifying."

Afghanistan at War

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

THE war being waged by the Afghan freedom fighters (the *mujahideen* or "holy warriors") against the Soviet Union and its puppet regime in Kabul has entered its seventh year, with no end in prospect. After years of shameful neglect, the American media have started to cover the war more frequently. For the moment, there is nothing "new" to report—no major military victories for the Afghans, no breakthrough on the diplomatic front, no easing of Moscow's multifaceted effort to crush the resistance, and no basic change in the plight of the four to five million Afghan refugees. But there has been no diminution in the determination of the Afghans to struggle on against the Soviet invaders.

Western information about the military situation inside Afghanistan comes from a variety of sources, the best of which are located in Peshawar, Pakistan, the communications hub for most Afghan resistance groups. The information is based on reports from freedom fighters returning from periods of combat in Afghanistan. Verification is virtually impossible, and there may be understandably inflated claims of successes. Nonetheless, the accounts provide a glimpse into the scope and activities of the *mujahideen* and help explain why the Soviet Union is having such a tough time winning the war.

One of the better-known information-collection organizations is the Afghan Information Center, an independent and nonpartisan institution headed by Professor Said B. Majrooh and not linked to any particular resistance movement. The July, 1985, issue of the Center's *Monthly Bulletin*, for example, reports on fighting in seven sectors: the province of Herat in the west that borders Iran and is strategically important to the Soviet Union because of the paved highway that goes through the region from Torghundi on the Soviet border south and east to Kabul via Herat, Kandahar and Ghazni, and because of the key air bases at Shindand and Herat; Ghor, a province in central Afghanistan; Ghazni, which is farther to the east; Kabul, the capital; some of the northern provinces like Balkh and Samangan, which were visited by Arthur Bonner of *The New York Times* (who subsequently wrote a series of articles on his experiences

with a guerrilla column); Kandahar; and Helmand, where "fighting between the resistance and the invasion forces lasted for 21 days. The *mujahideen* and the civilians suffered the heaviest losses in life and matériel since the invasion" in December, 1979.¹

The Soviet Union has an estimated 115,000 troops in Afghanistan. Over the past six years, Soviet military commanders have launched many offensives, but none has pacified any area for long. For example, in April, 1984, Moscow mounted its seventh offensive against the 75-mile-long Panjshir Valley, this time with more than 14,000 troops, 400 tanks and helicopter gunships. This *mujahideen* stronghold is situated about 50 miles northeast of Kabul. It stands astride the vital military highway and main supply route connecting Kabul with the Soviet border and close to the Salang Pass Tunnel, whose control is essential for Soviet logistical operations. The Soviet command had also hoped to capture the renowned resistance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud, with whom it had maintained a semiofficial truce for more than a year. The fighting dragged on until late November, 1984. In the end, Soviet troops were forced to withdraw because of winter weather, after destroying dozens of villages, killing hundreds of civilians and insurgents, and driving Massoud's forces high into the mountains. The withdrawal ended an inconclusive and costly campaign. A year later Massoud's forces were again ambushing Soviet/Afghan units and strongholds. Massoud's courage and resourcefulness have made him a symbol of the struggle in Afghanistan against the Russians.²

In May and June, 1985, a large Soviet military operation succeeded in lifting the siege of the Afghan government army camp at Barikot on the Afghan-Pakistani border. But no sooner was one fire put out than others flared up—in Khost, a garrison town farther to the southwest near the Pakistani border; in Herat; in Kabul; and elsewhere.

Soviet troops rely on overwhelming firepower: bombers, helicopter gunships, massive artillery bombardments and tanks. They seek to bomb the *mujahideen* into accepting the fact that it is futile to try to defeat the awesome power arrayed against them. To this end, Moscow is waging a brutal war of attrition, systematically destroying what it cannot control. The aim is to crush the Afghans' will to resist: crops are burned, water wells poisoned, livestock slaughtered, booby traps and antiper-

¹Afghan Information Center, *Monthly Bulletin*, no. 52 (July, 1985), pp. 18–19.

²Mark L. Urban, "The Battle for the Panjshir Valley—The Soviet Campaign of 1982," *Military Technology* (September, 1984), pp. 134–136.

sonnel mines indiscriminately set to prevent villagers from returning, and homes repeatedly strafed. These tactics are directed at destroying the Afghans' food system; the Soviet scorched-earth policy has aptly been termed selective genocide.

Notwithstanding the overwhelming Soviet superiority in weaponry and manpower, Soviet troops are being bloodied by the Afghan freedom fighters. As the mujahideen acquire better weapons, Soviet troops are incurring heavier casualties. It is estimated that they control less than 20 percent of the country, mainly the cities and key roads—and even there they are subjected to rocket attacks and sniper fire. The freedom fighters operate freely throughout the countryside. That Afghanistan is a dangerous place for Soviet soldiers is a theme that is increasingly relayed to the Soviet public by Soviet journalists.

Soviet correspondents now regularly report on the war. While extolling the ideals and heroism of Soviet forces (who, they say, are in Afghanistan only to help a "friendly country" that "requested" Soviet help against "foreign interventionist forces"), they devote growing attention to the actual combat environment, if only to help explain why Soviet soldiers are dying in an alien land. Inevitably, some of the harshness of the situation comes through.

One veteran journalist wrote in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*:

A struggle is being waged in among the markets, bazaars, mosques, pomegranate orchards, and cart tracks hewn out of rocks. A fierce and total clash of passions and ideals involving a multiplicity of destinies: they clash in ravines, along paths, at meetings, in raids, at mosques and universities, and at funerals and celebrations. . . .

I have the feeling that Afghanistan has split and cleaved our age into two parts. It has left behind the easy life, guaranteed personal and social prosperity, guaranteed peace. It has meant the beginning of terrible days and years involving acute danger, struggle, defense, personal sacrifice, rejection of personal prosperity for the sake of the state's common idea, and a collective sense of rebuff and sharpened civic consciousness.³

The mood of the report is somber and evocative, reflecting the realization in Soviet circles that the war will be long. In apparent recognition of the fact that Soviet troops will be fighting in Afghanistan for the indefinite future, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the newspaper of the Soviet army, is devoting a regular column to the war.⁴

³Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Afghan Reportage: Notes on the Armor," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (August 28, 1985), as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *USSR International Affairs*, September 6, 1985, pp. D1-D2.

⁴Radio Liberty, *Report*, RL 356/85 (October 25, 1985), p. 2.

⁵For example, *Pakistan Times*, March 6, 1985, and *The New York Times*, July 31, 1985.

⁶Joseph J. Collins, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study of the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1986), p. 150.

⁷For example, *Pakistan Times*, July 13, 1985; *The New York Times*, December 4, 1985; Radio Liberty, *Report*, RL 393/85 (November 22, 1985), p. 5; and accounts in the *Monthly Bulletin* of the Afghan Information Center (Peshawar).

In recent years, the Afghan resistance has become more sophisticated in its probes of Soviet vulnerability. For example, the Salang Pass Tunnel, the main artery connecting Kabul to the Soviet border, is a frequent target for ambushes. Last June, the mujahideen destroyed a column of more than 150 vehicles—mostly oil tankers—just north of the tunnel and captured more than 100 government soldiers; in July, a 50-truck convoy transporting bottled gas was hit at both ends of the tunnel; and in late November, another Soviet fuel supply column was struck.

Scattered, uncoordinated attacks are the norm. In August, 1985, Massoud's forces struck Soviet/Afghan garrisons in the Panjshir Valley; in the Paghman Valley northwest of Kabul, guerrillas knocked out several tanks and reportedly killed several hundred government troops. Hit-and-run rocket and mortar attacks on Soviet installations in the Kabul area are common, including launches against the Soviet military base at the Bagram (Kabul) airport.⁵ Similar incidents in Herat, in Kandahar, in Khost (which was besieged for much of 1985) and elsewhere have been reported by mujahideen sources. According to one leading American military analyst, Soviet forces generally "deal very poorly with ambushes," preferring to permit the guerrillas to take "the vehicles they have disabled and to move the rest of the convoy to safety," after which Soviet troops bomb and shell local villages.⁶

The overwhelming Soviet superiority in firepower is being slowly thwarted. Helicopter losses have increased. For a time, it appeared that the Soviet Mi-24 "Hind" helicopter gunship, an instrument of awesome firepower that can carry a dozen fully equipped soldiers, would demoralize and defeat the mujahideen. The gunships can spot guerrillas on the barren mountain paths and can riddle the area with fire and break up ambushes. But alertness, movement at night, and the growing availability of shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles like the American Stinger and the Soviet SAM-7 have restored some balance to the equation. The initial Soviet advantage has been reduced; and supporters of the Afghan freedom fighters abroad see a way to raise the cost of the war significantly. The downing of Soviet helicopters is no longer a rare news item.⁷

A spokesman for one of the Afghan resistance groups told this writer the incredible story of how helicopters have been downed by rocks! Much of the fighting takes place in deep ravines and rugged mountain terrain. A group of Afghans on a 2,000- or 3,000-foot ridge will shoot at an Mi-24 to draw its fire and bring it in closer; meanwhile, several thousand feet higher, piles of rocks are loosened, and one of them may hit a rotor or cause enough damage to cripple and "kill" the helicopter.

Defections hamper Soviet operations. On the ground, troops of the pro-Soviet puppet regime of President Babrak Karmal often deliberately avoid the "hot pursuit" of guerrilla bands. Desertions in the field are common. In

July, 1985, government pilots defected to Pakistan with two Soviet Mi-24 helicopter gunships. This marked the first time that this advanced type of aircraft "landed in a country with Western military ties, thus allowing Western intelligence officials to inspect the machines firsthand."⁸ Defections of diplomats and other employees abroad are also a constant source of embarrassment to Moscow and its client regime in Kabul.⁹

During the past year or so, according to one Western analyst, the mujahideen have "held their own despite setbacks, and continue to operate throughout most of the country":

They are much better organized and more effective than before, and there is an observable tendency toward greater professionalization of the resistance fighters, many of whom have now accumulated years of experience in the field. Military effectiveness is also enhanced by better supplies of heavy weapons, such as heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mortars, and an occasional SAM-7 anti-air missile, particularly in the eastern regions close to the Pakistan border.¹⁰

THE MUJAHIDEEN

From the very beginning of the resistance to the pro-Soviet Marxist regime that seized power in April, 1978, opposition parties have been sharply divided along ethnic, tribal, political and personal lines. Although they share a commitment to topple the puppet government in Kabul, they find cooperation extremely difficult. As a people, Afghans are individualistic, proud, stoic and fiercely clannish, commendable traits on a personal level, but characteristics that frustrate efforts to mount an effective resistance struggle. However, in the tradition of Khushan Khatak, a sixteenth-century warrior-poet, they bring to their diversity an underlying passion to oust the invader. The problem has been to find some formula for optimizing the efforts of these diverse parties.

To British journalist Mike Martin, who spent four months with different resistance groups inside Afghanistan, the fragmentation was pluralism run rampant:

Afghanistan was a huge patchwork of parties, some big and some small, who jealously guarded their territory and whose strategy was largely "what we have, we hold." Control of

⁸*The New York Times*, July 14, 1985.

⁹A Supreme Court judge who fled Afghanistan asserted that the country's legal system had been reduced to "organized terror." *The Guardian* (London), April 27, 1985.

¹⁰Alex R. Alexiev, "Soviet Strategy and the Mujahideen," *Orbis*, vol. 29, no. 1 (Spring, 1985), p. 36.

¹¹Mike Martin, *Afghanistan: Inside a Rebel Stronghold: Journeys With the Mujahiddin* (Poole, England: Blandford Press, 1984), pp. 155–156.

¹²Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 294.

¹³Tahir Amin, *Afghanistan in Crisis* (Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), pp. 96–97.

¹⁴John B. Ritch III, "Hidden War: The Struggle for Afghanistan," United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 1984), p. 22.

¹⁵Bradsher, op. cit., p. 294.

territory—and the acquisition of more—was a powerful driving force. Many provinces were dominated by one or other of the major parties, but they rarely exercised exclusive control. The unspoken truth was that, parallel to the war of resistance, the rival parties were often fighting each other.¹¹

The leading political parties have their headquarters in Peshawar. The group espousing the establishment of an Islamic state is referred to as the Alliance. Of the seven parties making up this grouping, three are important: Jamiat-i Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Society of Afghanistan), led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani; Hezb-i Islami Afghanistan (the Afghanistan Islamic party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; and a breakaway group using the same name, headed by Maulavi Younes Khalis. Whereas Rabbani's group derives support primarily from the Tajiks and Uzbeks in northeastern Afghanistan, the latter two are mainly Pushtun (Pathan) in character, although they are also able "to appeal across ethnic lines to northern peoples."¹²


The Jamiat-i Islami and Hezb-i Islami groups can be traced back to the period of King Zahir Shah, whose monarchy was overthrown in 1973. They oppose a return to a monarchical form of government, blaming the King for the introduction of Communists into the political system in the first place.¹³

The second group of parties, known as Unity, was formed after the struggle against the Communist regime began in 1978 and is more moderate and promonarchist. The three main member parties are: Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami Afghanistan (the Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan), led by Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi; Payman-e Ettihad-e Islam (the National Islamic Front), led by Pir Sayed Ahmed Ghalani; and Jabha-ye Azadire Afghanistan (the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan), led by Professor S. Mojadeddi.¹⁴ According to Henry Bradsher, a veteran Afghan-watcher, "all three parties' leaders [are] heads of important families noted for their religious authority, and all three [draw] their support predominantly from the Pushtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan."¹⁵

To this group of six parties should be added the fundamentalist Islamic Alliance, headed by Professor Abdul Rasul Siyaf. All are Sunni, and they constitute the principal parties operating in Peshawar, although there are dozens of other smaller mujahideen organizations.

Little is known of the activities of the Shiite groups based in Iran, the most important of which are held to be An-Nasr (Victory) and the Afghan Islamic Revolution Freedom Front.

In April, 1982, Saudi pressure forced the seven leading parties in Peshawar to take steps to promote political cooperation. In July, 1983, former King Zahir Shah broke his silence and called on all parties "to set aside all our disputes and differences and, as soon as possible, to establish" a united front for the purpose of more effectively defending "the people of Afghanistan" at home and in



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international forums. Although there was strong interest among some parties in exploring the overture, the opposition of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and others who blamed the King for the Communist takeover foreclosed even the possibility of using him as a symbol around which diverse groups might coalesce.

The most recent effort at fashioning a united front took place in May, 1985, when the seven leading resistance movements formed a new coalition—the Islamic Unity

of Afghan Mujahideen. The coalition plans to create a
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Extensive poverty continues to haunt the military rulers of Bangladesh. While elections have been promised for the spring of 1986, "Bangladesh also requires sympathetic treatment from the developed and the oil-exporting nations as it strives to improve its own economy and social infrastructure."

Continuing Problems in Bangladesh

By CRAIG BAXTER

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BANGLADESH celebrated the fourteenth anniversary of its separation from Pakistan on December 16, 1985. The country remains one of the poorest in the world; with a gross national product per capita of \$130 it ranks ahead only of Ethiopia according to the World Bank.¹ Thus the rulers of Bangladesh, like the rulers of other newly independent countries, have found that the resource base does not suddenly increase when independence arrives and that rapid rates of population growth do not decline, at least quickly enough, because of pious statements.

Nor has Bangladesh shown much improvement in political development; it has been led by authoritarian civilian or military regimes throughout most of its existence as an independent nation. The prospects for basic self-sufficiency in food are questionable, and the outlook for social service areas like education and health care delivery is perhaps even more dismal.

The three leaders of Bangladesh who served relatively long periods had and have very different styles. Although the goals of economic and social development have been constant, the means proposed to reach those goals have varied. Sheik Mujibur Rahman (January, 1972–August, 1975), the "father of the nation," declared that Bangladesh would be built on the "pillars" of democracy, socialism, secularism and nationalism. His socialist pattern crippled the already very weak economy and so did the loss of West Pakistani capital and entrepreneurship. As a result of increasing economic problems and charges of corruption and nepotism, opposition to his rule grew. Rahman abandoned his pillar of democracy and imposed an authoritarian regime, severely curtailing political activity. This action solved none of the difficulties, but it focused opposition to his rule. He was assassinated by disaffected military officers on August 15, 1975.

After a series of rebellions, power passed to Major General Ziaur Rahman (November, 1975–May, 1981). Gradually, Zia relaxed restrictions on the political system. Although he was confirmed as President in an un-

contested referendum in May, 1977, Zia recognized that this action did not confer legitimacy on him or on his regime. To gain a more solid basis for his rule he won a contested presidential election in June, 1978. This was followed by the restoration of Parliament through an election in February, 1979. In the election, the party supporting Zia, the Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP), won a substantial majority, 207 of the 300 seats. Zia ended the martial law under which he had governed and ruled with strong parliamentary support. Shah Azizur Rahman was named Prime Minister, but the President retained substantial powers.

Zia proclaimed a 19-point program aimed at significant economic and social changes. His primary object was an increase in food production. Rice production subsequently rose from about 10 million tons in 1973–1974 to more than 15 million tons in 1982–1983. Almost as important was the slowing of the rate of population increase. This was only minimally effective; the rate dropped from 2.6 percent in the late 1960's to 2.4 percent in the late 1970's. As a result, the per capita production of food increased only 1 percent during the same period.

Other goals of Zia's program included better health service delivery systems and improved primary school attendance. The private sector was encouraged to enter industry; but this effort proved only minimally effective, and few steps were taken to dismantle the state-owned and generally inefficient enterprises inherited from the Mujib period.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Zia regime was Zia's personal enthusiasm. His politics have been called the "politics of hope,"² and he exhorted Bangladeshis to improve their state through cooperation and self-help (*Swanirvar*). Zia's assassination on May 30, 1981, was a blow to political development and to the process of cooperation that he had stimulated.

Abdus Sattar, his successor, served less than a year. His election gave brief support to the belief that Bangladesh would continue the process of democratization begun under Zia. But an economic turndown, charges of corruption in high office, the age (and presumed weakness) of the elderly President and, especially, the demands of the military for a role in governing the country led to the downfall of his government. Even in Zia's

¹Unless otherwise stated, basic economic data are taken from World Bank, *World Development Report, 1985* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

²See Craig Baxter, *Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 71.

civilianized government there had been a connection with the military, because Zia was a former army chief of staff; Sattar had no military connection. On March 24, 1982, the new chief of staff, Lieutenant General Husain Muhammad Ershad, removed Sattar and declared martial law.

Following the pattern of most leaders of military takeovers, Ershad declared that he was acting to preserve the integrity of the country and to replace drift with discipline, and promised that he would soon hold elections. He announced elections several times, beginning in May, 1984, but no elections have been held. His current target date is the spring of 1986.

INDOOR POLITICS

The practice of politics was, of course, banned after the proclamation of martial law, but political activity has sometimes been permitted. An "in-between" state peculiar to Bangladesh has also been allowed. This is known as "indoor politics," i.e., no public, outdoor meetings can be held but politicking may take place in the privacy of homes or party offices. During most of the Ershad period, the press has carried reports about the activities of the major organizations and even the almost countless tiny groups that describe themselves as parties. At times, political leaders and their followers have been subject to detention, but major personalities have usually been detained only briefly and have often been placed under house rather than jail arrest. Perhaps one reason for the use of house arrest is that the leaders of the two principal groups opposing Ershad are women. Both groups are alliances of a number of parties, but in each group one party is dominant.

A seven-party alliance has been formed around the BNP, which itself was created to support Zia. It is headed by Khaleida Zia, the widow of Ziaur Rahman, and includes many of the figures who were associated with him. However, during 1985, the BNP lost several of its key personalities, including former Prime Minister Shah Azizur Rahman, who founded his own faction of the BNP and then led it into the Janadal alliance, which supports Ershad. Another loss was former Deputy Prime Minister Moudud Ahmad, who has joined the Ershad Cabinet. The BNP-led alliance demands early elections, preferably first for Parliament, and it pledges to return to the policies of Zia—sharing power between the President and the Parliament.

A 17-party alliance is clustered around the Awami League and is led by Hasina Wajed, Mujib's daughter. The Awami League is a far older party, dating back to the early days of Pakistan; it was the winner by a large margin in the election of 1970 before the civil war. It performed poorly in the 1979 parliamentary election, coming in second with 39 seats. This alliance also de-

mands early elections but, unlike the BNP-led group, it asks for full restoration of parliamentary sovereignty and the socialist development of Bangladesh. In foreign policy, the Awami League might support closer relations with India and the Soviet Union. Its members have been in the wilderness for ten years, but some support for the party may remain.

Ershad wants to remain President in a system dominated by the President. To achieve this, he needs a party or a group that will support his policies. Thus he has formed Janadal, an acronym for "people's party." Many members of the alliance built around Janadal are former supporters of the BNP; they include Shah Azizur Rahman and Moudud Ahmed. Ershad has also brought in individuals who have not been directly involved in politics, including Anwar Husain "Manju," now a Cabinet minister and publisher of *Ittefaq*, the largest newspaper in Bangladesh, and Ataur Rahman Khan, the doyen of Bangladeshi politicians, who was chief minister of East Pakistan in the 1950's and was briefly Prime Minister under Ershad. The party would prefer to hold a presidential election first and follow this with polling for Parliament. The reason is transparent. If Ershad should win the presidential election, a reasonable prospect, his ability to form a "king's party" will be greatly enhanced, and the likelihood that Ershad's associates will gain a majority in Parliament will be much improved. Zia followed this sequence with great success.

For this reason, the two major opposition alliances have demanded that the parliamentary election be held first. Ershad has compromised and has committed himself to a simultaneous election, because both alliances threatened to boycott earlier polling dates. Their threatened boycotts were based on other factors as well, including demands for the withdrawal of martial law and the unconditional release of political prisoners.

Ershad's policies do not differ greatly from Zia's, although he lacks Zia's charismatic personality. Food production, population planning, primary and vocational education and health care delivery remain major aims. However, Ershad's regime has taken some steps that Zia's government avoided or delayed. Ershad has revised the food-rationing system, under which urban dwellers were provided basic foodstuffs at subsidized prices, and he has raised the prices paid to producers as an incentive for higher production. He has also taken major steps in the denationalization of industries that are government owned, returning some properties to previous owners and auctioning others to new entrepreneurs. He has even taken steps to denationalize some banks and has permitted others to open in the private sector. More liberal conditions for foreign investment, however, have not yielded much result.

The decentralization of government has also been undertaken and is now on its way to implementation.³ Decentralization is not a new idea. The average

³For more detail see Larry Schroeder, "Decentralization in Rural Bangladesh," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 11 (November, 1985), pp. 1134-1147.

population of the former 21 districts approached five million. Mujib proposed increasing the number of districts to about 50, but the plan had not been implemented before he was assassinated. Zia looked to the devolution of some power to local bodies under *Swanirvar*.

Ershad has upgraded the subdivisions into which the former districts were divided to the level of district. There are now 64 districts, and the subdivision term is no longer used. The next lower level, the *thana* (properly the area of the jurisdiction of a police station), was redesignated the *upazila* (literally, subdistrict). The 4,354 union *parishads* (councils) remain the basic unit of local government.

The key in the new system is the *upazila*, the *parishad* of which is comprised of a directly elected chairman and members drawn from the chairmen of the union *parishads*. The elections for chairmen have been held; and members have been added from the union-level bodies, including the chairmen of any town councils in the area. In addition, three women members are appointed along with one other member, often to represent minorities, and the chairman of the local cooperative association is included. These are the voting members. Under the new system, officials are included in the *upazila parishad* membership but do not have a vote.

The *upazila parishad* receives funds from two sources: central government grants and locally raised revenues through taxes on market income, fishing income and some types of business activity. These funds may be spent in certain categories for which there are minimums and maximums set by the central government. For example, spending on agriculture, industry and irrigation must range between 30 percent and 40 percent, while infrastructure expenditures must range between 25 percent and 35 percent. It is believed that the rural resident will be more highly motivated toward development if he sees his tax money being spent in his local area.

The threefold expansion of the number of districts has created a shortage of senior officers. This shortage has spread to the *upazila* as well. The opposition alliances have complained that Ershad is using the new system to create a following among the local notables. No doubt he is, as Zia did before him.

ECONOMIC DECLINE

There has been a substantial growth in food production in the last decade, from about 10 million tons per year to more than 15 million tons. There has been a greater use of fertilizer (3.5 times as much as in

1970). Much of the nitrogenous fertilizer is manufactured in Bangladesh using the natural gas resources of the country. There has also been some improvement in irrigation, although much remains to be done. Improvements in irrigation are tied partly to the question of the sharing of the waters of the Ganges River with India. The area under double- and triple-cropping has increased. And the producer price paid to farmers has been increased moderately.

The continued rapid growth of population, however, has limited the increase in the per capita food supply (domestic and imported) to only one percent in the last decade. Bangladeshi planners say that at least 60 percent of the people go to bed hungry each night. The World Bank notes that on the average Bangladeshis receive only 83 percent of the minimum daily caloric requirement, and even this substandard amount is seriously deficient in proteins and overly concentrated in carbohydrates. Bangladesh imported 1.8 million tons of cereals, more than 10 percent of its consumption, in 1983, with about two-thirds of this bought by grant aid. The government's sale of this food helps to raise local funds for development and to fund the Food for Work program.

The extraordinarily small size of farms in Bangladesh may make it difficult to improve output. The expensive seed, fertilizer, pesticide and water required for higher yields are difficult to obtain for farmers whose operation is often barely subsistence. In 1977, when the maximum landholding was limited to 33 acres per family, a census showed that only 0.4 percent of families owned 25 acres or more and that the average holding, including those who held no land at all, was 2.3 acres.⁴ Furthermore, largely because of Muslim and Hindu inheritance patterns, the holdings are usually fragmented into minuscule and distant plots. A 1978 survey showed that 59.4 percent of rural families either owned no farmland (14.7 percent) or owned one acre or less (44.7 percent), a size that cannot yield a subsistence level. It is possible that the landless and the nearly landless rural population may be mobilized in a sort of peasants' revolt against the government and its supporters, the larger landholders and the urban elites. With the lack of communication and organizational skills and the absence of an active leader of the rural poor, this seems not likely soon. Nonetheless, the difficulties India experienced in the neighboring Naxalbari area of West Bengal cannot be ignored.

LAND REFORM

In September, 1984, Ershad's regime proclaimed a new land reform ordinance, replacing the law that had been passed in the early days of East Pakistan. The ceiling on landholding per family will be reduced to approximately 20 acres. This will not free much land for redistribution; according to one estimate, 450,000 acres of the total of 22 million acres under cultivation will be released.⁵ The ordinance also limits transfer within fami-

⁴These data on land ownership are drawn from Bangladesh, Ministry of Planning, *Statistical Yearbook for Bangladesh, 1981* (Dacca: Ministry of Planning, 1981), which cites the surveys mentioned.

⁵See Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladesh in 1984: A Year of Protracted Turmoil," *Asian Survey*, vol. 25, no. 2 (February, 1985), p. 165.

lies to circumvent the land ceiling rules, gives greater protection to sharecroppers and sets lower limits on the share of the crop given to the landowner on sharecropped land. The enforcement of the ordinance is reportedly under way, but a final evaluation cannot yet be made.

Besides rice, the principal agricultural crop is jute, a fiber whose day may well have passed because other materials for sacking, carpet backing and rope are now preferred. Raw jute and the manufactures of jute account for about 70 percent of Bangladesh's exports. During 1985, jute growers complained that the government procurement price for raw jute was below production costs. The government responded by raising the price slightly, but it noted that the export price of the fiber was very weak. Tea is also grown for export. Sales of tea amount to less than 6 percent of exports, a figure that seems unlikely to rise in the face of competition from preferred teas grown in India, Sri Lanka and elsewhere.

Industry has shown a creditable growth rate since independence, but this is calculated from a very small beginning base. From 1965 to 1973, Bangladeshi industry actually declined 6.1 percent per year, but this period included the devastating civil war and the reconstruction, including the years when Mujib was inflicting his disastrous socialist program. From 1973 to 1983, the annual growth rate was 8.1 percent. This did not greatly increase industry's share of the gross domestic product, which rose from 11 percent in 1965 to 13 percent in 1983 (agriculture declined from 53 percent to 47 percent in the same years; services rose from 36 percent to 40 percent). In the industrial sector, as measured by value added in 1981, textiles and clothing contributed 37 percent; food and agriculture, 30 percent; and chemicals, 17 percent. The textile category included the manufacture of jute; the chemical share included the processing of natural gas into nitrogenous fertilizers.

There was a 7.4 percent annual growth in the use of energy from 1973 to 1983 (including only commercial energy and excluding traditional sources like firewood and cow dung). This rate is below the rate for industrial growth, but it is important to note that Bangladesh imports only 20 percent (1983) of its energy requirements, drawing domestically from its natural gas deposits and its small hydroelectric production. To put it another way, only 12 percent of the country's imports are in the fuel category.

The trade balance remains in deficit. In 1983, Bangladesh's imports totaled approximately \$1.5 billion and its exports totaled about \$0.8 billion, leaving a deficit of \$713 million. There is little prospect that the demand for imports (more than half in manufactured goods, much of this capital equipment) will decline in the near future. Therefore Bangladesh, like so many developing countries, must emphasize exports. In fact, export earnings dropped below an annual rate of \$500 million in the third

quarter of 1985.⁶ The principal exports are jute and its products and tea. Textiles and clothing (including manufactured jute) account for 47 percent of the exports (1983) and other primary commodities (including tea and raw jute) for 36 percent. Bangladesh's few natural resources permit little expansion into other fields, and the low educational base makes it unlikely that Bangladesh can become a major overseas manufacturing center on the order of East Asian countries or Sri Lanka and India.

Remittances from Bangladeshi workers overseas have been a substantial source of foreign exchange, \$629 million in 1983 in official recorded channels and no doubt a significant additional amount if unrecorded transfers are included. It seems unlikely that this rate will be maintained. The current price war among oil producers will increase the rate of decline in job opportunities in the Gulf and other Middle Eastern areas. The government reported in October, 1985, that 350,000 Bangladeshis were working in the Middle East and added—perhaps unrealistically—that job prospects were “bright.”⁷

Because of the recent provision of a large proportion of economic assistance through grants rather than loans, Bangladesh does not have an unduly high debt-service problem. Debt service amounts to 1.3 percent of gross national product and, to use a more significant figure, 14.7 percent of export earnings.

SOCIAL FACTORS

In 1981, 74 percent of the employed laborers in Bangladesh were engaged in agriculture, although they produced only 47 percent of the gross domestic product. It is not clear from the data available how many workers are employed full time and how many are part-time laborers; underemployment is endemic.

Agricultural labor is unorganized in Bangladesh. There are a number of industrial trade unions, some of them affiliated with political parties. However, in a nation that clearly has a labor surplus, these unions have little political or economic power.

The labor surplus is not all employable. Bangladesh's educational standards are exceptionally low. Literacy is estimated at 25 percent, but this is probably a high estimate. The government reports that 60 percent of all children are attending primary school, but this figure is also probably high and perhaps includes those who attended school at any time during the academic year, rather than regular attendees. Only 15 percent of those who are eligible attend secondary school, and only 4 percent are involved in higher education. Technical and vocational training is at a very low level. Bangladesh must devote more of its limited resources to education if it

(Continued on page 131)

Craig Baxter served in the Foreign Service from 1956 to 1980, and was posted in Dacca in 1976–1978. Among his books is *Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).

⁶*Bangladesh Observer* (Dacca), October 9, 1985.

⁷*Bangladesh Observer*, October 28, 1985.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION, 1964–1983. *By Anthony Hyman.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 247 pages, notes, appendixes and index, \$25.00.)

AFGHANISTAN: INSIDE A REBEL STRONGHOLD. *By Mike Martin.* (Poole, England: Blanford Press, 1985. [Distributed in the U.S. by New York: Sterling Publishing.] 256 pages, photographs and index, \$16.95.)

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET WAR. *By Edward Girardet.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 259 pages and index, \$19.95.)

As the war in Afghanistan enters its sixth year, it remains, like many third world conflicts, underreported and poorly analyzed. The three books under review offer important information on the war by reporters who spent time in Afghanistan with the Afghan guerrillas fighting Soviet and Afghan government troops.

Hyman begins with a background description of Afghanistan before the invasion; he clearly explains the Afghan people and the politics of the preceding regimes. He offers a perfunctory description of the multitudinous groupings of guerrillas, who range from Islamic fundamentalists (the true mujahideen or holy warriors) to secular leftists. This edition has been updated to include events from 1982 and 1983.

Girardet, a reporter for the *Christian Science Monitor*, skips the de rigueur description of Afghanistan before the invasion and provides an informative analysis of the resistance. He details the various factions' political and religious tendencies and the problems of coordination and alliances between factions; he also discusses the guerrillas' lack of political organization, which is reflected in the dearth of guerrilla-governed zones. Other chapters in this overall view of the Afghan conflict include discussions of the Afghan refugees and the Soviet Union's "Sovietization" of Afghan society (a process that has occurred only in the major cities).

While Girardet's work is an excellent overview of the resistance and the war, Martin's report on his four-month stay with the most radical Islamic mujahideen—Hezb—is an up-close study. This is very much a book of first-hand impressions; it offers one of the clearest pictures of what the Afghan war is like at the personal level. W.W.F.

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN. *By Alan Campbell-Johnson.* (New York: Atheneum, 1985. 383 pages, photographs and index, \$11.95, paper.)

This is the third reprinting of Campbell-Johnson's

diary of his 10 months as press attaché to Lord Mountbatten. It remains an essential resource for anyone interested in the people and events that led to the partition of India and Pakistan and the transfer of power from Great Britain. W.W.F.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA. *By Pranab Bardhan.* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 118 pages, notes, appendix, bibliography and index, \$24.95.)

Bardhan, a respected development economist at the University of California at Berkeley, reviews the constraints on resource-rich India's economic development. He argues for increased public investment in both agriculture and industry as the means to spur economic growth. Bardhan notes that unlike the government's role in South Korea or Japan, the Indian government's role in the economy has generally been regulatory and not overtly interventionist; thus, there is little possibility of an economic "miracle" on the Japanese or Korean model. W.W.F.

BANGLADESH: A NEW NATION IN AN OLD SETTING. *By Craig Baxter.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 130 pages, photographs, notes, annotated bibliography and index, \$16.50.)

Fifteen-year-old Bangladesh remains mired in poverty and military-authoritarian rule. The author's well-written introduction to the country cogently describes Bangladesh's history as East Pakistan, its bloody birth and the reasons for the persistence of its political and economic problems. W.W.F.

ZIA'S PAKISTAN: POLITICS AND STABILITY IN A FRONTLINE STATE. *Edited by Craig Baxter.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986. 122 pages and notes, \$16.50, paper.)

This collection of research papers examines several factors affecting the stability of Zia ul-Haq's partially civilianized government, including the influence of urban and rural groups, economic growth, the military and the influx of Afghan refugees. The concluding chapter by the editor succinctly analyzes possible alternatives to Zia's rule; Baxter argues that the military will almost certainly be involved in the political process and that the Islamization of the state begun under Zia is too entrenched to be removed. W.W.F.

JINNAH OF PAKISTAN. *By Stanley Wolpert.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. 421 pages, photographs, notes, bibliography and index, \$24.95.)

Wolpert's biography of the founder of modern Pakistan casts Jinnah not as the implacable dissenter (a "psychopathic case," according to Lord Mountbatten) who rebelled at a united India but as an ardent

nationalist. The chapters on the partitioning of India and the creation of Pakistan are more historical narrative than biography. W.W.F.

SRI LANKA IN CHANGE AND CRISIS. *Edited by James Manor.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 229 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

SRI LANKA: THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE TAMIL LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. *By Satchi Ponnambalam.* (London: Zed Press, 1984. [Distributed in the U.S. by Totowa, N.J.: Biblio Distribution Center.] 273 pages, notes, bibliography and appendix, \$30.00.)

The papers in the Manor volume are divided into two parts. The first section analyzes the 1982 presidential election and the parliamentary referendum held later that year; the second section covers the ethnic violence between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Most of the papers on the election and referendum consider the events a defeat for democracy in Sri Lanka, because President Jayawardene: 1) called for presidential elections before parliamentary elections, and 2) then called for a referendum asking for an extension of the current Parliament until 1989, thereby assuring himself continued support in Parliament. The chapters on the ethnic violence center on the widespread killings of July, 1983; they detail the complaints of the minority Tamils and the feelings of the Sinhalese majority.

Ponnambalam's book is an unabashed defense of the Tamils (it is copublished by the Tamil Information Center, Surrey, England). It is a good background source on the grievances of the Tamils, but the author's reliance on Marxist class analysis to make his case detracts from his overall presentation. W.W.F.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: A BIOGRAPHY. Vol. III: 1956–1964. *By Sarvepalli Gopal.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984. 336 pages, notes, photographs, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

Gopal's much-praised biography of Nehru covers the last years of the Prime Minister's life. Foreign policy concerns were paramount during this period; the volume focuses on Nehru's attempts at mediation in the Congo, the war with China, nuclear disarmament, and the management of relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. W.W.F.

MISCELLANEOUS

ESTRANGEMENT: AMERICA AND THE WORLD. *Edited by Sanford J. Ungar.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 347 pages, notes, chronology and index, \$19.95.)

According to Ungar, the United States has entered a new era of relations with the world, one in which the United States is "separate" and "aloof." While some neoconservative intellectuals welcome this trend and call for an even more isolationist American foreign

policy—withdrawal from multilateral alliances and unilateral military interventions in defense of anti-Communists—Ungar and the other authors of these essays take a different tack. Each essay explores a facet of American postwar foreign policy to look for the roots of the current estrangement. Francis Fitzgerald provocatively examines the millenarianism she sees permeating United States foreign policy since George Washington's presidency. Robert Dallek offers a revisionist interpretation of the creation of the postwar world, and there are discussions of America's economic interdependence by Lester Thurow and America's "Quest for Invulnerability" by James Chace. Richard Ullman's review of possible solutions to estrangement ends with a call for an increased emphasis on multilateralism and, most important, "a drastic deescalation of the U.S.–Soviet conflict." He notes that for the United States this will not be possible during the Reagan presidency; however, only a deescalation of tensions will "liberate American policymakers to search for cooperative solutions to many of the most vexing problems that beset every one of the world's nations." W.W.F.

STAR WARRIORS. *By William Broad.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 245 pages, photographs and index, \$16.95.)

The popularized title aside, this is a sincere attempt to understand the men—there are no women principals—who are the theorists and developers of the weaponry that will constitute the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative. Much has been made of the men's youth, their cases of cola and their workaholic habits, but Broad, a science writer for *The New York Times*, also brings out the intellectual currents and political attitudes surrounding the men. All are committed to the idea that they are building the weapons of peace; and all are caught in the lure of high technology. It is this belief that there is a technological "fix" to the reality of mutual assured destruction that motivates most proponents of "Star Wars" and especially the scientists portrayed in Broad's book; Broad doubts the efficacy of such a defense because he does not share the belief in such a "fix." "The young scientists have never seen the sky painted with the reds and oranges of a high-altitude nuclear explosion. . . . They are creating a world of nuclear weapons they can know only through the sanitized flicker of electronic meters and the painstaking analysis of chart paper." W.W.F.

ARAB AND ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DIRECTORY, 1984–1985. *Edited by the Union of International Associations.* (New York: K. G. Saur, 1984. 477 pages, tables and index, \$100.00.)

The *Arab and Islamic International Organization Directory* provides brief, detailed descriptions of 500 worldwide
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INDIAN ECONOMY

(Continued from page 108)

ducers but narrowly segment the suppliers' side of the market for many products. While the original import substitution policy behind India's industrialization had as its justification an effort to protect Indian industrial firms during their early growth periods, the policy has been distorted to provide almost unlimited protection and guaranteed markets for any domestic enterprise producing any product. The licensing procedures that control entry or expansion have been used to discourage the entry of new firms into an industry or the expansion of existing firms, so that any existing firm has a guaranteed market. The antimonopoly legislation requiring additional entry procedures for larger enterprises is also restrictive.

The policy for small-scale enterprise, which restricts the production of a wide variety of modern items to very small firms to guarantee their markets, also discourages the growth of firms above those limits, makes it difficult to achieve any economies of scale in production, and discourages the introduction of more modern, and possibly more costly, technology in the small-scale enterprises. The consequent segmentation of markets by producers guarantees markets and profitability at relatively low levels of capacity operation, since potential competitors find entry difficult if not impossible. Segmentation also makes it unnecessary for producers to improve quality to capture new markets or to introduce new technologies to reduce costs. The results of such efforts might not be approved by responsible government agencies.

Fortunately, Indian policymakers seem to be increasingly aware of these problems. The government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is apparently taking steps to reduce the rigidities of licensing and antimonopoly controls; to raise the size limits within which small-scale units can grow; and to reduce the more detailed and direct planning controls, replacing the latter by more indirect and far more flexible fiscal and financial policies. Steps are also being taken to improve the management and efficiency of public sector enterprises, so that those firms will become net contributors to the government's investment resources rather than drains on them.

If these trends continue, India should be able once more to reach the rates of industrial growth that it achieved before 1965. India today has an educated labor force, a high level of scientific and managerial manpower, a long entrepreneurial tradition, abundant natural resources and a large infrastructure capacity.

However, in the area of infrastructure, improved performance from existing electric power and rail transport capacity is required, and capacity must be expanded to meet new demands and reduce existing bottlenecks. This will call for additional public investment. Whether the dominant political groups in the country will be amenable to such shifts in investment is still unknown. In

addition to investment, the managerial efficiency of the government-owned electric power plants and transport facilities must be improved. Increasing demand for power and transport and dissatisfaction with existing inefficiencies may gradually force such improvements.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

India has come a long way economically since independence; in the process, it has achieved a firm foundation for further growth. Perhaps the best measures of its achievement are the ending of famines, the large increase in the number of educated Indians, and the high rates of total savings and investment (at close to 25 percent of GNP). But these are preliminaries. The major tasks remain: accelerating growth and significantly reducing poverty. How can the resources of savings and the large, well-educated labor force be used with greater effectiveness to achieve faster growth and higher standards of living? Fortunately for India, many constraints on growth, especially over the next 20 years, arise from past policies. The economists and policymakers in India's government today are apparently aware of the issues and are moving to deal with them in the framework of India's socialist economy and democratic political system. If this political drive continues, there may be significant positive results, both in the form of accelerated growth and in the reduction of poverty, in the reasonably near future. ■

TENSION AND CONFLICT IN SRI LANKA

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country in regard to ethnic affairs and terrorism and seek solutions."²⁰ The all-party format for discussion was intended to rise above partisan contention, which had repeatedly frustrated earlier efforts. The TULF agreed to participate, but shortly after the dialogue began the SLFP withdrew, seriously compromising the nonpartisan nature of the discussions. The party delegations were soon joined by representatives of religious and cultural groups, in order to bring members of the influential *sangha* (Buddhist clergy) into the talks. In the past, some of the most impassioned opposition to government concessions to Tamil claims had come from clerical ranks.

The talks continued throughout the year. One long-standing ethnic problem was apparently resolved in the early sessions. Agreement was recorded on granting Sri Lankan citizenship to those members of the Indian Tamil community who did not possess either Sri Lankan or Indian citizenship and who remained in Sri Lanka.²¹ Soon after independence, Sri Lankan citizenship had

²⁰All Party Conference, Sri Lanka, *Statements of His Excellency the President and Chairman of the All Party Conference* (Colombo: All Party Conference Secretariat, December 14, 1984), p. 11.

²¹Sri Lanka, All Party Conference, *Report to the Plenary Sessions of the All Party Conference by His Excellency the President, Chairman of the Committee of Leaders of Delegations to the All Party Conference* (Colombo: All Party Conference Secretariat, September 21, 1984), pp. 5-6.

been defined to exclude a large proportion of the Indian Tamil community. Most of those affected did not possess Indian citizenship and consequently became stateless. Several agreements were reached by New Delhi and Colombo under which some Indian Tamils departed for India and others received Sri Lankan citizenship. A residual group of stateless persons who did not wish to go to India had, however, remained. The 1984 accord seemed to assure Sri Lankan citizenship and permanent residence on the island for this group.

Once the question of the Indian Tamils was resolved, the all-party talks focused on questions of regional autonomy and the devolution of government power to local or regional public bodies. Despite what appeared to be a substantial narrowing of differences, the talks were adjourned at the end of the year and (to the surprise of some participants) were not resumed in 1985.

One problem of the All Party Conference was that, while almost every variety of political opinion among the Sinhalese was represented, the separatist guerrilla organizations had no direct voice in the talks, and the extent to which the TULF could secure separatist acquiescence in any agreements was suspect. A renewal of large-scale violence occurred in 1985, including a rocket attack that destroyed a large police installation in Jaffna city. The violent confrontations between separatist guerrillas and security forces began to shift from the north to the east.

In June, however, a group of separatist organizations announced a cease-fire as a prelude to talks with the Sri Lankan government. The cease-fire and the willingness to negotiate were evidently the result of strong prodding by the government of India. Discussions were held in Thimpu, the capital of the tiny Himalayan state of Bhutan, in July and August. The talks were attended by spokesmen for the government of Sri Lanka, an alliance of four of the major separatist organizations called the Eelam Tamil Liberation Front, and the TULF.

Little public information was available. In the first sessions the Tamil separatist representatives apparently presented a set of four principles that were to serve as the basis for discussion of ethnic and territorial problems, to which the government of Sri Lanka responded in the August meeting. The four principles called for recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a "distinct nationality," the Tamil-populated areas as a Tamil "homeland," the right of self-determination for the Tamils, and the right to citizenship for all Tamils residing in Sri Lanka. The last of the principles presumably referred to the status of Indian Tamils resolved at the earlier All Party Conference.

The government response raised questions of definition of the terms employed in the first three principles and seemed to imply that agreements could be sought, pro-

vided they did not compromise the political and territorial integrity of the Sri Lankan state and did not create a special status for the Tamil community that was not recognized for other communities.²²

The negotiations were disrupted in September when the Eelam Tamil Liberation Front representatives walked out, charging security forces in Sri Lanka with atrocities against Tamil civilians. The cease-fire, however, was not repudiated, although numerous violations were reported, particularly in the vicinity of the east coast city of Trincomalee. Urged by the government of India, the two sides may well resume the dialogue. Although the intransigence and bitterness engendered by events of the past decade do not bode well for a swift or painless resolution of ethnic problems, the horrible costs of the struggle presumably offer both sides strong incentives to reach an accord.

CONCLUSION

The recent history of Sri Lanka has been rife with contention, conflict and violence. In the 1980's, a series of political moves suggested that constitutional and conventional practices were being manipulated for partisan advantage. The use of a referendum to avoid holding a scheduled parliamentary election in order to perpetuate the governing party's massive majority seems particularly detrimental to democratic practice. Charges of intimidation and ballot tampering added to the appearance of "political decay" in a once proud democracy.

Perhaps even more destructive to a free and orderly society is the mounting incidence of communal violence. The riots that convulsed the nation in 1977 and 1983 and the increasing tempo of armed clashes that in 1984 amounted almost to civil war in the north suggest a profound political malady, a spreading affliction that the nation's leaders seem incapable of arresting. Efforts to negotiate an end to the loss of life and property have not proved successful. The human cost of the communal conflict can probably never be calculated. The eventual social and political consequences may be equally difficult to gauge, but it seems certain that the polity will long bear the scars. ■

AFGHANISTAN

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defense council and a rotating chairmanship to coordinate guerrilla activities inside Afghanistan and to conduct a more vigorous campaign for recognition abroad.

Whether the deep political divisions can be bridged remains to be seen. In the meantime, these very divisions make it difficult for the Soviet Union to cope with the mujahideen and to infiltrate and undermine them. And the divisions contribute to another important development, about which generalization is impossible, namely, the emergence of local mujahideen commanders inside Afghanistan. Little is known of their political outlook or

²²Based on Sri Lanka, Ministry of State, *The Thimpu Talks: The Stand Taken by the Sri Lanka Government* (Colombo: Department of Information, 1985).

ambition, yet their views must be considered in any endeavor to find a political solution.

THE SOVIET STRATEGY

Moscow has adopted a three-pronged strategy to break the resistance and absorb Afghanistan into its imperial order, in much the same way it did Mongolia. First, there is the military campaign to eliminate all opposition. Depopulation, starvation, terror, uprooting traditional socioeconomic structures—these are the methods of coercive Sovietization. Being clever propagandists, Soviet leaders spread the word (unfortunately given credence by some in the West) that they must use force because of the unreasoning opposition of backward, feudal elements hostile to modernization and social change.

Whatever the cost and however long it takes, Moscow has a precedent to guide its basic approach—the Russian conquest of Muslim Central Asia in the nineteenth century. In January, 1881, General M.D. Skobelev used massive firepower and mercilessly slaughtered the Turkmen defenders of the Geok-Tepe bastion near the Persian border, and in so doing assured czarist domination of the region. Skobelev openly stated his underlying strategic-political principle:

I hold it as a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them the longer they will be quiet afterwards. My system is this: to strike hard, and keep on hitting till resistance is completely over; then at once to form ranks, cease slaughter, and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy.¹⁶

There is reason to believe that this basic approach is as true today as it was for Skobelev more than 100 years ago. The Afghans, however, are proving to be tougher nuts to crack.

The Soviet Union also plans to build up the pro-Soviet People's Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in order to institutionalize Communist rule. While hammering away at the resistance, Moscow works to develop cadres and institutions in the country. Realizing that this takes time, the Soviet leadership has taken thousands of Afghan youths to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination. The hope is that they will become loyal to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul; in exchange, they will receive positions and rewards. Clearly, the aim is to attract those who aspire to rise in the new political system that Moscow is trying to create. It will take a few more years before there is sufficient evidence to judge the degree of Soviet success in mass cooptation.

¹⁶Richard A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 45.

¹⁷For details on the Khalqi-Parchami rivalry, see Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).

¹⁸Claude Malhuret, "Report from Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 2 (Winter, 1983-1984), p. 428.

¹⁹Ibid.

Enormous hurdles must be overcome before the Soviet Union can hope to fashion a reliable political instrument through which to rule Afghanistan. The PDPA, the umbrella organization under which the Communists exercise power, was founded in 1965, when the country was still a monarchy. By 1967 it had split into two bitterly competing factions, the majority Khalq under Nur Mohammed Taraki, who subsequently became the first leader of the Communist regime after the 1978 coup; and the Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal. Karmal was brought to power by the Soviet Union at the end of December, 1979, after Soviet troops murdered Hafizullah Amin, a Khalqi who had killed Taraki in a shoot-out in September, 1978.¹⁷

The conflict between Parchami and Khalqi remains unresolved. Judging by the past, the split may be unbridgeable. The Khalqis continue to be strong in the military. Their estrangement from the Parchamis has led many of them to collaborate with the mujahideen and work against the regime.

Despite purges and recruitment campaigns, Babrak Karmal has been unable to broaden the base of his regime. He still depends for his survival on Soviet troops; the KHAD, or secret police, which is controlled by the Soviet KGB (secret police); and local police and officials who have responded to the regime's blandishments.

Moscow encourages Babrak's efforts to give the regime a democratic and pro-Islamic veneer. For example, in July, 1985, the PDPA passed legislation establishing local councils throughout the country. Through carefully stage-managed elections, it seeks to provide a semblance of local democracy and thereby to lay the foundation for legitimacy. In the process, the PDPA pays lip service to Islam and to the country's traditional pattern of administration. This is a long-term overall pattern of activity.

The third facet of Soviet strategy focuses on the short term, on securing strategic-military control of the country. To this end, Moscow has adopted the old British strategy of holding the cities and the main lines of communication, either by the sword or by the purse. No major effort is made to win over the countryside. Rather, "the towns are used as garrisons and as logistical stepping-stones. They provide storage facilities, aviation bases, barracks and strongholds."¹⁸ According to Claude Malhuret, a French analyst, this method of defeating an insurgency rests on the assumption, clearly different from the one holding sway in most Western circles, that "a war involving guerrillas and anti-guerrilla fighters would never be won by either side if the emphasis was placed on being in the good graces of the population. On the contrary, the war would be won by the side that succeeded in making terror reign."¹⁹

If Malhuret's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and the Soviet approach to it is accurate, the perspective is consistent with Skobelev's formula for pacifying Central Asia; and it also suggests that one should look to Moscow's long experience in dealing with subjugated

Muslim peoples for an understanding of current Soviet policy and probable Soviet activities. In a word, the czarist and Soviet records indicate that Moscow will not soon agree to a formula that calls for the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan and a return to something approximating the status quo ante April, 1978.

THE REFUGEES

No discussion of Afghanistan can ignore the problem of between 4 and 5 million Afghan refugees. Of this total, between 3 and 3.5 million are in Pakistan; more than 1 million are in Iran. Between 20 and 25 percent of Afghanistan's population, possibly even more, have been forced to flee, largely because of Moscow's scorched-earth policy. Comments here will focus on those who fled to Pakistan, since little is known about those in Iran.

The stream of refugees, which began slowly after the Communists seized power in April, 1978, swelled to tidal proportions after the Soviet invasion of December, 1979. Two million fled to Pakistan in the next two years. Until mid-1983, more than 90 percent of the refugees were Pushtuns, from the traditional heartland areas of Afghanistan lying south of the Hindu Kush mountain range. However, in the past two years, increasing numbers are Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, who were forced to leave once the Soviet Union began to destroy the system of food production.

According to one Pakistani scholar, the Afghan refugees can be grouped into five categories.²⁰ First, a very few refugees came from politically prominent and wealthy families, with personal and business connections and assets outside Afghanistan. Second, another small group came with "their movable assets to Pakistan, i.e., funds, trucks, loading vans, etc." and ventured into the transport business. As a group, they have done well in Pakistan and have built new lives. Third, some Afghan refugees came from the ranks of the highly educated—doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers. (Their exodus has complicated the Karmal regime's problem of economic development, since the regime has been deprived of most of the trained personnel that Afghanistan had before 1978.) This category of refugees has been assigned

some responsibilities in and around the camps, that is, helping the camp official in looking after the affairs of the camps, teaching . . . in the camp schools. These responsibilities . . . do not in any way compensate for the personal and professional losses suffered by them in the wake of the civil strife in Afghanistan.²¹

Fourth, some refugees managed to escape with household goods and/or herds of sheep, cattle and yaks, but for the most part they must be helped to feed their families.

²⁰Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and Implications," *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 37, no. 1 (1984), pp. 42–45.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 43.

²²*Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 24, 1985.

Fifth, "almost two-thirds of Afghan refugees are ordinary Afghans who entered Pakistan virtually in the clothes they were wearing." They are the poorest and they make up the overwhelming number of those living in refugee tented villages (RTV's).

There are about 300 such villages in Pakistan. Refugees are free to come and go, and they can move freely about the country. Originally intended as temporary quarters, the RTV's are acquiring a semipermanent character; most of the structures are now made of clay, not canvas.

Few refugees expect to return to Afghanistan. This has posed many problems for Pakistan: how to ease tensions between the local population and the Afghans in communities where the latter are not present in large concentrations, as in Karachi and Lahore; how to prevent Afghan resistance leaders who operate recruiting and training camps openly in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) from becoming involved in local NWFP affairs with Pushtun brethren who happen also to be Pakistani citizens; and how to support and encourage the Afghan resistance without angering the Soviet Union to the point where it might attack Pakistan.

A poor country, Pakistan has shouldered more than half the financial burden of caring for the refugees—about \$300 million a year. The other half comes from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United States, and other friendly countries and private organizations. The United States contribution constitutes approximately 35 percent of the total UNHCR budget and 50 percent of the world's contribution of food. No Pakistani leadership could espouse a policy of pushing the refugees back across the border. But any Pakistani government must view with uneasiness the presence in the NWFP of a large, well-armed, militant and increasingly politicized refugee population.

THE OUTLOOK

There has been no respite in the bitter war in Afghanistan, and no political solution is in sight (notwithstanding the comment of White House spokesman Larry Speakes at the end of the superpowers' summit meeting on November 20, 1985, to the effect that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev indicated there was "something new" in Soviet policy toward Afghanistan).²² The Afghan freedom fighters show no signs of losing heart or abandoning the uneven struggle, despite heavy casualties. If anything, resistance to the Russians is intensifying.

One British observer—and it is to the credit of the British and other West Europeans that they report on the war first-hand and often—expresses the general assessment of specialists on the Afghan war that the morale of the mujahideen is very high. "Indeed," he wrote, "I do not think that 'morale' as we understand it is the best description":

The presence of the Russians offends the honour of the

Afghans at its deepest levels. Without that honour and the uncompromising necessity to be a Muslim, the Afghan feels he may as well not exist. To accept Marxism is to deny themselves not only a place in this world but in the next world too.²³

The dirty war may drag on for years.²⁴ As everyone realizes, the United States and the Soviet Union have many serious issues to negotiate, and progress should not become hostage to the horrendous situation in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Afghan people and the men who are fighting there must not be forgotten. Their struggle is not only a drain on the Soviet Union but, more important, it is a powerful testament to man's wish to be free. ■

²³Martin, op. cit., p. 248. See also the account of one of Britain's leading television commentators, Sandy Gall, *Behind Russian Lines: An Afghan Journal* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983).

²⁴For a contrary view, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Grip on Afghans," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1984, and Selig S. Harrison, "The Soviets are Winning in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, May 15, 1984.

BANGLADESH

(Continued from page 124)

expects to share with other third world countries in technological industries.

Health is another area where immediate and dramatic changes are required. Bangladesh is home to a number of debilitating diseases, especially those of the intestinal tract. Life expectancy at birth is about 50 years. Infant mortality to age one is 132 per thousand. The Bangladeshi diet, with its deficiency in protein, is also a serious drawback; protein deficiency has been linked to slowed mental development.

When Morris David Morris put together his Physical Quality of Life Index, based on figures obtained in the early 1970's, he gave Bangladesh a score of 35. The index combines nonmonetary indicators: life expectancy at age one, infant mortality and literacy.⁸ A rough calculation, based on 1983 data, shows that Bangladesh has advanced to a score of 38, not a major increase and still one of the lowest scores in the world. Some gains have been made, but much remains to be done in the social sector.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In December, 1985, Zia's dream came to its culmination when formal documents creating the South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) council were signed at a summit meeting in Dacca. Zia was the first head of a South Asian government to visit each of the other major nations in the region, and on his visits he preached the need for cooperation. In SARC, Bangladesh was joined by India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. The association is limited; political matters are excluded and so are other potentially contentious issues

⁸See Morris David Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (New York: Pergamon Press for the Overseas Development Council, 1979).

like extra- and intraregional trade. But in areas like culture, science and technology, meteorology, education and development planning the members have pledged to cooperate. For the first time since 1947, the nations that came out of British colonialism or protection have agreed to return to limited cooperation.

Despite the cooperation that could be a part of SARC, Bangladesh continues to have key differences with India. During the first administration of Indira Gandhi (1966–1977), Indo-Bangladeshi relations became antagonistic, especially after Mujib's assassination. During the rule of the Janata party (1977–1980), the second Indira period (1980–1984) and the Rajiv Gandhi regime (since 1984), some attempts have been made on both sides to resolve the differences. The problem focuses on sharing the Ganges waters.

There are other disagreements. The sea boundary has not been settled; both India and Bangladesh hope that the disputed area will contain vast amounts of petroleum. On the question of the land boundary, Bangladesh has agreed to an exchange of enclaves, but the West Bengal government has frustrated Indian ratification. The Indian proposal to build a fence along the Indo-Bangladeshi border has met strong opposition from Bangladesh. An earlier problem, the support given by India during the first Indira regime to supporters of Mujib opposed to Zia, died out during the Janata period.

The Ganges problem is old; the barrage now built at Farakka was proposed just after the turn of the century. The plan was to divert water from the Ganges through the Bhagirathi and Hooghly rivers by a barrage at Farakka to provide more fresh water to Calcutta and to flush out the silt build-up at that port. The proposal was the subject of discussions between India and Pakistan after independence in 1947, and these continued after Bangladesh became independent in 1971. The Indian commissioning of the barrage at Farakka eventually led to an agreement between the two countries in 1977 on the sharing of the water of the river. The problem occurs during the "dry season," from January 1 to May 31 each year. At other times, there is sufficient water to supply both India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh's needs are related to partially completed irrigation projects south of the Ganges in Khulna division and to the related problem of increased salinization through the incursion of water from the sea in that area. The agreement, which calls for an approximately equal division of the water at the Farakka checkpoint during the dry season, was renewed in 1982 and, after a period without an agreement, was again renewed in November, 1985.

These agreements, however, simply buy time. The latest agreement again pledges to find a permanent solution. Here the views of the two countries differ. India suggests that a link canal be built from the Brahmaputra to the Ganges upstream of Farakka, with the heavy flow of the Brahmaputra supplying any dry season deficit to the satisfaction of each nation. Bangladesh opposes this

because the headworks and the outflow would both be in India and the canal would be mainly in Bangladesh, displacing perhaps 800,000 people whom Bangladesh would find it hard to relocate.

Bangladesh, on the other hand, proposes trilateral negotiations that would include Nepal, a country that holds the headwaters of a number of tributaries of the Ganges. The Bangladeshis say that dams built in Nepal could regulate the flow of the Ganges. Water would then be available in ample quantities during all seasons and the dams would, at the same time, provide hydroelectric power for India and Bangladesh and a source of foreign exchange earnings for Nepal. India steadfastly opposes the "internationalization" of this issue. The allocation of water resources (as well as the control of flooding) in the northeastern area of the subcontinent is apparently worthy of the kind of international cooperation that was shown in the 1950's. The Indo-Pakistani treaty of 1960 dealt with the successful division of the water resources of the Indus River and its tributaries. No such effort has been made in the northeast, despite the obvious needs of almost 200 million people—and even if the effort were made, India would object.

PROSPECTS

Bangladesh will need the assistance of the developed world for many years to come. Before 1947, eastern Bengal was one of the poorest areas of united India, and the region has remained poor. Aid will be necessary in many fields: food, health, education and, especially, population planning. Foreign private investment is unlikely. Foreign investors would be concerned about the lack of human and natural resources and about Bangladesh's poor record on political stability.

In politics, the question that agitates the press and the elite is when (and if) elections will be held to return Bangladesh to a representative government. Ershad has promised to hold elections in the spring of 1986 whether the opposition alliances agree or not. However, this time the opposition may have been discredited. Politically aware observers were not pleased with the opposition's refusal to participate in the last proposed elections after Ershad had made compromises. This, no doubt, shifted some support from the BNP and even the Awami League to Janadal. It is time for the opposition to take a chance against Ershad, even if he appears to hold the upper hand. Elections are often boycotted to avoid predictable defeats, retarding progress in political development and participation.

Bangladesh needs economic encouragement, perhaps even under the conditions prescribed by the International Monetary Fund. However, pressure in the domestic political arena may lead to unsettled conditions; these, in turn, may inhibit economic and social improvement. Bangladesh also requires sympathetic treatment from the developed and the oil-exporting nations as it strives to improve its own economy and social infrastructure. ■

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

(Continued from page 100)

One little noted but potentially important ingredient in the improvement in United States-Indian relations is the substantial increase in contacts between the Indian and American military. These include exchanges of delegations, the assignment of officers to one another's military institutions, and the evident interest of the Indian military in American equipment. Most novel were the visits of United States naval vessels to Indian ports in 1985 and the Indian invitation for further visits.

THE SOVIET UNION AND SOUTH ASIA

Over the last three decades, the Soviet Union has carefully constructed a broad variety of contacts with all the countries in South Asia other than Bhutan, but in the 1980's the Afghan connection has been a predominant influence on Moscow's perception of its interests in the region. So far, the prices paid by the Soviet Union for its Afghan policy have been higher than its rewards. While this could change eventually, the grim prospect is for a long and demeaning war that arouses no enthusiasm anywhere except in the home of Afghan President Babrak Karmal.⁸

By 1984, Moscow had concluded that it had to become more directly involved in the Afghan civil war and in the regional and international politics that influence this conflict. After four years that saw little progress in Soviet efforts to establish an effective political system, the Soviet leaders decided, in effect, to relieve the Karmal regime of most of the burdens of office. They then introduced or expanded several programs designed to neutralize the resistance internally by eliminating its support bases among the people, and to reduce external support for the mujahideen by persuading or intimidating Pakistan and Iran into accepting an accommodation with Moscow.⁹

Within Afghanistan, the Soviets continue their show-piece programs; tribal *jirgas* (councils) are held, and the tribal elders that can be rounded up pledge their loyalty to the Karmal regime in exchange for some tangible rewards like food, supplies and promises not to bomb their villages. But as the Soviet leaders know, these testimonials of loyalty usually apply only as long as Soviet or Afghan military forces are around to distribute largess. Once this ends, the mujahideen—who on occasion are in there pledging loyalty and receiving the largess—are once again the visible authority.

More important over the long term, perhaps, is the expanded program under which several thousand young

⁸For a general background see Dieter Braun, "The USSR and South Asia: Long Term Strategies, Recent Activities," *Pakistan Horizon*, vol. 37, no. 4 (1984), pp. 46-53.

⁹See Joseph J. Collins, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986).

Afghans are sent to the Soviet Union for "education and training" each year. But it will probably be five years before an ideologically reliable (pro-Soviet) Afghan cadre core will be available in any numbers.

To meet immediate requirements in 1984–1985, therefore, the Soviet Union devised more immediate strategies. This involved the relegation of the Afghan army remnant to a support position and the use of Soviet forces as the front-line troops in the biggest-ever military strikes at key resistance centers, some of them on the Pakistani and Iranian borders. While the comparatively large offensives receive most international media attention, the indiscriminate Soviet bombing of villages and towns beyond effective Soviet control may be more important. The Soviet objective is to force the rural Afghan population to take refuge either in Soviet-occupied cities or in Pakistan or Iran. The Soviet Union is trying to undermine the mujahideen's support base by making Afghans afraid to allow the resistance to operate in their home areas and by cutting their access to food and other supplies. This has been a reasonably successful operation, as the large refugee inflow into Kabul (fleeing Soviet bombings rather than the mujahideen) indicates. But it is questionable whether these Afghan refugees would be more of a problem for the Soviet Union in their villages than they are in their Kabul networks; their bitterly anti-Soviet and anti-Karmal attitudes make them available for exploitation by the mujahideen in the capital.

Two years of reasonably intense efforts to achieve a military solution in Afghanistan by using Soviet forces to destroy the resistance have not had significant results, and there is no reason to expect that the 1986 offensive will be any different. Mujahideen losses have risen somewhat, and the resistance is now larger and better armed and has an incredibly high morale after having "defeated" the "atheist Soviet aggressors" over the past two years. Nor have Moscow's efforts to influence developments in Afghanistan through pressure on neighboring states been successful.

Thus Afghanistan continues to defy the Soviet government. The optimistic line propounded by some Soviet specialists in the early 1980's—that the Soviet Union has a history of dealing effectively with Muslim dissidents in Soviet Central Asia—was heard less frequently in 1985. Afghanistan is different, and the international environment in which Afghanistan's war of national liberation is being fought adds new factors to Soviet decision making. In these circumstances, what is an unalterable Soviet policy today may not be unalterable tomorrow.

This raises the question of Moscow's position on a political solution in Afghanistan. Moscow maintains that the Soviet forces in Afghanistan will be withdrawn only after all forms of external intervention in support of the resistance have ended, the Pakistani–Iranian border has been closed, and the Karmal regime has been recognized. There is one problem. Regardless of actions taken by outside powers, the Karmal regime would still fall shortly

after the Soviet withdrawal, and Moscow understands this unfortunate fact of life. These terms, thus, are bargaining chips, used because they are unacceptable to Afghanistan's neighbors, to the Islamic states and, until now, to the United States and China. Soviet leaders have been able to project themselves as involved in the negotiation process sponsored by the United Nations on the assumption that they would not have to make any difficult decisions. Whether General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev will view this as a reasonable policy for 1986 and thereafter is not yet known.

THE SOVIET UNION AND PAKISTAN

Since World War II, Southwest Asia has usually had a higher priority in Soviet foreign policy than South Asia, but it has also been more resistant to Soviet meddling. Pakistan's geostrategic location astride the frontier zone linking South, Southwest and Central Asia has raised its importance to the Soviet Union, although this is not usually discernible in either country's regional policies. Since 1947, Pakistan has sought close identification with the more conservative Islamic states in Southwest Asia, reinforced at times by security ties with the United States, while keeping its South Asian affiliations at the lowest level possible. The Soviet Union has tried on occasion—in 1966–1970 and in 1980–1985—to persuade Pakistan to look to its friendly neighbor to the north for support and sustenance, but so far to no avail.

Until 1980, the Soviet Union had several useful channels through which it could apply pressure on the Pakistani government at a very low cost. One of these was the Azad (free) Paktunistan movement based among the Paktoons in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, with a support base in the large Paktoon community in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Paktoon dissidents, according to some members of their organization, have been partially financed by the Soviet Union and, on a separate basis, by the Indians through semiofficial Afghan channels since the mid-1950's. A decade later, the Soviet Union established a support relationship with a few Baluchi tribal leaders who, when it was expedient, demanded an independent Baluchistan incorporating parts of both Pakistan and Iran. Moscow also maintained rather distant ties with a dissolute collection of self-proclaimed leftists in Pakistan, but Soviet leaders had a properly skeptical attitude about the utility of this connection.

Since 1980, Moscow's capacity for indulging in indirect aggression through Pakistani social, ethnic and political groups has probably declined. While the Paktoon connection has not disappeared, it was far less easily exploited in 1985 and is largely sustained through the trans-border drug traffic. The cross-kinship ties between Pakistani and Afghan Paktoons require the former to support the latter in their war of resistance against the Soviet aggressors, and in 1986 it is only "traitors to the Paktoon community"—and drug dealers—who would even con-

sider a working relationship with the Soviet Union. The situation in Baluchistan is not quite so damaging to Moscow, because several Baluchi tribal leaders still live off the Soviets in the Baluch areas of Afghanistan. But as the very interesting 1985 general elections in Pakistan indicated, these Baluchis and their followers have been fairly well isolated even within their own areas in Baluchistan, where they once were "the elite."

On balance, then, the capacity of the Soviet Union to manipulate ethnic communities in the frontier areas of western Pakistan is much reduced, for the time being at least. As a minor compensation, Soviet ties with some extremist groups in Pakistan have expanded since 1980. The best known is the Al Zulfikar organization (headed by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's two sons until the death of one on the Riviera in 1985), which is primarily directed at the violent overthrow of President Zia (on whose orders Bhutto was executed). It is a juvenile bourgeois operation, but the Soviet Union does not have much else to work with in Pakistan. With their capacity to threaten internal upheavals much diminished, the Soviets have turned to far more expensive economic assistance offers to the Zia government in order to try to improve their bargaining position on Afghanistan and other strategic issues.

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH INDIA

The Soviet Union first directed serious overtures toward India in 1955, in the context of Pakistan's decision to join the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) alliance systems then being organized under United States sponsorship. That same year, Moscow signed military and economic aid agreements with Afghanistan as part of what became the standard Soviet policy of coordinating its relations with the two states involved in major territorial disputes with Pakistan. Initially this was a modest endeavor to raise the price Pakistan had to pay for affiliation with "anti-Communist" alliance systems and involved cooperation between the Soviet Union and India on only a few regional strategic issues. By the early 1970's, however, the Indo-Soviet relationship had expanded to include a broad range of strategic, political and economic issues beyond South Asia.

Public attention has focused on the Indo-Soviet strategic relationship. While important to both governments, it has rarely been a decisive factor in the formulation of either state's foreign policy. Indeed, consultations between Moscow and New Delhi have seldom preceded

either power's ventures in foreign policy. More often than not, Indian and Soviet leaders meet to discuss a development after it has occurred or at least after a decision has been made by one of the governments, in order to prevent a deterioration in their relationship. There is no consensus-building system at work such as there is in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), nor a regular consultative process as in the United States-Japanese security relationship.

Thus Indo-Soviet security ties are not normally based on a broad congruence of views on important international issues, and one need only read the carefully worded joint statements usually issued at the conclusion of meetings between Indian and Soviet leaders, noting the issues and themes that are not mentioned or are glossed over with meaningless generalities. While neither Moscow nor New Delhi defines its foreign policy without considering the likely response of the other country, both usually exhibit a sense of confidence in the basic relationship. In 1971, New Delhi ignored Moscow's strong advice against military intervention in Pakistan's civil war, on the correct assumption that the Soviet Union would fall into line. Similarly, in 1979 Moscow did not even bother to consult with New Delhi under the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty on its decision to intervene militarily in Afghanistan, a South Asian state. Moscow assumed correctly that India would not be obstructive.

Thus, the Indo-Soviet security relationship is hard to define in conventional terms.¹⁰ New Delhi is correct in denying that it is an alliance, but it is much more than a treaty of peace and friendship. Through the 1970's, this cooperative relationship on security issues was sustained through a convergence of interests on specific issues, primarily China. In the 1980's, the strategic alignment makes less sense to everyone involved except the Soviet Union. China has completely revised its anti-Indian policy in South Asia; Pakistan has launched a "peace offensive" directed at India, raising questions in India about the standard line of analysis on Indo-Pakistani relations; and the United States has endorsed a fundamental improvement in Indian-Chinese-Pakistani relations as critical to peace and stability in South Asia and beyond. Finally, Moscow is determined to prevent any alterations in South Asian regional politics that might reduce its capacity to exploit tensions and conflicts to its own advantage. New Delhi has the difficult task of devising a strategic policy based on the new reality without at the same time placing undue strains on the important Indo-Soviet relationship. One reasonably safe prediction is that Indian regional strategic policy in the mid-1990's will be quite different from what it was in 1985.

Perhaps the aspect of the Indo-Soviet security relationship that may demonstrate the longest survival capacity is the arms sale program under which India has usually purchased between 50 and 75 percent of its foreign arms requirements from the Soviet Union. This is

¹⁰There are now some serious efforts in India to analyze Indo-Soviet relations in realistic terms, a development that was not very evident in the past, when ideological orientations usually prevailed. See for example Nirmala Joshi, "Soviet-Indian Relations: Convergences and Divergences," and Jyotirmoy Banerjee, "Indo-Soviet Security Relations in the Post-Nehru Era," in *Problems of Non-Alignment* (New Delhi), vol. 3, nos. 1 and 2 (April-September, 1985), pp. 1-32 and 33-48.

not a dependency relationship, because India has also been buying arms from Western countries, including the United States, in growing amounts in the 1980's. In some instances, India is buying weapons systems from the West that are not available in the Soviet Union at the quality level desired, but at times New Delhi seems to diversify its arms purchases abroad to keep the Soviet Union in line. And this policy has had some success, if the Soviet response in terms of its own bargain basement offers is any indication.

The Soviet Union has also made a considerable effort to expand economic relations with India since 1963, an effort that has met with some success. In 1985, the Soviet Union was India's second largest trading partner (after the United States), and would have been number one if India had found a product other than oil and arms to import from the Soviet Union. India has acquired a large surplus, amounting to nearly one billion rubles, in a state-to-state trading system that is supposed to avoid such surpluses. Surpluses are usually considered achievements in international trade, but not when they cannot be used in third-party trade. In 1984–1985, several Soviet trade missions were sent to India to persuade the Indians to buy more Soviet products, but reportedly they had limited success. And with the world price of oil (the one Soviet commodity the Indians want) falling, the imbalance in Indo-Soviet trade may become worse. It was with some amusement, therefore, that Indians noted Gorbachev's offer of a one-billion ruble loan to Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to Moscow in May, 1985.

Some political aspects of the Indo-Soviet economic relationship are important to both governments, however. Indian exports to the Soviet Union keep several antiquated textile and leather goods factories operative, which helps New Delhi avoid making painful decisions on what might become redundant industries if the Soviet market were not available. One of the most useful decisions Moscow made in the early 1970's involved moving from state-to-state trading to state-to-private-sector trading with India. This provided the Soviet Union with a very useful pro-Soviet "capitalist lobby," composed of Indian companies and trading firms that are heavily dependent on trade with the Soviet Union. The capitalist lobbyists not only are firm and enthusiastic supporters of close Indo-Soviet relations but also serve as channels for Soviet financial support to the two wings of the Communist party in India and to various Soviet-financed media and organizations, to the Indian government's irritation at times.

More disturbing to New Delhi was the revelation in early 1985 of the extent to which Soviet intelligence agencies had penetrated the Indian government, including the Prime Minister's office. But Rajiv Gandhi decided not to challenge Moscow publicly on the espionage issue, and what had earlier been proclaimed as India's most serious spy case was shunted aside as a minor affair when it turned out to be a Soviet KGB (secret police) operation.

THE SUPERPOWER PAS DE DEUX IN SOUTH ASIA

While the substantial but limited involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in South Asia is usually attributed to their lack of vital interests in the region, another important factor has been India's supervisory role in the region (other than the northwest corner). India has been a stabilizing force in the region and its protective policies against outsiders have been successful—so much so that all the other states in the region are apprehensive about Indian "neoimperialist" tendencies. Both superpowers, therefore, have sought to interact with New Delhi on terms determined mainly by their interests beyond South Asia, in effect leaving it to India to supervise developments in the subcontinent in ways that are not harmful to their interests.

In South Asia most attention is directed toward the divergencies in United States and Soviet policy objectives. But it may be useful to conclude with references to a few instances in which the superpowers have collaborated informally but effectively in the region. One of the more important examples of such collaboration was their separate but loosely coordinated support programs for India in its dispute with China in the 1963–1970 period. It was during this period that both the United States and the Soviet Union were trying to achieve the active "containment of China."

Longer lasting has been the quiet United States–Soviet cooperation on the nuclear nonproliferation issue in South Asia since the late 1960's. While the Soviet Union has been generous with India on all other aspects of economic and military relations, it has remained hard-line on the nuclear question. Some Indians suspect that this reflects Moscow's preference for an India without its own nuclear weapon systems and thus dependent on a Soviet nuclear umbrella for security against Chinese nuclear blackmail. But this made little sense in the past decade, when India did not require a nuclear umbrella, because of its own demonstrated capabilities and the changes in China's policies in South Asia.

While continued cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear issues in South Asia is encouraging, the key issue in the mid-1980's is the civil war in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the settlement of this conflict through the United Nations is highly unlikely, in view of the current level of involvement and the narrowly defined terms for discussion. Some forms of indirect or direct United States–Soviet negotiations on this issue are necessary. To expect the Soviet Union to make a concession with no return concession from the United States is probably unreasonable. The suspension of United States assistance to the resistance during an interim period could be helpful, and Washington has already indicated its willingness to concede this. But Moscow may expect more—perhaps a reduction in United States naval forces in the Indian Ocean in exchange for Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan.

Since the United States expanded its military commit-

ments in the region in large part to meet the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan, this may make good sense to both sides. Washington has indicated its openness to discussion with the Soviet Union on a range of issues focused around Afghanistan; it is not yet clear whether Moscow will respond. But United States-Soviet interaction on a South Asian issue could have broad implications for the superpowers throughout Asia. ■

INDIA'S AWAKENING

(Continued from page 104)

Even if Gandhi were to succeed completely at the top level of the party, he would still face a party across the subcontinent that consists largely of yes-men. This is the result of Indira Gandhi's 1970 decision to abandon the intraparty elections by which the Congress party had always conducted its internal affairs. Her aim was to strengthen her position, but the result was to cut her off from reliable information, which weakened her politically. Eventually she was forced to turn to the Intelligence Bureau as her main source of information on domestic politics.

Rajiv has inherited this problem. The use of a police agency to watch opposition parties and interest groups is not only dangerously illiberal; it is woefully inefficient.

A NEW APPROACH

In a few of India's states, Rajiv Gandhi has placed men of probity, intelligence and efficiency in senior leadership posts. This may seem an obvious move, but such leaders were not chosen very often in recent years because of Indira Gandhi's fears that competent regional leaders might threaten her power. One example of Rajiv Gandhi's new approach can be found in the northern state of Rajasthan. In December, 1984, as the election campaign began in earnest, several Congress party parliamentary candidates from that state came to New Delhi with urgent appeals that the Prime Minister assign the management of the campaign in Rajasthan to someone other than the Congress chief minister (that is, the leader of the state government), S. C. Mathur. The candidates feared that the chief minister might live up to his reputation and pocket most of the campaign funds. This could have been disastrous for the ruling party, since the opposition in the state was strong.

The candidates asked that the campaign be turned over to former Chief Minister S. Joshi, who was known for his honesty and intelligent management, attributes that had not prevented Indira Gandhi from casting him aside. Rajiv Gandhi acceded to their pleas and made Joshi campaign manager; Congress swept every seat in Rajasthan. After the election, Gandhi ousted the dubious chief

⁷This is based on interviews in January and November, 1985, with two sources very close to the Prime Minister.

⁸People's Union for Civil Liberties and People's Union for Democratic Rights, *Who Are the Guilty?* (New Delhi: n.p., 1984); and interviews in January, 1985, in New Delhi with a member of a second investigation.

minister and replaced him with Joshi, who has improved government performance in the state and has begun to rebuild the state's party organization.

In many, perhaps most, parts of India, daunting impediments stand in the way of this sort of cleansing of the Congress party. The would-be cleansers usually cannot find an alternative leader who is both honest and powerful. And even when they do, the unsavory elements are so formidable that there is greater risk in excluding them from the party than in including them. This was true, for example, in the state of Haryana. Many observers were shocked when the Prime Minister included in his Cabinet Bansi Lai, a Haryana politician who had been a hard-line member of Indira Gandhi's emergency regime between 1975 and 1977. It was then learned that Rajiv Gandhi had appointed him to the Cabinet to check the power of the sitting chief minister of Haryana, Bhajan Lai, who also had a highly dubious reputation (he had led mass defections from party to party, and he had made constant questionable intrusions into his bureaucrats' actions). Why did Rajiv Gandhi not dismiss the chief minister to avoid having two such unattractive figures in the front rank of party leadership? The answer was that there was no reliable figure in Haryana with enough power to stand up to the destructive antiparty actions these men would mount if they were excluded from powerful posts.⁷ At such moments, Rajiv Gandhi appears to be as much the prisoner of the unsavory elements in his party as the leader.

At the same time, the Prime Minister has often held back when opportunities arose to rid the party of undesirable, sometimes criminal elements. In 1984 he denied renomination to 37 percent of his party's incumbent members of Parliament. But many of those who received tickets were divisive factional leaders or were involved in illegality or violence. Many of those who were excluded were widely considered to be reliable servants of the party. The same was true of the award of tickets at state elections in March, 1985.

THE SIKH MASSACRE

Nowhere has the Prime Minister's treatment of men of dubious repute raised such serious concern as in New Delhi. In the three days following the assassination of Indira Gandhi (November 1-3, 1984), more than 2,000 Sikhs were massacred by vengeful mobs in New Delhi. Reliable independent investigations established that much of the butchery was the work of Congress party toughs, and that certain prominent party figures in New Delhi had fomented the killings and had protected some of the killers. One report named several of these people, and other authoritative citizens' inquiries corroborated its findings.⁸

The murder of Indira Gandhi could have produced the kind of shock and remorse making possible a rapprochement between the Sikhs, on the one hand, and the Hindus and the government, on the other. But this massacre and

others that occurred elsewhere in north India ensured that the result would be still another widening of the yawning gulf of fear and misunderstanding.⁹ Rajiv Gandhi soon came under heavy pressure to mount an official investigation into the massacres. For many months he refused—hence the citizens' inquiries—and although he eventually stated that he would establish a commission of inquiry, no action has yet been taken and few observers believe that there ever will be an official commission.

The Prime Minister did see fit, however, to promote several of the New Delhi congressmen who were apparently involved in the disorders. One was given the party nomination in a New Delhi constituency previously held by a Congress Sikh. After the election, another was promoted to Cabinet rank and a third was given a high party post. Many Sikhs saw this as Gandhi's endorsement of the massacres. In New Delhi today, there are dozens, perhaps hundreds of Sikhs who lost family members in the killings and who are preoccupied with revenge. Sikh gunmen have already murdered two of the New Delhi congressmen who were allegedly involved in the massacres. Assassins presumably stalk the other alleged organizers and the man whom Sikhs regard as the patron of these people, Rajiv Gandhi.

It is remarkable, then, that Gandhi has also made considerable headway in promoting reconciliation with Sikhs in the Punjab, where they form a majority. In mid-1985, after making significant concessions, he reached a negotiated agreement with the most prominent moderate Sikh politician, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal. When Longowal was assassinated by Sikh extremists, the Prime Minister pressed bravely ahead with a state election in Punjab in September, 1985. Despite calls from Sikh militants for a boycott, the high turnout demonstrated a Sikh desire for accommodation.

The isolation of Sikh extremists became apparent when the moderate Sikh Akali Dal party won the election and then formed the new state government. Gandhi privately welcomed this development because it meant that Sikh leaders have the initial responsibility for dealing with Sikh extremism.

The Prime Minister's refusal to rid himself of the men widely associated with the anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi thus seems especially surprising. Until he dismisses them, his life remains at risk. That is a matter of deep concern to anyone who values Indian democracy. Moreover, should Gandhi be assassinated before he can rebuild political institutions and informal accommodations, his Congress party is likely to disintegrate into bitter factions; social conflict might increase alarmingly; and technocratic civilian elites, who already regard democratic politics as a dysfunctional untidiness, might try to impose an autocracy that would have no chance of providing adequate government for this complex society. ■

⁹The best single source on this is Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985).

PAKISTAN

(Continued from page 116)

tial law would not have lasted nearly so long without the external threat posed by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The charge seems exaggerated, but it points to some of the benefits that have accrued to the regime as a result of the war. Certainly the attention of the United States, at a low point before the Soviet occupation, has grown rapidly since, making Pakistan a primary United States aid recipient and making American assistance an important element in Pakistan's economic and foreign policy calculations.¹⁴ Pakistan and Zia have also gained stature within the community of Islamic nations for spearheading the diplomatic effort in Afghanistan.

The transition to the new civilian government has not brought any appreciable change in Pakistan's position on this issue. As in the economic sphere, the key foreign policy personnel have remained the same. Although Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo has played a role, including a major trip to China in 1985, the key actors on the international stage continue to be President Zia, Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan and Foreign Secretary Niaz Naik.¹⁵

Pakistan's policies on Afghanistan have also remained consistent over the last few years. Pakistan is willing to continue the United Nations-sponsored negotiations in Geneva but insists on a four-point package that includes an assurance of Soviet troop withdrawal. Six rounds of the Geneva talks have taken place, the last in December, 1985, without much progress on this issue.

If the MRD should come to power, however, Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan could change significantly. During the past year, MRD leaders have advocated the establishment of direct negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Their position implies formal recognition of Afghanistan's Babrak Karmal regime, a position Pakistan has thus far avoided by means of the indirect talks in Geneva. Pakistani public opinion still appears to be supportive of the government's position.¹⁶ Public opinion could change, however; war-weariness is increasing in Pakistan, and opportunities expand for the MRD to press its case.

Whatever the immediate threat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Pakistanis continue to be more concerned

¹⁴See William L. Richter, "Pakistan: A New 'Front-Line State?'" *Current History*, vol. 81, no. 475 (May, 1982), pp. 202–206, 225.

¹⁵For example, Zia spoke at the United Nations in October and represented Pakistan at the inaugural session of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation in Dacca in December. Both Yaqub and Naik continue to hold positions they have held for some time under martial law.

¹⁶Polls conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion in mid-1985 showed 10 percent in favor of recognizing the Karmal regime and 60 percent opposed. These figures differ only slightly from what the same polling organization found in 1984 and 1983. *Gallup Political Weather Report, July 1985* (Islamabad: Gallup Pakistan, 1985), p. 17.

about the threats from neighboring India. This is understandable, given the longstanding enmity between the two countries, their prolonged territorial disputes, their past conflicts, and the differences in their size and resources. During the period of martial law, India has been highly distrustful and critical both of Pakistan's military regime and its Islamization program.

Despite all this, there has been more improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations under Zia than during any comparable period in the nearly four decades since the two countries became independent. Building on earlier efforts, like the 1972 Simla conference, real movement toward the normalization of relations began in the late 1970's. Pakistan's 1981 proposal of a "no-war pact" and India's counterproposal of a "treaty of peace and friendship" are still under discussion, but negotiations have resulted in a joint Indo-Pakistani commission and the removal of several barriers to communication and travel between the two countries. Progress toward improved relations has been sporadic, interrupted whenever internal disruptions in either country magnify fears and suspicions of meddling by the other. The 1983 riots in Sind, for instance, brought Pakistani accusations of Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, and India's problems with Sikh separatists in Punjab have resulted in Indian charges of Pakistani involvement.

Of more immediate consequence are the tensions that have been building in Kashmir since about 1983. The focus of attention is Siachen Glacier, a large area at the northern end of the line of control that separates Indian and Pakistani-held Kashmir. When the line of control was established, the glacier was left undemarcated because it was thought to be uninhabitable. Since then Pakistan has made some claim to it by issuing passes to mountain climbers. And India has apparently decided that the glacier is strategically important because of Siachen's proximity to Chinese-held territories that India claims. Indian and Pakistani troops are positioned on the glacier and several armed clashes have occurred. The issue has been given wide coverage in the Indian press but is played down in Pakistan, apparently in an attempt not to aggravate tensions further.

A second major foreign policy issue that affects Indo-Pakistani as well as United States-Pakistani relations is the question of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan has evidently acquired much of the technology necessary to build a nuclear weapon. It has not proceeded with the testing of a nuclear device, however, and President Zia has repeatedly denied that Pakistan intends to develop nuclear weapons. India, which exploded a device in 1974 but chose not to proceed with a weapons program, con-

¹⁷This political strategy is seldom mentioned in the rather voluminous literature on nuclear proliferation in South Asia. One exception is Richard P. Cronin, "The United States, Pakistan and the Soviet Threat to Southern Asia: Options for Congress," Report no. 85-152 F (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, September, 1985), p. 31.

tinues to raise alarms concerning Pakistan's alleged "Islamic bomb."

Pointing to recent Pakistani attempts to smuggle nuclear triggering devices out of the United States, the Indians have asked the United States to bring pressure on Pakistan to halt its nuclear program. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have argued that nuclear research is necessary for their future energy needs and have offered to enter into nonproliferation agreements with the Indians, including provisions for the mutual inspection of facilities. India has spurned all such offers.

Although any assessment of Pakistani nuclear intentions is speculative, Pakistan is apparently not interested in developing nuclear weapons, but is interested in developing credibility as a potential nuclear weapon state to pressure the Indians into an agreement that might enhance Pakistan's security.¹⁷ Whatever India's reasons for refusing such an agreement, continued disagreement over the nuclear issue will continue to cloud Indo-Pakistani relations.

It is difficult to tell whether the end of martial law will have any significant impact. Despite India's frequent criticism of Pakistan's martial law regime, a change in Indian attitudes after the formal ending of military rule is unlikely. It is more probable that India will echo the MRD claim that no significant change has occurred and that the new civilian order in Pakistan remains little more than a facade for military control.

CONCLUSIONS

After several years of seemingly permanent political deadlock in Pakistan, several important changes have occurred fairly rapidly in the past year or so. Elections have been held; civilian government has been established; martial law has ended; and steps have been taken toward the restoration of political parties.

From an optimistic perspective, the process of political reconstruction and consensus-building has begun. This has the potential to create a representative civil order in which change can occur without the disruption and violence that have punctuated Pakistan's history.

From a skeptical or pessimistic viewpoint, there is insufficient evidence that the military is not still the dominant force in Pakistani politics. From this perspective, the civilianization process has only given public support and ratification to the illegitimate actions of the martial law regime. Until these two perspectives are resolved, Pakistan will be troubled by political confrontation. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

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Arab and Islamic organizations. An alphabetical index makes it easy to locate each entry. A second section lists the location of each organization's secretariat. A third section lists all international organizations that are located in Arab and Islamic-majority countries. ■

O.E.S.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1986, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

- Jan. 5—The League issues a communiqué that condemns U.S. threats of military action against Libya; the U.S. has accused Libya of aiding the Palestinian terrorists who attacked the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27.
- Jan. 31—Ending a special meeting, the Arab League condemns U.S. actions against Libya but rejects Libya's request for economic retaliation by the League against the U.S.

Arms Control

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

- Jan. 28—U.S. and Soviet negotiators at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament open talks on banning chemical weapons.

European Economic Community (EEC)

- Jan. 1—Spain and Portugal are admitted as the 11th and 12th members of the Common Market.
- Jan. 28—The 12 member nations agree to ban the sale of weapons to countries "clearly implicated in supporting terrorism." Their declaration does not mention Libya.

Group of Five

- Jan. 19—Meeting in London, economic officials from the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany and Japan agree that interest rates will continue to drop because of lower inflation and lower oil prices; however, the group does not initiate a program to force rates down.

International Terrorism

(See *EEC; Libya; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Iran-Iraq War

- Jan. 19—Iraqi jets attack a Dutch oil maintenance ship in the Persian Gulf; 1 crewman is killed and 2 others are wounded in the attack.
- Jan. 27—Iraq claims that an Iranian air raid on Siddiq today killed 6 civilians and wounded 21; Iraq says it has responded by attacking military camps in Iranian Kurdistan.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

- Jan. 30—OPEC announces that a special committee will meet February 3 to discuss falling oil prices; on January 20, oil prices dropped to under \$20 a barrel on the spot market; crude oil prices have fallen by almost \$10 a barrel in the last 2 months.

AFGHANISTAN

- Jan. 7—Western diplomats in Islamabad report that on December 5 the Afghan government arrested 4 Afghan army generals for passing information about Soviet troop movements to Afghan guerrillas.
- Jan. 11—In an interview with the Tokyo newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, President Babrak Karmal rejects a U.S. offer to serve as a guarantor to end the war.
- Jan. 19—The Soviet Union's official press agency, Tass, reports that the Afghan government has allowed non-Afghan

Communist party members to join the government.

Jan. 26—Karmal says the U.S. must stop aiding the Afghan guerrillas if it wants to help end the Afghan war.

ANGOLA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Jan. 8—President José Eduardo dos Santos meets with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker in Luanda.
- Jan. 29—Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), arrives in Washington, D.C., for 10 days of talks with President Ronald Reagan and other officials; Savimbi hopes to receive U.S. aid for his South African-backed guerrillas, who are fighting the Marxist government of Angola.

ARGENTINA

- Jan. 14—Police quell the worst street demonstrations in Buenos Aires since the restoration of democracy; the demonstrators have been protesting a visit by U.S. banker David Rockefeller.

BOLIVIA

- Jan. 23—President Victor Paz Estenssoro swears in 11 new Cabinet members.
- Workers throughout Bolivia stage a 24-hour general strike to protest the government's economic policies.

BURKINA FASO

- Jan. 17—Captain Thomas Sankara, the head of Burkina Faso's military government, meets in the Ivory Coast with the head of Mali's military government, General Moussa Traoré; this is their first meeting since fighting ended between the 2 countries last month.

CANADA

- Jan. 10—Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announces that Canada will join with the U.S. and will impose limited economic sanctions against Libya.

CHILE

- Jan. 15—Pro-government protesters confront visiting U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy at the Santiago airport; the protesters blockade a road, forcing Kennedy to leave the airport by government helicopter.

CHINA

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

- Jan. 15—The Foreign Ministry reports that China has rejected a Soviet proposal for a mutual nonaggression pact.
- Jan. 20—A Nicaraguan delegation meets with Foreign Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin to discuss a Chinese interest-free loan. No details are announced.

COLOMBIA

(See *Nicaragua*)

ECUADOR

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

EGYPT(See also *Israel*)

Jan. 7—Suliman Khater, an Egyptian soldier who shot and killed 7 Israeli tourists in the Sinai in October, is found hanged in his prison cell. Opposition groups had proclaimed Khater a hero for the killings.

EL SALVADOR

Jan. 11—The government reports that during the civil war in 1985, 426 government soldiers died and 1,683 were wounded; 1,034 guerrillas were killed.

Jan. 12—Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas condemns the government's indiscriminate bombing of civilians.

Jan. 18—Leftist guerrillas knock out power to 10 of El Salvador's 14 provinces.

Jan. 21—President Jose Napoleón Duarte announces economic austerity measures that include a devaluation of the colon, increases in gasoline prices and restrictions on the importation of luxury goods.

FRANCE

Jan. 20—France and Great Britain announce that they will build a 30-mile-long railway tunnel under the English Channel between Dover and Calais; the \$7-billion project is to be completed by 1993.

GERMANY, WEST

Jan. 3—The government says that despite the U.S. request, it will not impose sanctions on Libya in retaliation for Libya's alleged support of Palestinian terrorists.

Jan. 8—Feldmühle Nobel A.G. pays a \$2-million indemnity to a New York-based Jewish organization that represents Jews who were used as slave laborers at the company's factories during the Nazi era.

Jan. 27—Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres arrives in Bonn to meet with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

GREECE(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)**GUATEMALA**

Jan. 14—Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo is sworn in as Guatemala's 1st elected civilian President in 30 years.

HAITI

Jan. 8—The government announces that all schools have been closed and security forces have been ordered to stop all illegal demonstrations; antigovernment demonstrations on January 6 left 1 person dead.

Jan. 26—President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier announces changes in the military leadership and the disbanding of the palace secret police.

Jan. 27—Police kill 3 antigovernment protesters and wound 30 in the city of Cap-Haïtien.

Jan. 30—Looting and antigovernment demonstrations continue in several cities; 5 people are killed during a raid on a warehouse containing cooking oil and wheat.

Jan. 31—Denying U.S. reports that he has fled the country, President Duvalier declares a state of siege and appears on television and radio to tell the nation that "the President is here. . . ." Rioting continues.

HONDURAS

Jan. 27—José Azcona Hoyo is sworn in as President.

ICELAND

Jan. 24—Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson resigns to be-

come director of Iceland's central bank. Matthias Matthiesen is named foreign minister.

INDIA(See also *Vatican*)

Jan. 10—Police and Sikh extremists clash during an antigovernment protest in northern Punjab; 3 people are killed and 500 Sikhs are arrested.

Jan. 20—Indian scientists investigating the crash of an Air-India jet that killed 329 people last year say the crash was caused by a bomb.

Jan. 22—Three Sikhs are sentenced to be hanged for the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984; 2 of the Sikhs were Gandhi's bodyguards.

Canadian scientists investigating the Air-India crash report that they believe a bomb was the cause of the crash.

Jan. 26—Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi orders a delay in the return of the city of Chandigarh to the exclusive rule of Punjab; Punjab and Haryana states share control of the city. The transfer is part of the agreement reached with Sikh moderates in 1985.

Jan. 28—The trade representative to Taiwan, Rama Swoop, is formally charged with spying for the U.S.; Swoop was arrested in October, 1985.

IRAN(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; Zimbabwe*)**IRAQ**(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)**ISRAEL**(See also *Germany, West; Lebanon; Libya*)

Jan. 2—Rockets fired from southern Lebanon explode in Qiryat Shemona and elsewhere in northern Galilee; Israeli and Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army artillery return the fire, hitting several Lebanese villages.

Jan. 3—Prime Minister Shimon Peres says that Israel will not retaliate by itself for last month's Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli and American ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports.

Jan. 13—The Cabinet agrees to accept Egypt's offer to submit the Israeli-Egyptian dispute over the Taba beachfront to international arbitration.

Jan. 17—Israel and Spain announce that they have established diplomatic relations and will open embassies in each other's country.

Jan. 24—Peres says that Jordan's King Hussein has decided to move ahead on Middle East peace talks without the support of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or Syria.

ITALY

Jan. 9—The government announces that it is banning weapons sales to Libya.

Jan. 28—Prime Minister Bettino Craxi says he has received a proposal from Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi; Qaddafi has offered to halt Arab terrorist actions in Europe if the U.S. will pledge not to attack Libya. Libya denies that it sent the message.

JAPAN(See also *U.S., Administration*)

Jan. 19—At the end of a 5-day visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe agree that Japan and the Soviet Union will reopen negotiations on a peace treaty; the ministers sign trade and taxation agreements.

JORDAN

(See also *Israel; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 30—The government reportedly tells Israel that the gunman who killed 2 Israeli soldiers yesterday was a deserter from the Jordanian army; the gunman was killed by Israeli troops.

KOREA, NORTH

Jan. 20—The government suspends political and economic talks with South Korea to protest U.S.–South Korean military maneuvers scheduled for February; it says it will resume talks after the maneuvers.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See *Korea, North*)

LEBANON

(See also *Israel*)

Jan. 2—President Amin Gemayel goes to Damascus to confer with Syrian President Hafez Assad on the Syrian-sponsored peace agreement that was signed last month by the 3 main Christian, Muslim and Druse militias; Gemayel's Christian Phalangist militia did not sign the pact.

Jan. 13—Gemayel's Christian Phalangist militia attacks Elie Hobeika's Christian Lebanese Forces in Beirut; Hobeika signed the Syrian-backed peace pact.

Jan. 15—Gemayel's militia declares itself the winner in its battle with Hobeika's militia; at least 200 people have been killed in the fighting. Hobeika has reportedly left for Paris.

Jan. 16—Eleven various Muslim and Druse militias begin an offensive against Gemayel's militia.

Jan. 17—Fighting continues between Christian Phalangists and Muslim and Druse militias; a Muslim–Druse attack on President Gemayel's hometown of Bikfiya is driven back by the Phalangists.

Jan. 18—Shiite Muslim militia leader Nabih Berri joins with Druse leader Walid Jumblat in calling for Gemayel's resignation.

Jan. 21—At least 22 people are killed when a car bomb explodes in the Christian section of Beirut near the headquarters of Gemayel's Christian Phalangist party. No one takes responsibility.

Jan. 24—Hobeika returns to Lebanon; he confers with former President Suleiman Franjeh (a Christian opponent of Gemayel's) about forming a front with the Muslim and Druse militias.

Jan. 29—Israeli jets bomb suspected Palestinian bases in Sidon. One person is reported killed.

LESOTHO

Jan. 20—A coup led by General Justin Lekhanya overthrows the government of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan.

Later in the day, South Africa eases its 20-day blockade of Lesotho when it allows a trainload of goods to enter Lesotho.

Jan. 25—The new government deports 25 South African political refugees to an undisclosed location. At the same time, South Africa ends its blockade of Lesotho.

Jan. 27—King Moshoeshe II swears in Lekhanya as Prime Minister.

LIBERIA

Jan. 6—General Samuel K. Doe, the head of the military government, frees 18 jailed politicians and journalists. He is then sworn in as President.

Jan. 25—Doe orders 2 jailed opposition leaders to stand trial for treason; he says they were part of an abortive November coup.

LIBYA

(See also *Intl, Arab League; Israel; Italy; U.K., Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 1—Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, the head of state, says an American or an Israeli attack on Libya in reprisal for the Palestinian terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports last month would lead to attacks on "American citizens in their own streets."

Jan. 5—Qaddafi says that, contrary to American reports, there are no Palestinian terrorist training bases in Libya.

Jan. 8—Libya says U.S. President Ronald Reagan's imposition of economic sanctions on Libya is equivalent "to a declaration of war."

Jan. 15—In a 2-hour speech in Tripoli, Qaddafi says Libya will train and arm Arabs for "suicide and terrorist missions"; he says he is making Libya "a base for the liberation of Palestine."

Jan. 25—Qaddafi sails into the Gulf of Sidra; he says he will confront the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which is holding maneuvers near the gulf.

Jan. 30—Foreign Minister Ali Abdussalam Treiki says Libya is ready to hold talks with the U.S. about easing tensions between the 2 countries.

MALAWI

Jan. 2—President Kamuzu Banda dissolves his 13-member Cabinet and takes charge of the government personally.

MALI

(See *Burkina Faso*)

MEXICO

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

THE NETHERLANDS

Aruba

Jan. 1—Prime Minister Henny Eaman and his Cabinet are sworn in as Aruba begins self-rule; full independence will come in 1996.

NICARAGUA

(See also *China*)

Jan. 2—The government shuts down the Roman Catholic Church's official radio station because the station did not broadcast President Daniel Ortega Saavedra's New Year's address.

Jan. 5—Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockman says that Nicaragua did not aid the M-19 leftist guerrillas who took over Colombia's Palace of Justice in November.

NIGERIA

Jan. 2—The government announces that it will limit foreign debt payments in 1986 to 30 percent of Nigeria's annual export revenue.

Jan. 13—Major General Ibrahim Babangida, the head of the military government, says that his "military democracy" will return the country to civilian rule by October 1, 1990.

PHILIPPINES

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 2—Presidential candidate Corazon Aquino says that, if elected, she will allow Communists in her government if they renounce all violence.

Jan. 19—A hand grenade explodes in a crowd of 50,000 people at a rally for presidential candidate Aquino; no one is hurt.

Jan. 21—President Ferdinand Marcos says that Aquino has forfeited her role as a woman by "challenging the men" for the presidency.

The electoral commission announces that foreign election observers will not be allowed within 150 feet of polling places during the February 7 presidential election.

Jan. 22—In a front-page story, *The New York Times* reports that recently released U.S. Army files from World War II show that President Marcos's claims to have been a guerrilla fighter and a war hero during the Japanese occupation are "fraudulent" and "absurd."

Jan. 25—The government reports that 9 campaign workers for Aquino and 4 campaign workers for Marcos have been killed in the last 6 weeks.

POLAND

Jan. 11—Police arrest Bogdan Borusewicz, the leader of the Gdansk branch of the banned trade union Solidarity.

Jan. 21—The government announces that it is putting Nobel Peace Prize winner and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa on trial for slandering the state.

PORTUGAL

Jan. 26—Conservative Freitas do Amaral wins 46.6 percent of the vote in today's presidential election; he will face former Prime Minister Mário Soares, who won 25.5 percent of the vote, in a run-off election on February 16.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Lesotho*)

Jan. 6—Gencor, South Africa's second largest mining company, announces that it has fired 20,000 striking nonwhite miners at a platinum mine.

Jan. 8—A U.S. congressional delegation meets with President P.W. Botha in Johannesburg.

Jan. 9—At a news conference in Lusaka, Zambia, African National Congress (ANC) leader Oliver Tambo calls for a "rapid, extensive escalation" of violence against the white South African government; Tambo says that civilians will inevitably be killed in the escalation.

Jan. 12—For the 1st time, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker visits a black township; pro-government blacks kill a black activist who was to have met with Crocker.

Jan. 13—Crocker gives President Botha a letter from U.S. President Reagan calling for "decisive" action on the system of apartheid.

Jan. 20—In Delmas, a trial begins for 22 black dissidents accused of trying to overthrow the government.

Jan. 22—Police kill 7 blacks and wound 40 in a search of Bekkersdale township; yesterday, 2 white policemen were killed in the township by blacks.

Jan. 23—Thirty blacks are killed in tribal violence between Zulus and Pondos south of Durban.

Jan. 26—Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu ends his 3-week visit to the U.S.

Jan. 28—Black high school students end their nearly two-year-old boycott of classes; the ANC and a black parents' organization had called for an end to the boycott.

SOUTH YEMEN

Jan. 13—State radio in Aden claims that President Ali Nasser Mohammed Hassani survived today's coup attempt by members of the military. Four government officials have been executed for the coup attempt.

Jan. 14—Fighting rages throughout Aden as a full-scale civil war breaks out between the Soviet-backed government and a hard-line Marxist faction of the military and the ruling party.

Jan. 22—British, French and Soviet rescue efforts for thousands of foreigners continue; foreigners have been unable to leave because of the fighting.

Jan. 25—The Soviet press agency Tass reports that Prime Minister Haider Abu Kakr Attas has returned to South Yemen and has been named President by the hard-line faction.

SPAIN

(See *Israel*)

SRI LANKA

Jan. 1—President J.R. Jayewardene restores the political rights of former Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike.

Jan. 12—The Eelam National Liberation Front, which is fighting for a Tamil minority state, ends its 7-month cease-fire because of the army's "genocide."

SYRIA

(See *Lebanon*)

UGANDA

Jan. 26—The guerrilla National Resistance Army overthrows the military government of Major General Tito Okello.

Jan. 29—Yoweri Museveni, the head of the National Resistance Army, is sworn in as President; he says there will be a restoration of parliamentary democracy, but he does not give a date.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Arms Control; China; Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 11—Vladimir Lukyanenko replaces Konstantin Brezhnev as minister for chemical and petroleum machine building.

Jan. 15—General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev unveils a nuclear disarmament proposal that calls for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Gorbachev says the proposal is contingent on an end to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) program. Gorbachev also extends the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear testing until March, 1986.

The U.S. Defense Department reports that the Soviet Union's 1st full-size aircraft carrier was launched today and that work has begun on another one. The carrier will not become operational until 1990.

Jan. 18—At a news conference in Moscow, three top officials say that Gorbachev's January 15 arms offer would allow the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe without corresponding cuts in the British and French nuclear forces.

Jan. 25—Interior Minister Vitaly Fedorchuk is replaced by Aleksander Vlasov, the provincial party leader in the Northern Caucasus.

Jan. 30—Sergei Bashilov replaces the retiring Nikolai Goldin as minister of heavy industry construction.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *France*)

Jan. 9—Defense Minister Michael Heseltine resigns after a dispute with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over the government's participation in saving Westland PLC, Britain's only helicopter manufacturer. Thatcher names George Younger to replace Heseltine.

Jan. 16—Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe tells a visiting American official that Britain will not join with the U.S. in imposing economic sanctions against Libya.

Jan. 24—Minister of Trade and Industry Leon Brittan resigns after he is accused of misleading the House of Commons about the government's role in the Westland affair.

Jan. 27—Thatcher tells the House of Commons that she regrets her Cabinet's mishandling of the Westland affair; she

denies that she or her Cabinet intentionally misled the House.

Northern Ireland

- Jan. 1—A bomb planted by Irish Republican Army guerrillas kills 2 policemen and wounds a third.
- Jan. 24—Results from yesterday's special by-election show that 14 of 15 Protestant candidates were returned to their parliamentary seats.

UNITED STATES

Administration

- Jan. 2—In Alexandria, Virginia, a federal grand jury issues a new indictment against former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst Larry Wu-Tai Chin, charging him with 6 counts of espionage because he gave intelligence information to China.
- Jan. 6—The U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors selects Albert V. Casey to replace Paul N. Carlin as postmaster general; Carlin held the post for only 1 year.
- Jan. 7—Secretary of Agriculture John Block resigns, effective mid-February.
- Jan. 8—The Food and Drug Administration approves the implantation of an artificial heart in as many as 3 more patients after federal approval of each case; the agency prohibits the emergency use of an unapproved smaller version of the Jarvik-7 artificial heart.
- Jan. 9—The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announces that the Internal Revenue Service will withhold refunds due taxpayers for 1985 if they have defaulted on government loans owed to any of 5 government agencies; most defaulters have held student education loans.
- Jan. 14—The President's Committee on Organized Crime issues a report calling for "a coherent federal strategy to attack organized crime's corruption of our business institutions and labor organizations."
- In a 3-1 decision, the Federal Communications Commission rules that state and local government restrictions on dish antenna systems used to receive satellite signals cannot be used to favor local cable and television stations.
- The U.S. Postal Service announces that newly appointed Postmaster General Albert Casey will leave the Postal Service in September to accept an academic post.
- Jan. 15—The OMB and the Congressional Budget Office send Comptroller General Charles Bowsher a list of \$11.7 billion in suggested spending cuts for fiscal 1986; the cuts are mandated by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman). Congress passed this legislation in December.
- Jan. 16—President Ronald Reagan proclaims Sunday, January 18, as National Sanctity of Human Life Day; he deplores "the terrible toll of abortion."
- Jan. 17—Doctors at Bethesda Naval Hospital remove 3 small, noncancerous polyps from President Reagan's colon; doctors also take a "shaved biopsy" of a small facial growth, which is evaluated as benign.
- Jan. 19—The CIA says that it is reestablishing ties with members of the academic community as a means of receiving outside viewpoints.
- Jan. 20—Acting under a new law (Gramm-Rudman) that does not allow the President to modify the cuts, Comptroller General Charles Bowsher presents President Reagan with the mandatory cuts in the fiscal 1986 budget.
- Jan. 22—The U.S. International Trade Commission rules that Japanese manufacturers are selling 256K random access memory chips in the U.S. for less than the cost of manufacture.
- Jan. 23—Because of asbestos's known carcinogenic properties,

the Environmental Protection Agency issues rules barring all use of asbestos in 4 widely used products and its elimination in all other products over a 10-year period.

- The White House announces that Director of the Veterans Administration Harry Walters is resigning; Thomas Turnage, Selective Service System director, will replace him.
- Jan. 24—President Reagan announces the appointment of Lando Zech Jr. to succeed the retiring Nunzio Palladino as director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- Jan. 26—The Federal Aviation Administration orders prompt repairs of some 27 Pratt & Whitney JT8D airplane engines that were overhauled by AeroThrust Corporation and the inspection of 78 more engines for possible repair.
- Jan. 27—Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Alfred C. Moran informs local HUD officials that their March, 1986, "small-cities round" of grants and the grants for the rest of 1986 have been postponed indefinitely by order of the OMB.
- Jan. 28—President Reagan postpones his State of the Union address until February 4, because the space shuttle *Challenger* exploded shortly after takeoff today, killing all its occupants.
- Jan. 29—President Reagan nominates Richard E. Lyng to succeed John Block as secretary of agriculture.

Civil Rights

- Jan. 22—The National Urban League issues a report that states that despite the fact that the economy has recovered, "economic inequity" between white and black people "is greater now than it has been at any time since 1970."

Economy

- Jan. 8—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate fell to 6.8 percent in December.
- In its largest ever 1-day drop, the New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average falls 39.10 points.
- Jan. 10—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.4 percent in December.
- Jan. 22—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) rose at a slow annual rate of 2.4 percent in the 4th quarter of 1985.
- Jan. 30—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for 1985 was a record \$148.5 billion; the deficit for December, 1985, was \$17.4 billion.
- The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.9 percent in December.
- Jan. 31—The Dow Jones industrial average of 30 blue chip stocks closes at a new record high of 1,570.99.

Foreign Policy

- (See also *Intl, Arms Control, Arab League; Afghanistan; Angola; Canada; Germany, West; Haiti; India; Italy; Libya; South Africa; U.S.S.R.*)
- Jan. 1—President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev address each other's nation in a 5-minute televised exchange of greetings.
- Jan. 3—In Mexicali, Mexico, President Reagan meets with Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid; the President says that the U.S. "remains ready and willing" to help Mexico carry its heavy burden of debt.
- Jan. 6—In an article published by the U.S. Naval Institute, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins notes that the Navy could use conventional weapons to destroy Soviet nuclear weapons in a conventional war, thereby altering "the nuclear equation" in favor of the U.S. before either side actually uses nuclear weapons.
- U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives meet in Hanoi for 2 days of talks on Americans missing in action (MIA's) in the Vietnam War.

Jan. 7—Calling Libya “a threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” President Reagan orders the severance of all U.S. economic ties with Libya; all Americans and American companies are to cease commercial dealings with Libya February 1; the President also orders all Americans in Libya (between 1,000 and 1,500) to leave immediately or “be subject to appropriate penalties upon their return to the U.S.” He asks countries friendly to the U.S. to “join us in isolating” Libya and its leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.

Jan. 8—In an executive order, President Reagan freezes all Libyan government assets in the U.S.

Jan. 9—At a news conference, Secretary of State George Shultz acknowledges that U.S. allies are not willing to join the U.S. in imposing sanctions on Libya.

Jan. 11—The State Department announces that an agreement with Greece was signed on January 7; under its terms, the U.S. will sell 40 F-16 fighters to Greece.

Jan. 12—The State Department announces that the Iranian navy has halted and searched an American ship, the *President Taylor*, in international waters near the Persian Gulf; the ship was allowed to proceed to its port after about 1 hour.

Jan. 13—The White House and the State Department say that the search of the *President Taylor* may have been justified under the “rules of naval warfare,” which traditionally accord a belligerent “certain rights” to search neutral shipping for contraband.

Jan. 14—President Reagan meets in the White House with Ecuadoran President León Febres Cordero.

Jan. 15—Secretary Shultz calls for the use of military force in reprisal against terrorism and says that we “cannot wait for absolute certainty and clarity” before using force.

Jan. 16—President Reagan says that the U.S. is “grateful” for Gorbachev’s new proposal for the elimination of nuclear weapons over a 15-year period; Gorbachev still insists that the U.S. must abandon its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

Jan. 17—The State Department says that Libyan-subsidized Libyan students in the U.S. will be allowed to continue to receive funds for their education.

Jan. 24—The U.S. Navy begins naval exercises north of Libya in “international waters and airspace,” which, it claims, include the Gulf of Sidra.

Jan. 29—Secretary Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger meet separately in Washington, D.C., with Angolan guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi, who has the support of South Africa.

Jan. 30—President Reagan says that if the February 7 Philippine elections are “credible” and if the ensuing government proves willing to make some basic reforms, the U.S. will consider “significantly larger” amounts of economic and military aid.

The State Department announces a cutback in aid to Haiti because of Haiti’s continuing human rights violations.

President Reagan meets with Savimbi in Washington, D.C.

Jan. 31—Administration sources confirm the indefinite postponement of the sale to Jordan of \$1.9-billion worth of air defense equipment, including 40 advanced fighter planes and mobile anti-aircraft weapons.

Labor and Industry

Jan. 20—Attempting to avoid default on some \$2.5 billion in debts, Eastern Airlines cuts flight attendants’ pay 20 percent and lengthens their working hours; the airline also plans to lay off some 1,000 attendants by February 4.

Jan. 21—The Treasury Department imposes a \$4.75-million civil penalty on the Bank of America for its failure to report

more than 17,000 cash deposits of over \$10,000 each between 1980 and 1985.

Legislation

Jan. 15—President Reagan signs a funding bill providing some \$320 million to enable South Carolina, Washington and Nevada to keep open the nation’s only authorized low-level nuclear waste dumps; the bill was passed before the 1st session of the 99th Congress adjourned.

Jan. 17—President Reagan vetoes a federal workers’ health benefit bill because the bill would increase the federal deficit by \$90 million.

Jan. 21—The second session of the 99th Congress convenes.

Politics

Jan. 4—Senator Gary Hart (D., Colo.) announces that he will not seek reelection for the Senate in 1986; it is expected that he will seek the Democratic presidential nomination for the 1988 election.

Science and Space

Jan. 18—The space shuttle *Columbia* lands in California after a day’s delay due to bad weather conditions at its intended Florida landing site; the shuttle was delayed in starting its mission 7 times for a variety of reasons.

Jan. 22—The *Voyager 2* spacecraft nears Uranus and transmits information of great scientific value, including the discovery of 14 moons orbiting the planet.

Jan. 28—The space shuttle *Challenger* explodes in a monstrous fireball 10 miles above the earth within 2 minutes of what appeared to be a normal takeoff. All 6 astronauts and civilian teacher Christa McAuliffe are lost. The U.S. has 3 remaining shuttles.

Jan. 29—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) begins an inquiry into the *Challenger* explosion.

Jan. 31—President and Mrs. Reagan attend a memorial service at the Johnson Space Center in Houston for the crew of the *Challenger*.

Supreme Court

Jan. 14—In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reverses a lower court ruling and declares that a convicted defendant who was indicted by a grand jury that unconstitutionally excluded members of his race is entitled to have his conviction reversed.

Jan. 21—In 2 cases, the Supreme Court rules 6 to 3 that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law is not violated by the negligence of state officials.

Jan. 22—In a 8-0 decision, the Court upholds a lower court ruling that the Federal Reserve Board has no authority to regulate or limit so-called limited-service banks.

VATICAN

Jan. 31—Pope John Paul II begins a 10-day visit to India.

VIETNAM

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 6—Tanyug, the official press agency, reports that Branko Mikulic has been chosen by the 8-member state presidency to succeed Milka Planinc as Prime Minister in May.

ZIMBABWE

Jan. 20—Visiting Iranian President Ali Khamenei refuses to attend a diplomatic dinner with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe’s Cabinet because of the presence of female Cabinet ministers at the head table. ■

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